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CHAPTER ONE 
IN'IRODUC TION 
It may well be wondered why it should be thought necessary 
or desirable to undertake now the review of an area of the 
law which was the subject of consideration and statutory 
modification a mere ten years ago. Had any change been 
necessary, it could have been accomprished then. In fact, 
the circumstances in which the Crimes Act was passed in 1961 
have altered subsequently in three ways which, in combination, 
call into question once more the purpose and bases of the 
whole doctrine. 
At present, the scope of the defence in New Zealand is 
", " 
succinctly stated by Section 169(1) of the Crimes Act, 1961 
which provides that 
"Culpable homicide which would otherwise be murder 
may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who 
caused the death did so under provocation". 
The remainder of the Section, and the succeeding one, deal with 
such matters as the definition of "provocation", the 
respective functions of judge and jury and one or two specific 
instances of what mayor may not constitute "provocation". 
One important practical point, which is often overlooked or 
obscured by the heat which debates on the subject seem to 
generate, is that the main effect of a finding of manslaughter 
upon provocation by the jury is to afford the trial judge a 
discretion as to sentence which, by virtue of Section 172 
of the Crimes Act, 1961, does not exist when the finding is 
one of murder. Apart from cases of homicide, the plea of 
provocation will not operate to change the character of the 
offence; but it is a matter which the presiding judge (or 
2. 
magistrate) must take into account in his consideration of 
sentence. 
What then has occurred since 1961 to suggest that the 
present law and its administratinn are in any sense unsat-
isfactory? To begin with, it would seem safe to say that 
the death penalty has now been itself permanently interred. 
Perverse though it may seem in a legal system which later 
countenanced the infliction of capital punishment for a vast 
number of offences, provocation was initially accorded formai 
recognition precisely to avoid the imposition of the death 
penalty. Throughout the course of this century, the retention 
of capital punishment has proved a constant source of debate. 1 
More important, when the present Crimes Act came before 
Parliament in Bill form in 1957, capital punishment was 
retained, but in the 1959 Bill, it had been abrogated. After 
considerable debate, and a free vote, the provisions of the 
1959 Bill preva iled, and the sentence for murder became 
mandatory life imprisonment. In other words, the provisions 
drawing the line between manslaughter and murder were drafted 
and enacted in an atmosphere of debate and uncertainty which 
must have had some effect on their content. 
Secondly, since 1961, some confusion has arisen as to 
the role of provocation in -the case of lesser offences, in 
particular in the case of attempted murder. 2 Although no 
1. For a summary of these events in New Zealand, see "New 
Zeal and: The Development of its Laws and Constitution", 
ed. J.L. Robson, 2nd ed o pp.382-3. 
2. See the decisions of Wilson J. in Smith [1964J N.Z.L.R. 834 
and tlcKee (1968) unreported. Supreme Court, Christchurch, 
23 July 1968. Per contra see Lag§. [1969] N.Z.L.R. 417. 
Bruzas [1972J Crim.L.R. 367. 
3. 
attempt will be made to deal with this problem, it is 
submitted that an analysis of the present law in homicide 
cases will shed incidental light on this area. 
Finally, there have been a number of reported cases 
dealing with the subject since its new treatment in the 
1961 legislation. These are intrinsically worthy of some 
lengthy analysis; the question whether the aspirations and 
hopes of those who framed the legislation have been achieved 
merits examination in the light of these cases. 
It may be as well to point out what this survey does 
not purport to do. No attempt will be made to assess the 
law in terms of sociology, psychology or physiology. 
Ultimately, these disciplines may unearth facts which show 
that the assumptions upon which the present law is based are 
ill-founded. But partly because so little is known in 
statistical terms about the circumstances in which provoked 
killings occur, why some but not others are moved to commit 
acts of homicidal violence, and partly because the law is in 
any case the product of the' values of those who create and 
administer it, it has been considered preferable to assess 
the law on its own terms of common sense, completeness and 
most importantly self-consistency in terms of the rationale. 
Where the application of ordinary language philosophy has been 
thought capable of pointing up inconsistencies and ambiguities, 
it has been utilised. 
Nor does this survey purport to be a complete statement 
of the present law relating to provocation. No attempt is 
made to either find or forge links between the different 
treatment afforded provocation in Sections 169-170, and 
4. 
Sections 48-50 although some ties may well exist. Indeed, 
Section 170, the presence of which in the Crimes Act 1961 
is explicable only in historical terms is not made the 
subject of examination at all. Nor is Section 169(7), 
whereas Section 169 (5) is accorded the most fleeting of 
references. 
Basically, then, this thesis holds itself out to be no 
more than a discursive analysis of some of the mre important 
and controversial areas of the law. In so far as it may be 
said to have any unifying theme at all, (and the pursuit of 
this is at best fitful and spasmodic), it is that the test 
which the law has chosen to palliate intentional killings, 
the anticipated reaction of a hypothetical ordinary' man, is 
one whose fulfillment is essentially a matter of opinion. For 
this reason, coupled with the fact that a successful plea 
mitigates but never excuses completely, it is better that 
the opinion of the jury should be sought more frequently than 
it is at present. It will be submitted that as the law stands 
at present, there is a very real danger that the judges may 
unintentionally, in a desire to achieve uniformity, usurp the 
very function which the jury is best suited to perform, 
namely, to keep the law in step with current social and moral 
attitudes and values. 
But the prosecution of this theme is very much a sub-
ordinate one, and the main purpose is to examine the law with 
a view to ascertaining why the distinction between provoked 
and non-provoked homicides is drawn. The somewhat limited 
framework within which this is undertaken must be mentioned. 
5. 
There have been suggestions recently that the distinction 
between murder and manslaughter should be abolished 
altogether, and that there should be one single, undivided 
offence, culpable homicide, to which no mandatory provision 
as to penalty is attached. One repercussion which the adoption 
. of this proposal would have, would be the abolition of the 
defence of provocation. This thesis will proceed on the 
assumption that, for a variety of reasons, these proposals 
will be found unacceptable. That being the case, the abolition 
of the defence of provocation could only work to the disadvan-
tage of persons charged with murder. This reason alone 
militates heavily in favour of retaining the doctrine, what-
ever its contemporary justification may be. In addition, 
there is nothing in the cases themselves to suggest that the 
distinction drawn by the law is totally unworkable, however 
much difficulty it gives rise to in individual cases. Thus 
although some features of the defence will be placed under the 
microscope for the purposes of rational justification, the 
thesis itself rests on something of an unproven basic 
premise, which is that nothing has as yet occurred to suggest 
that the historical rationale of the rule, that a provoked 
killing is less serious than a killing from motives or 
revenge or greed, no longer has any validity. 
This is subject to the exception, already mentioned, that 
the death penalty is no longer enacted in cases of murder. 
However, the law does still retain a mandatory penalty of 
life imprisonment for the most serious form of homicide. It 
may be that some would argue that the taking of the life of 
another, even under provocation, merits this penalty, and 
6. 
that the distinction should no longer be preserved. Value 
judgments of this sort cannot be contradicted other than in 
their own terms, and all that can be said is that, until such 
views become more widely held, they cannot form the basis of 
any argument for reform. 
Where comment is made about the rationale of the defence, 
or the various aspects of it such as the objective test, this 
is done, not so much to defend the doctrine from its reform-
minded attackers at either end of the spectrum, but to assist 
in an evaluation of the law on the terms previously referred 
to. 
Since the ra tiona Je of the doctrine is so much a matter 
of history, Chapter II will deal with its evolution, showing 
how it originated as a matter of historical accident and orly 
gradually acquired its modern justification. The Chapter 
will also show how, from about the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the law sought to impose limits as to what might or 
might not be provocation in a way which, in retrospect, makes 
the formulation of the reasonable man test seem almost inevit-
able. 
Chapter III also serves a dual purpose. It attempts 
first to state the law. This is not quite as simple a matter 
as might be supposed, because it is by no means clear that 
the concepts used such as "self-control", "provocation" and 
"the· ordinary man" have either settled "meanings" or functions. 
These questions are examined as the secondary purpose of the 
Chapter, and in their light, suggestions are made either as 
to what the law is, or where there seems to be room for 
dispute, should. be. 
Unfortunately, at least for purposes of tidy classificat-
ion, it is impossible to achieve these objects without 
trespassing on the subject matter of Chapter IV, which deals 
with the adjectival matters of the functions of judge and 
jury and the burden of proof. These questions, particularly 
the former, have a profound effect on the content of the 
substantive law. Despite this, they merit separate treatment, 
if only because of the interesting way in which the issues 
have·been handled at various stages in the history of the 
defence. Indeed, as has been mentioned, it will be suggested 
that if any area of the law is unsatisfactory, this is 
perhaps the most important one, and the one which most merits 
consideration for purposes of reform. 
CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORY 
8. 
In 1576, one Robi!l§.Q!1 became engaged in a sudden fighto 
His adversary fled, but Robinson, pausing for a moment to 
collect his staff, pursued his unfortunate victim and beat 
him to deatho He was charged with murder, but convicted of 
manslaughter only, because "tout fuit fait in un continuing 
furY",1 and the offence of manslaughter upon provocation was 
born.2 Earlier historians, in particular Stephen and Mait-
land,3 have assumed that this innovation occurred as a result 
of a slight shift in the boundaries between the long-distinct 
offences of murder and manslaughter. More recent researches 
indicate that the law relating to homicide was in a state of 
considerable uncertainty and change throughout the Tudor 
period, and that manslaughter, as a separate substantive 
offence, is a creature of the courts and legal writers of 
Elizabethan England.. Thus, although the formal recognition 
-----~"~""-"~-~"------------------------
1. The writer is heavilymdebted to an article by J.M. Kaye 
for some of the information contained in the earlier part 
of this chapter. See his "The Early History of Murder 
and Manslaughter" (1967) 83 L.QoR. 365. The passage 
quoted is from Crompton~ Lioffice et aucthoritie de 
Justices de Peace (1587), fo o24a. 
2. Stephen, 3 H.CoL. 87, states without giving examples, that 
some of the cases dealing with provocation, "especially 
in the early part of the sixteenth century, were decided 
by the full Court upon special verdicts". This is probably 
a slip of the pen as he has elsewhere noted that "The law 
as to the effect of provocation is traceable as far back 
as Coke but not much further". General View, 2nd ed. 141. 
The Third Institute was completed in 1628, although not 
published until 1641. 
3 0 3 H.CoLo 43-44; Maitland, "The Early History of Malice 
Aforethought" (1883) Collected Papers, Volo!, 3040 
9. 
of a provocative incident as a mitigating factor certainly 
marked a departure from the earlier law, it was less radical 
a step than Stephen and Maitland have suggested. 
Probably the major solvent in this state of flux was the 
gradual withdrawal of benefit of clergy from various types of 
culpable homicide,4 and in particular a Statute enacted in 
1531 withdrawing clergy from "any wylfull murder of malyce 
prepensed". 5 Homicide had for the first ti1Ie been made the 
subject of statutory enactment in 1390. 6 For some time before 
the passing of the Statute, the Commons had been displeased 
at the ease with which the Crown granted pardons in the case 
of felony, and in 1390 presented a petition against the 
practice. The response .cf the Crown took the form of a 
Statute 7 which provided that, for the future, no pardo.n was 
to be allowed for, inter alia, "Murdre, Mort dlrome occis par 
agait, assaut, ou malice prepense", u..I'lless the particular 
crime pardoned was mentioned in the charter itself, and 
justices had satisfied themselves that the homicide which had 
occurred did not fall within one of the named categories. 
According to Maitland, the effect of the Statute was that 
a killing was termed "murder" whenever it was committed by 
stealth, ambush or by "assaut", (which he dismisses as a 
"rather wider" version of ambush). If this is so, it would 
4. See Holt, C.J9 in Mawgridge (1706) Kel ol19, 121.84 
EoR. 1107, 1108. 
5. 23 Hen,,8, col .. (1531) This was the culmination of a 
series of Statutes, of an irl:creasingly comprehensive 
nature, withdrawing clergy from homicide. 
6. Stephen, 3 H.CoL. 44, asserts that this may be regarded as 
an "indirect •• 0 definition", but this is really something 
of a misdescription. 
7Q 13 Rich.2, s.2, c.1. 
10 .. 
mean that the definition of murder by specification of 
circumstances was, even at the time of the passage of the 
Statute, anachronistic, because all three were in any case 
subsumed under the general rubric of "malice prepense", an 
expression which Maitland translated literally to mean pre-
meditation or pre-conceived ill-will. 
At that time, only two kinds of 'killing were regarded 
as non-culpable, namely where death occurred se defendendo or 
per infortuniu~. Maitland assumes that there was a residuary 
group of homicides, cases in which no malice could be shown, 
which must be presumed to have remained pardonable as before, 
and it was this group which later became known as manslaughter 
or chance medley. 
Kaye~s disagreement with this thesis is largely one of 
emphasis 0 To begin with, he stresses the fact that, for a 
considerable~ period after 1390, all culpable homicide was 
equally capital. There was thus no reason why the judges 
should attempt to divide one kind of culpable homicide from 
anothero The important dividing line was that which marked 
off culpable homicides from those covered by such defences 
as self-defence and misadventure. He argues that it was this 
area of the law which remained the focal point of the judges' 
attention until the first half of the sixteenth century, and 
the judges continued to regard culpable homicide as a single 
undivided offence. 8 
-------=~----------------------------------------------------------
8. Stephen, who agrees with Maitland, does note that the 
distinction between his residuary category and murder was 
one without effective difference in that all homicide, 
llriless it W,g s committed se defendendo or TB:' iriortunillm 
was punishable with death and within benefit of clergy. 
The significant fact, it is submitted, is that manslallghter 
upon provocation was in fact evolved at a time when 
manslaughter generally was a new concepto 
Secondly, Kaye maintains that "malice prepense", as used 
in the Statute, did not have reference to a state of mind, or 
a preconceived plan of any sort, but: was simply a shorthand 
form of referring to those homicides which did not fall within 
one of the two accepted categories of excuse. 
B) Manslaughter UDon a sudden encounter: 
According to Kaye, this position persisted almost 
unchanged until the turn of the sixteenth century. By that 
time, "murder" was almost invariably quaLified as being 
committed "upon malice aforethought", but in none of the 
statutes in "which it appears does Parliament attempt to define 
it.. Kaye asserts that if it had acquired any positive meaning 
at all, it could best: be translated as "wickedly" or "delib-
erately", and was probably used in this sense by Parliament 
in the 1531 Statute. At all events, it may be safely concluded 
that the expression was of little or no definitional 
significance. 
At the same time, writers were beginning to note distinct ... 
ions within culpable homicide, referring to the lesser form 
indifferently as manslaughter or chance medley. But the 
references are so brief and imprecise that it is impossible to 
ascertain what the real point of those distinctions was. For 
example, an early manual for justices of the peace says that 
"manslaughter is where two men or mo meet and by 
chance medley they fal at affray so that one of 
them sleeth another (this) is but felonye in hym 
self •••• " 9 
It is not clear from this whether any killing, even a 
-----------~------.------------
9. The Boke of Iustyces of the Peas (1510) at fo.4 alb 15. 
12. 
deliberate one, would be excused simply because it took place 
in the course of such a fight, or whether there had to be 
other extenuating circumstances such CE that the killing 
occurred by accident or under provocation Q Similar co~~ents 
may be made of Fitzherbert's account of the law, which was 
written, significantly enough, shortly after the 1531 Statute. 
" ••• and so appereth ye diversitie between Murder 
and Manslaughter of which the one cometh by malyce 
prepensed and the other but by chaunce. II 10 
These references do indicate that the withdrawal of clergy had 
a fairly immediate impact on the development of the substantive 
law, and that the judges were reluctant to sentence to death 
all persons guilty of culpable homicide. But it was not until 
the middle of the sixteenth century that the law began to 
precipitate into firm general principles. 
In HerbertRs case 11 the Courts struck a surprisingly modern 
note o Herbert and a number of his followers went to the house 
of Sir Richard Mansfield with the intention of starting a 
fight with its occupants, but without intending'to cause 
death. Whilst they were milling aronnd outside, a woman (WLLO 
may have been a member of the household, or simply a passer-
by), a ttemp ted to intervene. One member of Herbert r s party 
threw a rock at her, which struck her on the head and killed 
her. On one point at least, the Court was unanimous; if the 
woman was a member of the household, and was thus within the 
contemplation of the parties from the outset of the venture, 
the verdict would be one of murder on the basis that the 
10. New Boke of Justices of the Peace. Published by Berthelet 
(1544) p.cxxiiia o The work was first published in 1537. 
11. (1558) Dyer 128b; 73,E.R. 279 0 
13. 
killing took place in the course of an unlawful act of 
violence directed at the person slain, or at the group of 
which she Was a member. At issue was the liability of a 
person killing by accident in the course of an unlawful act 
of violence directed at someone other than the person actually 
slain. Had the act been lawful, (a possitility which was not 
even canvassed by the Court) the killing would have been 
per infortunium. In the event, the judges were divided over 
the question of fact as to the status of the woman as a member 
of the household, a.nd the end result of the case is not known o 
But some principles do emerge from the examples given in the 
case; a killing was committed with malice prepense and was 
murder either where there was a deliberate application of 
force to the person of another, however spontaneously the intent 
was formed, or where the killing occurred accidentally in the 
course of an unlawful act of violence which was directed at 
the party slain. 
Had these principles become established and been applied 
consistently, it is doubtful whether the doctrine of provocat-
ion would ever have seen the light of dayo However, shortly 
before the decision in Herbert, the case of Salisburv12 had 
been decided. A group of men had conspired to ambush and kill 
a Doctor Ellis. Their plan failed to the extent that they 
succeeded in killing, not Ellis but one of his servants, 
_whether by mistake or in the ensuing fracas cannot be ascertain'" 
ed from the Report. Salisbury was the servant of one of the 
----------------------------------------------------~---~.---.------
·12. (1553) Plowd. Commo fo o 100; 75 EaR. 157. Kaye~ accounts 
for the fact that the case was not mentioned in Herbert 
~ 
by pointing out that it was an assise case tried be~ore 
a Court of-entLrely dLfferent composLtLon, and WOULQ not 
have become widely known until the appearance of the 
Commentaries in 1571 0 
14 .. 
conspirators~ and although he was in thevicinity~ he had not 
been apprised of their plans o However, the Report tells us 
that 
"when he saw them fighting together he suddenly took 
part with them, having no malice prepense~ and with 
them wounded the man who subsequently died"-. 
Along with the others, Salisbury was indicted for murder, and 
in the course of the trial~ the jury asked whether, if the 
facts were as Salisbury maintained~ he was guilty of murder 
or manslaughter only. The ruling given was that 
"si John Vane Salisbury navait malice. prepense, 
coe est manslaughter en luy et nemy murder, pur 
coe qa il navoit malice prepense". 
Had the case proceeded on the principles which were subsequently 
expounded in Herbert, a conviction for murder would have been 
proper on the basis that Salisbury took part in an unlawful 
act13 of violence directed at the party slain. Instead~ the 
Court interpreted the expression "malice prepense" literally, 
to mean a preconceived plan to killo Because, it appeared that, 
as far as Salisbury was concerned" the quarrel.was a sudden 
one~ the verdict was manslaughter only. 
It was this case which was fastened on by later writers 
such as Crompton and Lambarde to support their proposition that 
any killing, provided that it took place in the course of a 
sudden encounter, should be no more than manslaughter. Whereas 
previously, the cou.r.ts had concentrated on the question whether 
the killing itself occurred by accident, they now turned their 
attention to the circumstances in which the parties met, and 
13. This would have necessitated an inquiry into whether 
Salisbury thought himself to be defending his master 
from an unLawful attack. The view actually taken by 
the Court rendered such an inquiry redundant. 
15. 
Rob.inson"s case,14 in which the parties had become engaged 
in a sudden fight, was in effect a straightforward application 
of the sudden encounter rule. Even so, the remark about 
"continuing fury" is evidence that the Courts were almost 
immediately attempting to rationalise the sudden encounter 
rule, and had already begun to formulate the doctrine which 
was so drastically to reduce its scope. 
According to Kaye 15 some difficulty was experienced in 
applying the new rule, particularly where there was some 
prior animosity between the parties, or where the killing 
occurred some time after their initial encounter. The 
rationa~ given by the commentators such as Crompton and 
Lambarde for the manslaughter concept was that it was a 
bearing with the infLrmity of human nature. 
C) ~slaughter Upon Provocation: 
The bridge between the sudden encounter doctrine and 
modern notions of provocation is to be found in the concept 
of implied malice, the role of which is very clearly explained 
by Haleo 16 
"When one voluntarily kills another without any 
provocation, it is murder, for the law presumes 
it to be malicious, and that he is hostis humani 
generis; it remains therefore to be inquired, what 
is such a provocation, as will take off the 
presumption of malice in him that kills anothero" 
It was quickly realised that a.n extension of the sudden 
encounter rule to all cases of culpable homicide would have 
14. Supra n.l. 
15 0 op.cit., 590. 
16. 1 Hale p.C., 455. 
proved undesirable as a matter of policy. But instead of 
providing tha t in such si tua tions, no rna lice in the Salisbury 
sense was required, the Courts resorted instead to the fiction 
of implied malice. 
In ~bertts case, it was accepted that if a killing 
occurred in the course of an unlawful act directed at the 
party slain, the malice aforethought of murder had been estab-
lished. This rule was retained, even after Salisbury, and even 
17 
extended shortly afterwards in the case of Saunders, in 
which the principle of transferred malice was enunciated, with 
the result that the requirement tha t the act be aimed at the 
victim was abandoned. 18 It was also decided in Young's case 
that if the victim of the killing was an officer of the p·eace 
acting in the execution of his duty, the case was murder 
"though the murderer knew not the party slain and 
glthough the affray was suddeg". 
In both of these cases, the rationalisation given was that the 
1 "1" 1" 19 aw Lmp Les rna Lce o 
MOre important for present purposes is the fact that, 
very little time elapsed after the appearance of Plowdenis 
Commentaries before the same device was being applied where 
a man was slain without provocation. In his Institutes, 
Coke writes simply that 
17. (1573) Plowd. Comm. fo.473-476; 75 E.R. 706. 
18. (1586) 4 Co.Rep. 40a.; 76 EoR. 984. 
19. It is central to Kaye 1t s thesis that "cases of ttis kind 
were not later exceptions to a long established rule 
requiring premeditation, but were simply instances of 
the old pre-sixteenth century law of murder which, for 
policy reasons, were permitted to survive the change in 
the definition of the crime generally". opocit., 370. 
17. 
"Malyce implyed is in three cases: first in respect 
of 1he manner of. the deed. As if one killeth another 
without any provocation of 1he part of him, that is 
slain, the law implieth malice". 20 
It is not entirely clear how this rule developed, but it may 
have been through an extension of the rule that, where a man 
made a sudden attack upon another, catching him off his guard, 
he was guilty of murder despite the absence of premeditation .. 21 
A situation of this sort, in which there was also a slight 
element of provocation occurred in Watts v. Brain. 22 The 
evidence given on an appeal of murder brought by the wife of 
the deceased was that, on the two days preceding the fatality, 
the defendant and the deceased had come to blows. The 
defendant claimed that, on the day in question, the deceased 
had passed his butchers shop and "smiled upon him and wryed 
his mouth at him", whe.reupon the defendant immediately took 
up a knife, chased his victim and struck him from behind on 
the calf of the leg, killing him. Croke who was a member of 
the Court, reports that this was held to be murder 
"for it shall be presumed to be malice precedent; 
and that such a slight provocation was not 
sufficient ground or pretence for a quarrel". 
Subsequent writers, in treating this case, have emphasised 
the lack of gravity of the provocative incident as the 
decisive factor in the reasoning of the Court. 23 What is less 
clear is the reason why malice was implied at all. It is 
20. Vol. 3 Co.Inst. 51. 
21. Burchet (1574) Crompton fOe 22b. 
22. (1600) Cro.Eliz.778; 78 E.R. 1009. Also reported sub. 
nom. Watts v. Byrne Noy 171; 74 E.R. 1129. 
23. 1 Hale P.C., 455. And see Holt C.J. in Mawgridge (1706) 
Kel. 119, 131; 84 E.R. 1112. 
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submitted that there is considerable merit in Kaye is argument 
that the real reason for the implication of malice was not 
that there had been a sudden killing without adequate provocat-
ion but that the deceased had been caught off his gUard,24 
especially in the light of the so-called Statute of Stabbing25 
passed only four years after the decision. According to its 
preamble, this measure was enacted liTo end ••• ·stabbing and 
killing men on the suddenllo To effect this worthy end, it 
was provided that 
"Every person ••• which ••• shall stab or thrust any 
person or persons that hath not then any weapon 
drawn, or that that not then first stricken the 
party, which shall so stab or thrust so as the person 
so stabbed or thrust shall thereof die witHn the 
space of six months then next following, although it 
cannot be proved that the same was done of malice 
aforethought, ••• shall be excluded from the benefit 
of his clergy, and suffer death as in the case of 
Viilfu1 murder." 
If Watts v. Brain were authority for the more general proposit-
ion that, in every case of a sudden killing, the 1aww..11 imply 
malice, there would have been little need for the Statut~ to 
single out two specific instances in which proof was unnecessary. 
Further, it is impossible to suppose that the Court found the 
requisite malice in the prior disagreements of the parties; 
again, there would have been no need for any presumption at 
all. 
The extension may well have been the .resu1t of Cokets 
own influence on the development of the law. As authority 
for the proposition, he cites dicta from his own report of 
24. Op.cit., 590-591. 
25. 2 Jac.l, c.8. 
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Mackallye's case,26 and there are indications that not all 
were prepared to share his views before he wrote. For example 
27 in Roylev's case, decided the year after Mackallye, the 
father of a boy who had been 'beaten in a fight, upon being 
informed of the incident by his son, took up a "little cudgel", 
ran the distance of a mile and struck his sonis opponent, 
killing him. The Court, of which Coke was not a member, 
resolved that the offence was manslaughter only, because the 
killing had occurred on a "sudden occa sio,n", and because there 
was no prior malice, 
"and will not presume it to be upon any former 
malice unless it be found". 
The case is also reported by Coke himself,28 but the passage 
cited does not appear in his account. Stephen comments 29 that 
Coke does not seem to have seen the importance of the case, 
and makes no mention of it in his Institute, but it would 
seem at least equally possible that Coke was fully aware of 
its importance, but omitted it because it was at variance with 
the point of view which he was concerned to advance. Be tha t 
as it may, his assertions eventually carried the day, and 
26. (1611) 9 Co.Rep. 61.b; 77 E.R. 824, where he said that, 
"If one kills another without provocation, and without any 
malice prepense, which can be proved, the law adjudges it 
murder, and implies malice: for by the law of God every-
one ought to be in love and charity with all men, and 
therefore when he kills one w.t:hout provocation, the law 
implies malice: and .... they may be indicted generally, 
that they killed of malice prepense, for malice implied 
by law, given in evidence is sufficient to maintain the 
general indictment". fo.67. b.; 77 E.R. 833. 
27. (1612) Cro. Jac.296; 79 E.R. 245. 
28. 12 Co.Rep. 87; 77 E.R. 1364. 
28. 3 H.C.L. 59. 
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subsequently, whenever a killing was proved to have occurred 
upon the sudden, there was a prima facie presumption that the 
killing occurred with that degree of malice necessary to sustain 
a conviction of murder. It was then for the accused to show, 
where he was permitted to do so, that he had acted without 
malice because of provocation. 
Although Stephen asserts that the presumption of malice 
. 30 
was initially one of fact only, and later became one of law, 
(and would then apply even where the absence of premeditation 
was conclusively proved), it is submitted that this account 
is an oversimplification, and ascribes to the law of the day 
a degree of sophistication to which it did not at the time 
aspire. Rather, the status of the presumption was a product 
of the view which was then taken as to the respective functions 
of the judge and jury. Although there was no actual authority 
on the point, it would seem that it was always open to a jury 
to return a general verdict of either murder of manslaughter. 31 
But reported cases in which this procedure was adopted are 
the exception rather than the rule, and in a large majority of 
the earliest reported cases, a special verdict was returned. 32 
30. 
31. 
32. 
3 H.C.L. 63; without citing any authority. 
Oneby (1727) 2 Ld.Raym. 1485, 1494; 92 E.R. 465, 470. 
Herbert (1558) Dyer 128b; 73 E.R. 279. Sali~burr (1553) 
Plowd. Comm.fo. 100; 75 E.R. 157. Mackallye 161) 9 Co. 
Rep. 61.b.; 77 E.R. 824. Roylev Cro.Jac. 296; 79 E.R. 
254. Holloway (1628) ero.Car. 131; 79 EoR. 715. Williams 
(1639) Jones W. 432; 82 E.R. 227. The Protector v. 
Buckner (1655) St. 466; 82 E.R. 867. Huggett (1666) Kel. 
59; 84 E.R. 1082. Thomson (1667) Kel. 66; 84 E.R. 1085. 
Grey (1666) Kelo 13~84 E.R. 1113. Maddy (1672) T. Raym. 
212; 83 E.R. 112 (sub.nom.) Manning. 
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Even in those few cases in which the issue was determined by 
the jury, the directions given were usually quite specific; 
for example in Watts v. Bra in, 33 the Court "delivered the law 
to the jury, that it was murder". And in one case of 
particular importance, Lord MOrley's case,34 which established 
the rule that words alone could not amount to provocation, 
the law was established by all the judges of England, who had 
met, two days prior to the trial of Lord MOrley by his peers, 
to consider such points of law as were expected to arise in 
the course of the trial. 
The first case to deal expressly with the separate issues 
involved, viz. the occurrence of the circumstances constituting 
the alleged provocative incident, as distinct from their legal 
efficacy, did not occur until 1666. Kelyng's Report of the 
ca se notes rather tersely that it appeared upon the evidence 
that the accused had killed his victim without provocation. 
Kelyng, who was the trial judge then directed the jury that the 
case was murder, because the law implied malice; although they 
were the judges of fact, their task as _such was limited to 
saying whether or not it was the accused who had done the 
killing, 
"but whether it was murder or manslaughter, that was 
a matter in law, in which they were to observe the 
direction of the Court". 35 
A rather more detailed exposition of the law was under-
taken by the Court in oneby,36,which shows~ry clearly how 
-----
33. Supra n.22. 
34. MOrley (1666) 6 St.Tr. 769. 
35. Hoog (1666) Kel. 50; 84 E.R. 1077. Even after this stern 
injunction, the jury were reluctant to find the accused 
guilty of murder, and were fined and imprisoned for their 
recalcitrance. 
36. (1727) 2 Ld. Raym. 1485, 1494, 92 E.R. 465, 470. 
22. 
little latitude was allowed to juries to decide whether the 
presumption of malice had been cast off. It was stated that 
it was for the judge to tell the jury that, if they believed 
the evidence of a particular witness or witnesses, the malice, 
express or implied, had or had not been established, and the 
proper verdict was murder or manslaughter as the case may be. 
Where the jury declined to find a general verdict, it was for 
the Courts to rule on the question of malice in the light of 
the facts found. It is thus submitted that there is no 
authority for the view that the presumption of malice was 
ever one of fact alone, and that all the indications are that, 
in so far as the question arose at all, it was probably more 
akin to a presumption of law. The importance of the point is 
that once it had been established that it was for the law to 
say what was such a provocation as would cast off the presumpt-
ion of malice, the way had been cleared for the Courts to 
develop the law of provocation in a recognisably modern form .. 
D) Sufficiency: the Evolution of the Reasonable Man Test: 
One feature of the modern law which has been SUbjected 
to a considerable amount of criticism37 is the rule, first 
enunciated in Welsh,38 that in order to constitute "legal" 
provocation, the provocative incident must have been such that 
an "ordinary" or "reasonable" man would have reacted to it in 
the same way as the accused did. It is submitted that, by 
comparison with the law which preceded it, the reduction 
-----------------~-----------"--.~----
37. E.g. Edwards; "Provocation and the Reasonable Manti [1954J 
Crim.L.R. 898. And see post p.64. 
38. (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336. 
23. 
of the question of sufficiency to one over-riding test removed 
some elements of capriciousness from the law, and at least 
paved the way for a more realistic assessment of the amount of 
tormenting which "human frailty" may be expected to withsand. 39 
In the earliest cases, the Courts did not articulate 
any general criteria according to which they would decide 
whether or not the provocation offered was sufficient to 
reduce a killing to manslaughter. Coke does not allude to the 
issue directly, and according to Turner, 
"Neither in Hale nor in Foster is there anything to 
suggest that the Courts were consciously applying 
anything like the modern test of an affront such 
as would be likely to cause an 'ordinaryU or 
'reasonable ll man to lose control of himself". 40 
This comment is, however, somewhat misleading in its suggestion 
that there were actually no objective criteria at all, and that 
the defence would automatically operate whenever the accused 
actually lost his self-control. 41 In fact, although opinions 
as to what constitutes sufficiency may have varied throughout 
succeeding centuries, objective limitations (in the sense that 
the accused was expected to have exercised some degree of 
self-restraint) have been secured as part of the law, in a 
variety of guises, almost since Robinson was decided. That the 
39. This is not of course to argue in favour of retaining an 
objective test, nor to deny that the formulation of the 
objective requirements in terms of the "reasonableu man 
brought with it further difficulties. 
40. Russell; 12th ed. 533-537. 
41. See E.g. Brown, "The Subjective Element In Provocation" 
(1959) .Malaya L.R. 288, 29'1, where it is said that "Hale 
and Foster considered that fulfilment of the subjective 
test alone was enough to ensure the successful operation 
of the defence". If by "subjective test", Brown means 
actual 106s of self-control only, it is submitted that 
this opinion cannot be supported. 
24. 
Courts were endeavouring to draw some boundaries to exclude 
the merely bad tempered is evident in Foster's remark that 
" ••• the outrage is considered as flowing rather from 
brutal rage or diabolical malignity than from human 
frailty; and it is to human frailty, and to that alone, 
the law indulgeth in every case of felonious homicide". 42 
If this is not the overt expression of a "reasonable man" test, 
it is at least an indication that some tension was felt to 
exist between subjective and objective tests. 
It is not really surprising that the Courts should have 
felt it necessary to restrict the scope of the defence by 
imposing objective conditions when it is recalled that, 
whereas the penalty for murder was death, punishment for 
manslaughter was, until 1822,43 imprisonment for one year only. 
Initially, the Courts reaction to this conflict was typically 
pragmatic; each case was decided on its merits as it arose, 
according to common sense but broadly retributive criteria.44 
Explanations as to why particular incidents should be 
sufficient or otherwise to cast off the presumption of malice 
were neither called for nor proffered. Before long, a number of 
fairly detailed and specific rules had emerged, categorised 
according to the circumstances in which the actus reus had 
taken place, and in particular according to the nature of the 
provocative incident which had precipitated the killing. 
45 Although it was decided in Huggett that 
--------------------=-----------~~-.~.-¥----------------------
42. Foster; 292. 
43. Geo.4, c.38, made the offence punishable by transportation 
for any period up to life, or by imprisonment with ,or 
without hard labour for three years, or by an indeterminate 
fine at the discretion of the Court. 
44. Of the sort to which Hart refers in connection with the 
modern judge's view as to his role in the sentencing 
process. See Punishment and Responsibility "Punishment 
and the Elimination of Responsibility", 158, 168. 
45. (1666) Kel. 59; 84 E.R. 1082. 
"such a provocation as must take of f the killing of 
a man from murder.to be but manslaughter, must be 
some actua 1 vio lence, or actua 1 striving Wi:h, or 
striking one another", 
25. 
in very few of the earliest cases does the incident take the 
form of a straightforward assault. In consonance with that 
46 
rule, it had already been decided that mere gestures, words 
1 47 h b k" f . 48 d l' 49 a one, t e rea Lng 0 a prOffiLse, an stea Lng were 
insufficient, but the sight of one's friend in a fight,50 the 
assault of one's son,51 or unlawful imprisonment of either 
oneself or another,52might be. 
It was then in the form of such all or nothing rules that 
the first efforts at determining questions of sUfficiency were 
cast. As the law stood, no real attempt could be made to 
evaluate the gravity of the provocative incident once it had 
been found to fail literally within the terms of one of the 
established categories. In Dmgerfield, 53 in which the alleged 
incident took the form of scurrilous words alone, the defendant 
was duly convicted, (although the restrictions of Huggett 
seem to have been forgotten or ignored in Maddy, where the 
incident relied on was the sight of the victim committing 
adultery with Maddy's wife). 
46. Watts v. Brain (supra n.22.) 
47. Lord MOrl~ (1666) 6 St.Tr. 769. 
48. Clement v. Blunt (1625) 2 Roll.Rep. 460; 81 E.R. 916. 
49. Holloway (1628) Cro.Car. 131; 82 E.R. 105. Jones W. 196; 
79 E.R. 715. 
50. Anon (1611) 12 Co.Rep.87; 77 E.R. 1364. 
51. Royley (1612) Cro.Jac. 296; 79 E.R. 245. 
52. Huggett (1666) Kel.59; 84 E.R. 1082. And see The Prdector 
v. Buckner (1655) Sty. 466; 82 E.R. 867. 
53. (1685) 3 MOd.R. 68; 87 E.R. 43. 
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Once the standards had been set by these earlier cases, 
such development of new rules as there was tended to proceed 
by analogy, and from about the middle of the seventeenth 
century, there was constant reference to them for the purposes 
of comparison. If the established rules seemed to be too un-
compromising, their effect could sometimes be overcome by 
permitting the accused relief under some other rule. Thus 
if particularly provocative words were accompanied by even the 
most technical of assaults, they were taken outside the 
operation of the rule established in MOrley's case54 that words 
alone could not be a sufficient provocation. 
For more than a century, the Courts avoided confronting 
the problem of sufficiency squarely. But there remained the 
logical problem of reconciling a verdict of murder with Coke's 
rule, which was phrased in such a way as to suggest that 
malice would be implied in the case of a sudden killing only 
where there was no provocation at all. Disquiet was particularly 
likely to be felt in cases where the alleged incident fell 
technically within the terms of one of the established rules, 
but which was in itself comparatively trifling. This troubling 
issue seems to have come to something of a head in two cases 
decided in the early years of the eighteenth century. Their 
significance is not so much in the law propounded in them,' 
since there is little reference to them in the subsequent cases. 
54. Stedman (1704) Reported in Foster 292; Reason and Tranter 
TI722) 1 Str. 499; 93 E.R. 659. This practice persisted 
throughout later years, and perhaps the most striking 
illustration of the artificialities into which it lead 
may be found in the case of Smith (1865) 4 F.&F. 1066, in 
which a wife, having tormented her husband with her 
adultery, and the superiority of her lover, then spat at 
him. The spitting was held to be an assault, (whether the 
spittle actually hit him or not), and the plea of provocat-
ion succeeded. 
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What they do demonstrate, it is submitted, is a hardening in 
attitude of the Courts towards persons killing in hot blood, 
an attitude which is reflected in the works of Foster, Hale 
and East. 
In the first, Mawgridge,55 who was a guest of his victim 
Cope, caused a quarrel by abusing a woman fellow guest. When 
he refused upon request to desist, Cope then asked him to 
leave, whereupon he picked up a full bottle of wine and threw 
it at Cope, striking him on the head. Cope retaliated in kind, 
and Mawgridge, almost simultaneously drew a sword and delivered 
the fatal blow. None of the argument advanced on the special 
verdict is reported, but it would appear that one of the 
points taken was that, in returning the bottle thrown at him, 
Cope had himself commocted an assault, and had thus provoked 
Mawgridge. Had the case proceeded according to well-established 
principles, this argument would have succeeded, since, although 
there had been a sudden killing, it had not occurred without 
provocation, and malice could not therefore be implied. It 
was held, however, that because of the circumstances surrounding 
the killing, Mawgridge had demonstrated express malice. 
"When a man attacks another with a dangerous weapon 
without provocation; that is express malice from the 
nature of the act which is cruel." 56 
Because by his actions, Mawgridge had demonstrated express 
malice, Cope, in returning the bottle, was acting in self-
------------------------------------------------------------------
55. (1706) Ke1.119; 84 EoR. 1107. According to Stephen, 
3 H.C.L. 68, this case was actually reported by Holt 
himself, and simply appended to Kelyng1s ReportsQ 
Turner describes Holt1s decision in Mawgridge as a "tangle 
of conceptions", and notes tha tit is dif ficul t to see 
upon what principles he decides the question of when 
provocation may be pleadedo Russell 518, 12th ed. 
56. ib. 129; 1112. 
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defence and lawfully, and this could not amount to provocation. 
57 In Oneby, Oounsel for the accused argued that Mawgridge's 
~ "carried murder further than it had ever been carried 
before". This seems to have been the case in two respects. 
Whereas Coke used the expression "malice" to denote a pre-
conceived intention to kill or cause bodily harm, Lord Holt 
interprets it to include not only intention, but also the fact 
that the killing was unaccompanied by circumstances of excuse 
and was "wicked"; malice in the natural sense of the word. He 
is thus forced to explain the rule that malice is implied in 
the case of the killing of a peace officer acting in the 
execution of his duty by saying that "properly and naturally 
it was not malice, for his design was only to defend himself 
from arrest",58 a design which presumably is understandable, 
and does not proceed from diabolical malignity. In fact, the 
reason why it was necessary to imply malice in such circum-
stances originally was simply that the requisite degree of 
forethought was rarely if ever present in cases where a peace 
officer was killed, and had nothing to do with the meaning of 
"malice". Such cases almost invariably occurred "on the sudden", 
and would have amounted to manslaughter only under the Salisbury 
rule59 unless malice were implied. But despite the fact that 
Lord Holt may not have been able to reconcile his version of 
malice with the earlier law, the fact that this had undergone 
irrevocable change is clearly illustrated by Lord Raymond's 
57. (1727) 2 Ld. Raym. 1485; 92 E.R. 465. 2 Str. 766; 93 E.R. 
835. 
58. Kel. 130; 84 E.R.1112. 
59. As to which see supra p. 13. 
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statement in Oneby itself that 
"In common acceptation, malice is took to be a 
settled anger (which requires some length of time) 
in one person against another, and a desire of 
revenge. But in legal acceptation, it imports a 
wickedness, which includes a circumstance attending 
an act, that cuts off all excuse." 60 
A second extension of the law in Mawgridge is the view 
there taken that express malice can be gathered from the nature 
of the act itself. As authority for this proposition, Lad 
. 61 Holt cites HollowayVs case. There, the warden of a park ~ 
had discovered a boy i.ri a tree stealing pears. When the boy 
descended, as hewas ordered to do, Holloway tied him to a 
horse, which ran away, breakingfue boy~s shoulder and killing 
him. Lord Holt argues tha t mal ice wa s held to be present 
because the act was a particularly cruel one o But in neither 
of the two reports of the case cited is there any reference 
62 to express malice. Indeed, in PalmerstonUs Report, it is 
stated that the case was adjudged murder but that the "Court 
63 
ne declara les reasons overtment", and in- Croke's Report, 
the case is said.to have been based upon implied malice, "he 
having done it to one who made no resistance". The point that 
express malice could not be inferred from the nature of the 
60 0 2 Ld. Raym. 1485, 1487; 92 E.R. 465, 467. 
61. (1628) Cro.Caro 131; 79 E.R. 715. 
62. Palm 545; 81 E.R. 1213. 
63. Supra n.61o As is the case with Watts v. Brain (discussed 
supra pp.17-18), the probable reason for the implication of 
malice in the first place was not that there had bean a 
sudden killing without sufficient provocation, as Lord 
Holt assumes, but simply as a variant of the rule that the 
victim had been caught off his guard. 
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act was taken by the Court in Oneby, where it is stated that 
Mawgridge is really based on implied malice~ the malice being 
implied from the nature of the first act, i.e. throwing the 
bottleo 
The facts of Onebv are not unlike those of Mawgridge. 
Accused and a number of others were playing at dice in a tavern 
when one Gower offered to stake half-pence when the others were 
playing for half-crowns. After an exchange of angry words, 
Oneby threw a bottle at Gower, hitting him on the perriwig, 
and Gower returned an object which missed its mark entirely. 
After an hour or so, Gower made an apology which Oneby refused 
to accept saying "no, damn you, It 11 have your blood". As the 
group was leaving the tavern, Oneby recalled Gower, the door 
to the room was closed, and a clashing of swords was heard. 
Oneby received three cuts, but Gower was killed, although he 
acknowledged tha t "he had received his wounds in a manner 
among swordsmen called fair". The Court distinguished 
Mawgridge, which it said had really been decided on the basis 
of implied malice. However, it ruled that in using the words 
that he did in refusing to be reconciled, Oneby himself had 
demonstrated express malice, and the case was therefore 
stronger than Mawgridge. 
One factor affecting the turpitude of Onebyts actions, 
and hence the malice displayed by him, was the length of time 
which elapsed between Gower's initial provocation (if such it 
could really be called), and the ultimate killing. Counsel 
for Oneby sought to evade the difficult,ies which this posed 
by arguing that the law had set no limits on the duration of a 
man 1 s passion. The Court agreed with this proposition in 
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principle, pointing out that this would vary frommdividual 
m individual, and would depend on the circumstances in which 
the killing took place. It also allowed that it was for the 
jury to decide what the circumstances surrounding the killing 
in fact were. However, it insisted that it was for the Courts 
to draw inferences as to malice, and the deliberateness of 
the killing from those facts; it had previously been decided 
that the law was that if two persons meet and fight, and agree 
to fight the next day, 
lithe passion must be looked on to be cooled o • o • To 
go a little further: if two men fallout in the 
morning and .meet and fight in the afternoon, and one 
of them is slain; this is murder; for there was time 
to allay the heat, and their meeting is of malice." 64 
It is submitted that these passages show that the Courts were 
prepared to treat the lapse of time as a question of law, 
where a considerable period of time had elapsed. Even if the 
accused had managed to sustain the transport of passion over 
such prolonged periods, he would have been excluded from the 
benefit of the defence. Where the period was somewhat shorter, 
the time element appears to have been an amalgam of similar 
objective considerations, and a test for ascertaining the 
genuineness of the accused's wrath from a subjective point of 
view. In the event, the Judges decided that "there had been 
sufficient time for Mr Onebyts transport of passion to cool", 
which is open to interpretation as either a finding that it 
had in fact cooled, or simply that the lapse of time was such 
that it ought to have done so. 
It has been felt necessary to deal with these cases at 
some length because, it is submitted, they represent such a 
64. 2 Ld. Raym. 1485, 1495; 92 E.R. 465, 471. 
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marked change in the attitudes of the Courts towards the question 
of sufficiency, and are indeed, a significant step towards the 
evolution of the reasonable man test. They show that, although 
the doctrine originated almost accidentally, it had acquired 
ex post facto, by the turn of the century, an independent 
rationale. This may be summarised as a crude moral assessnent 
that a killing committed under the sting of a recent provocat-
ion was less seriaus than a killing proceeding from other 
motives such as gain or revenge. Since the moral guilt of the 
accused was by comparison less, he deserved to be punished 
less. But balanced against the preparedness of the law to 
make some concessions to human failure were a number of 
considerations a To begin witl\ it was felt that society was 
entitled to expect of its members, certain standards of self-
restraint, and a perso.n who fell below those standards, and 
readily gave way to his anger, should not be entitled to the 
benefit of the defence. As a more practical problem, the law 
had to guard itself against the possibilities of persons taking 
advantage of its lenience by disguising as provocation, 
killings which in reality proceeded from other motives; it had 
to ensure that there was a genuine causal link between the 
provocative incident and the retaliation to it. By defining 
the touchstone of murder, "rna lice", to mean a "wicked 
vindictive disposition",65 the Courts had created a concept 
which was both flexible and vague enough to allow them to give 
effect to each of these factors in their decision of any 
t · I 66 ~par l.CU ar case. 
65. 
66. 
Foster, 291. 
Except in those cases in which the hands of the Courts 
remained tied by the rigid confines of some of the early 
rules, such as that words and gestures were insufficient. 
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It is difficult to trace the development of the reasonable 
man test through the remainder of the eighteenth century, 
mainly because of the dearth of reported cases. In his treat-
ment of developments in the following century, Turner makes 
the following claims. 
"Accordingly when ••• the. judges established the rule 
that the facts of the alleged provocation must be left 
to the decision of the jury, we find that, as a guide 
to them, the judges told the jury that they must make 
up their minds whether the provocation was such that in 
their opinion it would have been enough to cause va 
reasonable man' to lose control of himself. 
This direction to the jury presented them with a simple 
device for weighing the evidence in order to decide 
what was the vital question, as it always has been, and 
still is, namely, was the prisoner driven into a 
state of passion so that 'reason was dethroned from 
her seat'? This is a purely subjective matter." 67 
This passage has been quoted in full because it presents, it 
is submitted, a distorted analysis of the cha.nges which the 
law underwent in the early part of the nineteenth century. It 
also presents, by implication, a false picture of the law 
which preceded those changes. It is submitted that when the 
nreasonable mann made his first entry into this area of the 
law, he did so as an objective measure of the gravity of a 
. . . d d h v . J 68 . provocat~ve ~nc~ ent, an t at .l\,.eat~ng • was attempt~ng 
to express, in an elliptic way, the notion that the law demands 
certain standards of self-restraint before making concessions to 
human frailty. 
Such fleeting references as there are to the .doc trine 
during the eighteenth century,69 suggest that, although no 
~-~-~.-------------------------~----
67. 
68. 
69. 
Russell; 12th ed. 5340 
In Welsh (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336. 
In the forty years immediately after ~5e)y, only one case 
is reported on the sUbject. Mason (1 6 Fost. 132; 
168 E.R. 66. 
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explicit distinction was drawn between subjective and objective 
°d 0 70 0 h f th d f d t t consl. eratl.ons, l.t was never enoug or e e en an 0 
show only that "reason was dethroned from her seat". Sir 
Michael Foster says that in cases of "slight provocation", if 
it can be shown tha t the defendant intended to kill or cause 
great bodily harm, the case is one of murder. 71 The issue 
would have been greatly simplified 'had Foster posited some 
test whereby "slight" provocation might be differentiated from 
grave, but he gives none, preferring to make his point, (as 
did Hale before him) by reference to a series of illustrations. 
However, it is submitted that, conceptUa lly, objective 
connotations are present in the very description of provocation 
as "slight". When used in its adjectival sense, the word 
imports elements of compariso,n; provoca tion cannot be "slight" 
in a vacuum. It is true that the standard by which the 
gravity of an incident is measured need not, as a matter of 
logic, be the anticipated reaction of hypothetical ordinary 
men. But by the same token, it would be most unusual were the 
quest~on to be judged solely in terms of the accused's 
reaction to the incident. If this were the case, it is 
difficult to see how provocation leading to a killing could 
ever be "slight" at all, since the defendant must have regarded 
it as sufficiently grave to kill in response to it. The only 
conclusion that can be reached is that Foster must have had 
70. See E.g. the confusion between the two evident in Foster's 
trea tment of the time factor, when he says that"... in 
every other case of homicide upon provocation, how great 
soever it be, if there is sufficient time for passion to 
subside, and for reason to interpose, such homicide will 
be murder." Foster, 296. 
71. Foster, 291. 
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some objective limits in contemplation. 
Throughout the period under discussion, the queeion of 
sufficiency was generally treated as a question of law. 72 
Occasionally, the issue was left to the jury, as E.g. in 
Wiggs. 73 There, however, the jury was expressly directed to 
consider "whe-eher the negligence of the deceased was sufficient 
to excite the provocation of the master". This procedure did 
not invariably work to the disadvantage of the prisoner, and 
74 in Snow, the judges ruled that a killing was manslaughter 
only after the jury had found the defendant guilty of murder. 
. 75 76 Similarly in Rank~n, and Ayes. In the latter case, the 
finding is somewhat surprising, in view of the triviality of 
the provocation, (which was no more than the attempted theft, 
by the victim, of a fellow-prisoner IS tobacco pouch), and the 
long and brutal retaliation of the offender. 77 
But despite this lenient application of the law in some 
cases, there :are reminders of the objective limits in others. 
78 In Hazel, counsel for the King explained a rule, stated by 
Kelyng, that certain conduct could not amount to provocation, 
on the basis that it was "a violent act beyond the proportion 
of the provocation". This is echoed by East, who writing in 
----------------------------------....---...--------------------~~-----
72. Taylor (1771) 5 Burr. 2793; 98 E.R. 466. Brown (1776) 
1 Le a c h 148; 168 E. R. 1 7 7 • 
73. (1784) 1 Leach 378n.; 168 E.R. 290. 
74. (1776) 1 Leach 151; 168 E.R. 178. 
75. (1803) R. & R. 43; 168 E.R. 674. 
76. (1810) Ro & R. 166; 168 E.R. 741. 
77. See the comments of Glanville Williams [1954J Crim. L.R. 
740; 745. 
78. (1785) 1 Leach 368; 168 E.R. 287. 
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IB03, uses the words "if upon a reasonable provocation and 
without malice". According to Turner, East later "explains" 
these words in a way which is consistent with the former's 
view that reasonableness was purely an evidentiary criterion. 
"For where the punishment inflicted for a slight 
transgression of any sort is outrageous in its 
nature, either in the manner or the continuance of 
it, and beyond all proportion to the offence, it is 
rather to be considered as the effect of a brutal 
an diabolical malignity then of human frailty." 79 
It is difficult to see in what sense this may be regarded as 
proving Turner1s point; at best, it seems to be ambiguous, 
and at worst, it may be interpreted as positively refuting it. 
What East is saying, it is contended, is that, even though the 
defendant may be acting in the heat of passion, if the 
incident which induced such a state was of a trivial nature, 
there is a legal fiction ("rather to be considered,,)BO that 
he was acting out of malice and is guilty of murder. 
It is perfectly true that, in the early years of the 
nineteenth century; the judges did develop the practice of 
leaving the question of provocation to the jury. But Turner1s 
lengthy quotation from Thomas,Bl which he cites as authority 
for the proposition that "reasonableness" was only an evidentiary 
criterion,B2 proves no more than that the jury had to satisfy 
79. 1 East P.C. 234. 
~O. And see Foster's "is considered as flowing rather". 
Foster, 291-
Bl. Russell; 12th ed. 533. The same comments apply to his 
analysis of ~ard (IB33) 6 c. & P. 157. 
B2. See f.n. 67 supra. Indeed in the case, Baron Parke himself 
appears to have decided the question of sufficiency when 
he said that "There is no doubt here, but that a violent 
assault was committed; but the question is, whether the 
blow given by the prisoner was produced by the passion of 
anger excited by that assault". ib; B19. 
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itself that the defendant was in fact acting in the heat of 
passion caused by a "violent assault". It by no means follows 
that the judges had relinquished their control over the question 
83 
of sufficiency entirely. In Shaw, decided only three years 
before Thomas, in which a sixteen year old boy had strangled 
another after a quarrel about money had developed into a fight, 
the jury was directed in the most uncompromising terms by 
Patteson J. that, even if the offender's story were true, the 
84 proper verdict was one of murder. And in Carroll, the same 
point is made even more explicitly. The victim, a woman 
publican, refused to serve the offender, a soldier, because 
of something which he had said to her the previous evening, 
and asked him to leave. She was then knocked senseless and 
stabbed to death. Park J. ruled that 
"There is no doubt that the prisoner was:ina great 
fury; but the question of law is, was there sufficient 
provocation to excite it? We are of opinion that 
there was not." 
No real reason is advanced for this conclusion, beyond a 
recitation of the facts, but in its tenor, the decision is but 
a very short step_.away from the evolution of the reasonable man 
test. Furthermore, the judges showed a reluctance to extend, 
the ambit of some of the well established rules. Thus in 
85 Pearson, it was held that the rule that the sight of a spouse 
in adultery could constitute provocation was inapplicable unless 
th h d b t 1 " l' t'" And 1".n F1" sh'er ,86 ere a een ac ua occu ar 1nspec 10n • 
83. (1834) 6 C. & P. 372. 
84. (1835) 7 C. & P. 145. 
85. (1835) 2 Lew. 216; 168 E.R. 1133. 
86. (1837) 8 C. & P. 182. 
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it was held that the provocation was insuf ficient because of 
the lapse of time between the incident, (which was in this case 
the commission of an unnatural act with the accused's son), 
and the sUbsequent retaliation o 
Even in those cases where the distinction between murder 
and manslaughter was left to the jury, it was not invariably 
freed to make the decision untrammelled by objective consider-
ations as Turner asserts. In Langstaffe,87 Hullock B. directed 
the jury in terms of lIadequate provocation". 88 In Hagen, 
which was a prosecution for "cutting with intent", in which 
there was a conflict in the evidence as to the exact circumstances 
in which the incident occurred, the jury was told by Coltman J. 
that, if the prosecution's version was accepted, 
"if upon a provocation so slight as that, a party 
draws out a dangerous weapon and inflicts a wound 
with it, there is no doubt that if death ensues, it 
will amount to murder". 
There is no evidence what soever, in the reported cases, tha t 
the judges left the "reasonable man" to the jury "as a guide".89 
Perhaps the closest that any judge actually comes to directing 
a jury in "reaso.nable man" terms is found in the words of 
---~--='--'~~""'~'--------------------------
87 Q (1827) 1 Lew. 162; 168 E.R. 998. A twelve year-old 
accused had been charged with manslaughter only, and the 
decision and words referred to must be regarded as obiter 
dicta only. However, Hullock B. felt that had the 
prosecution been brought for murder, it could have been 
sustained. 
-88 • ( 183 7 ) 8 C. & P. 16 7 • 
89. In the twelfth edition, (1964) Turner cites as authority 
the opinion of Lord Devlin in Lee Chun-Chuen [1963J A.C. 
220. However, no authority is given for the same state-
ment in the. eleventh edition, and since Lord Devlin 
himself cites no authority, it is almost certain that 
there is none. 
39. 
Coleridge J. in Kirkham,90 which was decided in the same year 
as Thomas. 91 He told the jury that 
"although the law condescends to human frailty, it 
will not indulge human ferocity. It considers man 
to be a rational being, and requires that he should 
exercise a reasonable controul [sic] over his 
pa ss ions". 
It is submitted that any attempt to interpret these words as 
"a matter of evidence" is completely insupportable. It is 
equally difficult to see any difference in substance between 
Coleridge Jots statement, and that for which Keating J. has 
subsequently been so greatly criticised, when he said that 
"The law is, that there must exist such an amount 
of provocation as would be excited by the circum-
stances in the mind of a reasonable man, and so as 
to lead the jury to ascribe the act to the influence 
of that passion." 92 
Whatever may subsequently have been made of this fest, it is 
submitted that Keating J. did little if anything more than 
articulate the test towards which the Co~mon Law had been 
groping virtually since the inception of the doctrine. 
90. (1837) 8 C. & P. 115. 
91. (1837) 7 C. & P. 817. 
92. Welsh (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336, 338. 
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CHAPTER 'THREE 
THE PRESENT LAW 
A) Introduction 
At the beginning of the evolution of the doctrine as an 
independent palliative, knowledge and foresight had not 
attained the predominant position as the pre-requisites of 
criminal responsibility which they now occupy, and it is no 
doubt for this reason that the unique character of the 
doctrine, in its departure from those now-familiar criteria, 
did not elicit any detailed apologia from any of the great 
institutional writers. 1 Indeed, once the doctrine had 
, 
secured a place in the legal system, its rationale seems to 
have been taken almost for granted by both the Courts and 
the commentators, and it was not unt,il the celebrated dictum 
of Viscount Simon in Holmes v. n.p.p.2 that this aspect of 
the doctrine, and the relationship of self-control and its 
loss to the cognitive cr:iteria of responsibility, were 
subjected to any really' critical scrutiny. 
It is arguable that, with the clarification of the 
cognitive tests, a concession to the loss of self-control has 
become increasingly anomalous; since the abolition of the death 
penalty, the "fixed and inevitable penalty" which acted as the 
----.--~---""~~,-------------------------
1. See E.g.;. Blackstone IS Commentaries, where the bland 
statement is made that "To kill a man upon sudden and 
violent resentment is less penal, than upon cool 
deliberate malice". Vol. IV. p.16. 
2. [1946J A.C o 588, 589. For a fuller discussion of which 
see post p.45. 
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catalyst for its development in the first place,3 much force 
has now departed from the rationale, and the doctrine, after 
sorre four hundred years of faithful service, has finally 
outlived its usefulness. At most the critics urge, all that 
is now required before we can dispense with the formal 
recognition of the doctrine altogether, is an amendment to the 
law to provide that there should no longer be any mandatory 
sentence, even of life imprisonment, for murder. 4 
Whatever the merits of such suggestions may be, they do 
serve to throw into relief some of the fundamental questions 
which the continued acceptance of provocation as formal 
mitigation poses for the concept of criminal responsibility. 
Foremost among these, although there may be others, are the 
following four: 
(a) Why should the retention of self-control be regarded 
as a precondition of responsibility at all? 
------------------------------
3. But see Edwards; "Provocation and the Reasonable Man" 
[1954J Crim. L.R. 898, who sets the law in perspective 
by pointing to the effect which non-legal provocation 
had in the Home Secretary r s decision as to a recommend-
ation as to the grantingcr a commutation. 
4. There is a suggestion to this effect in Cross; "The Mental 
Element in Crime" (1967) 83 1.Q.R. 215, 227. And see 
Samuels; "Excusable Loss of Self-Control in Homicide" (1971) 
34 MG L.RQ 163. Such proposals wo uld, obviously enough, 
have wide ranging repercussions in other areas of the law 
relating to homicide, which cannot be dealt with in this 
survey_ 
It is probable that capital punishment will never again 
be exacted as the penalty for murder in New Zealand, 
although such predictions cannot be made with certainty. 
Originally abolished by the Labour Party in 1941, it was 
reinstated by the National Party in 1950 (Capital Punish-
ment Act) only to be once more abolished, after consider-
able debate, by the present Crimes Act 1961, with the 
important difference that this time, it was the National 
Party which was in power. 
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(b) Why should its loss mitigate, rather than excuse 
complete ly? 
-(c) For what reason does the law require the reactions 
of the offender to be assessed in terms of wh£ the 
hypothetical "ordinary" or "reasonab le" man would 
have done in the same circumstances? 
(d) To what extent should the operation of the doctrine 
rely on the intention of the victim to rile the 
accused? 
No specific attempt will be made to present answers to these 
questions but it is in their light that the state of the 
present law, and the premises and assumptions upon which it is 
based, will be explored in the present chapter. 
2. Brief Statement of Present Law 
From the outset, the law has evinced a tendency to 
crysta llise into fa irly specific rule s c:s to the sort of 
incident which mayor may not amount to provocation. As recently 
as 1954, Glanville Williams was able to assert that "the 
class of provocative acts is fixed . 5 by law". EVen after the 
enunc:iat:ion of the "reasonable man" test in Welsh,6 which 
provided an over riding standard against which the provocative 
tendencies of any given incident could be measured, the Common 
Law experienced considerable difficulty in av6iding this 
unfortunate tendency, and in applying principles rather than 
all or nothing rules. 7 To a large extent, although not 
----------~--~--.~---------------------------.-.-=,--~~-----------
5. Williams; "Provocation and the Reasonable Man" [1954J 
Crim. L.R. 740, 742. 
6. (1869) 11 Cox C.C g 336. 
7. E.g. The rule that the sight of onels de facto wife or 
fiancee in "adultery" could not amount to provocation, 
despite the effect which this might have on the average 
person. See post p.135. 
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entirely, this difficulty was avoided in New Zealand by the 
statement of general principles in the Crimes Acts, which 
enabled each case to be determined by the jury as it arose, 
on its individual merits. In broad terms, the present Act 
provides that a killing which would otherwise be murder is to 
be regarded as manslaughter only, if it was precipitated by 
an .. incident which caused the accused to lose his self-control 
in circumstances in which an ordinary man might be expected 
to have reacted in the same way. To complete the picture 
it should also be pointed out that a provocative incident is 
a proper consideration to be taken into account for sentencing 
purposes in cases of offences (presumably of violence against 
th ) t . t h . °d 8 e person no amount Lng 0 omLcL e. 
B) §.htbjectiY~ Re,guirementsi..,Actual Loss of2elf-.9£?.!J.~..t:'01 
At the heart of the doctrine is the rule that the 
provocative incident must have been such that 
S.169 (2) (b} "It did in fact deprive the offender of the 
power of self-control and thereby induced 
him to commit the act of homicide". 
Thus it will not avail the accused to show, without more, that 
he discovered his wife in the act of adultery, was attacked, 
--.-...---------------------------.-...----~ 
8. OtConnell (1909) 2 Cr.App.R. 11, and Cunningham [1958J 1 
Q.B. 188, and the statement to this effect in Holmes 
[1946J A.C. 588, 601. See Bruzas [1972J Crim. L.R. 367. 
There is an unresolved dispute in New Zealand as to whether 
provocation may be formally pleaded in the case of attempt-
ed murder. See Smith [1964J N.Z.LoR. 834. Per contra 
La&a [1969J N.Z.L.Ro 417. It is probable that the better 
view is that the plea is restricted to its mitigating role 
in this case too. See Adams; "Criminal Lvw and Practice 
in New Zealand" 2nd ed. p.339. For fuller discussions 
see Trebilcock; "Scope of the Defence of Provocation in 
N.Z. Law" (1963) N.Z.L.J. 619 and Brown; "Murderous Intent 
and the Lesser Offences" (1965) N.Z.L.J. 537. An analysis 
of the issues involved is outside the scope of this 
survey. 
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9 
or made the object of vile or obscene remarks; he must also 
be able to show that he actually lost his self-control. 
1. The Concept of Se1f..:Con1U;;:01 
Whilst it is an easy enough matter to state what is 
required, the real meaning of "self-control" is somewhat more 
elusive. As is the case with many of the terms which ~he law 
utilises, the concept has always been regarded as se1f-
explanatory, and the law has generally been content to say' 
h . . 1 d" b h h' . 10 w at 1.S 1.nvo ve 1.n 1.ts a sence, rat er t an 1.ts presence. 
Underlying the use of the phrase is the idea that a person 
doe s not, as a result of emotion (usua 11y anger), 11 think in a 
rational way about his behaviour and its consequences, a 
process usually described in such stock terms as 
"a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, 
rendering the accused so subject to passion as to 
make him for the moment not master of his mind". 12 
As will be shown, it is extremely difficult to ascribe any more 
positive, precise meaning to the phrase. And it is submitted 
9. This is also the Common Law rule; Smith and Hogan 207 
2nd ed. 
10. The expression is relatively new in the law, and appears 
first in the Reports in Kirkham (1837) 8 C. & p. 115. One 
probable reason for the lack of definition is the exist-
ence of the objective condition. Recently there have 
been suggestions that thae is some physiological foundat-
ion to what the Courts have been cont.ent to regard a s a 
matter of common sense. See Brett; "The Physiology of 
Provocation", [1970J Crim. L.R. 634. Without in any way 
deprecating the value of such research, it is submitted 
that it will not have a great deal of impact on the law, 
because of the way in which the concept of self-control 
is actually used by the law. 
11. For suggestions that emotions other than anger may be 
material, see Packett (1937) 58 C.L.R. 190, 217, per Dixon 
J. Rolle [1965J 3 All E.R. 582, in which "terror" is 
referred to as a possibility. 
12. Duffy [1949J 1 All EoR. 932, per Devlin J. 
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that, until it is possible to establish rather more accurately 
both the meaning and function of a "loss of self-control", we 
are in no position to accede to the submission of such critics 
as Smith and Hogan, who argue that "the objective test should 
be a bolished, and a purely subjective criterion applied" .13 
(a) Rela tionshi.12 wglLl~nj;:boJ,:LJ:ip~L~l:i..c~ 
One celebrated attempt to explain the effect of a loss 
of self-control was essayed by Viscount Simon in Holmes v. 
D.P.p. 14 who said that 
"The whole doctrine of provocation depends on the 
fact that it causes, or may cause, a sudden and 
temporary loss of self-control whereby malice, 
which is the formation of an intent to kill or to 
inflict grievous bodily harm, is negatived." 
An exception to this was to be found in the rule relating to 
adultery; only when one spouse found the other in flagrante 
delicto could the doctrine of provocation still succeed where 
the prosecution tad established the intention to kill. This 
dictum was subjected to .a barrage of criticism, and it is 
unnecessary here to undertake a detailed refutation of it. 15 
Suffice it to say that none of the numerous attempts to 
reconcile the statement with the law as it had hitherto been 
understood was completely ,successful. Thus, it was suggested 
_______________ ._p=-_~o..,'__=__~ __ 
13. op.cit. 215. Since the Homicide Act, 1957 (U.K.) it is 
the law in England that a trial judge may withdraw the 
issue only where there is no evidence that the accused 
himself lost his self-control, but this has not so far 
prompted the Courts to say what the expression means. 
14. [1946] AqC. 588, 598. 
15. Landon (1949) 65 L .. Q .. R. 105. Edwards (1953) 69 L"Q.R. 549. 
J.V. Barry; "The Defence of Provocation" (1948-1950) Res 
JUdicatae 129. Williams; "Provocation and the Reasonable 
Man" [1954J Crim. L.R. 740, 744. Royal Commission on 
C-apita 1 Punishment, Cmnd. 8932 of 1953, para 136. The 
best documented refu1ation, from an historical point of 
view, is written by Turner in Russell, Volo 1, pp.520-526. 
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that when Viscount Simon used the word "malice", he was doing 
so in its old sense of a pre-conceived intention, and the 
dictum was then reduced to the comparatively trite and harm-
less proposition that provocation and the formation of a pre-
. d· . . 1 . . bl 16 conce~ve ~ntent~on are ~n genera ~ncompat~ e. Even this 
suggestion is not without its difficulties. To begin with, 
the element of preconception was introduced, not by the 
word "malice", but by the various qualifications appended to 
it such a s "praecogitata", "prepense" or "aforethought". In 
addition, if the adultery rule really is exceptional, it must 
follow tha t the law will in certain circumstances allow the 
plea to succeed even where the intention was premeditated, 
and this is clearly n~ the law. 
Despite these criticisms, Viscount Simon's remarks are 
not altogether without validity. _In New Zealand, in order to 
establish that a killing is murder, the prosecution is required 
to show either that the accused meant to cause the death of the 
person killed, or that he meant to cause his victim some 
bodily harm, knowing that death was likely to ensue, and was 
reckless whether death ensued or not. 17 It is conceivable that 
a person could be so infuriated that, at the time when he 
performed the act causing death, he was unable to form the 
intention to kill. Or, it may be that his reaction was so 
instantaneous that he did not appreciate that his conduct was 
likely to cause death. This was the point made by Eveleigh J. 
in Bruzas,18 in which, on a charge of attempted murder, he 
16. For a fuller exposition see, "Studies in Criminal Law". 
MOrris and Howard, Chapter III. 
17. See generally Sections 167 and 168 of the Crimes Act 1961. 
18. [1972] Crim. L.R. 367. 
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ruled that 
"provocation is a factor to be taken into account with 
all the other evidence in deciding what the accusedlls 
actual intention was". 
Only one, extremely unsatisfactory, case seems to have 
been decided on the point. In Philpot,19 the offender killed 
his wife by strangulation in the course of an argument over who 
was to pay for the family Christmas tree. It appeared in 
evidence that the couple had hitherto lived in comparative 
harmony. The main defence was insanity, but counsel also 
addressed the jury on provocation. Nothing was said at all by 
the trial judge about the possibility of a manslaughter verdict 
being reached. It was found by the jury that the accused was 
not insane, but "he acted in a fit of temper without intending 
to kill her". Upon being pressed for an explanation of this, 
the foreman then said that "the jury are unanimously and 
emphatically of opinion that at the moment of the act the 
prisoner did not realise the consequences of what he was 
doing". The trial judge directed the jury to reconsider this 
verdict reminding them that a man is presumed to intend the 
consequences of his conduct, and the jury eventually 
returned a verdict of murder with a recommendation to mercy. 
In the Court of Criminal Appeal, it was argued that the first 
verdict was tantamount to one of manslaughter, and that there 
should have been some direction on the point. However, the 
Court ruled that the jury 
"must have meant that the failure to realise the 
consequences was due to the fit of temper. In the 
circumstances it was not a misdirection to tell the 
jury that a man is held to int.end the consequences 
---------------------------=--_.----------------------
19. (1912) 7 Cr.AppoR. 140 0 
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of his act" .. 
This decision was approved by the House of Lords in D.P.P. v. 
Smith,20 and it is submitted that it must be considered to 
have been abrogated by Section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 
1967" 
Although the point has never arisen for consideration in 
New Zealand, it is submitted that, should it do so, the 
offender would 1:e entitled to a verdict of manslaughter rather 
than murder simply because the Crown would have failed to 
prove, all the elements of its case. In principle, such a result 
should also follow whether the objective limits of the defence 
of provocation are satisfied or not, and there would be no 
objection to the offender's alleging that he was abnormally 
short tempered, or was mentally deficient or weak minded. In 
practice, the offender's allegation that he did not know what 
he was doing is likely to founder on the scepticism of the 
jury, particularly where the killing is accomplished by the use 
of prolonged vio1ence o 
Be that as it may, actual loss of self-control will not 
normally negative the presence of the cognitive criteria 
which the law generally regards as essential for criminal 
responsibility. If anything, the provocative incident acts as 
an inspiration for the formation of the intention to kill. 
As a general rule, the criminal law will not concern itself 
with the reasons why the intention to perform an act constit-
uting a criminal offence has been formed; such matters are 
consigned to the realms of motive, and are treated as 
20. [ 61J A.C. 290. 
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irrelevant for the purposes of conviction. It is sufficient 
that the act in question is causally connected with the 
intention, and is the result of it. 21 It is submitted that 
the law relating to provocation is an exception to this general 
practice, and that the Courts in effect pursue the inquiry one 
step further backwards along the chain of causation. If the 
accused deliberately seeks the provocation, or if the 
provocative incident is one of which he is unaware at the time 
h d h . d h 22 . b d d h e oes t e act caus~ng eat, ~t cannot e regar e as t e 
true source of his intention. Actual loss of self-control is 
relevant because, in the heat of the moment, it means that the 
actor is less able to check the formation of the intent to 
kill. Indeed, it is little more than an alter.native mode of 
expressing the idea that ,the offender himself experienced 
difficulty in checking his impulsive reaction to wha t was said 
or done to him. 
If Viscount Simon's exposition of the law were to be 
regarded as correct, and the inquiry were to be directed 
solely at ascertaining whether the intent to kill had been 
formed, the doctrine in its original form would have been 
completely undermined. However, the law governing the point 
was set aright by the Privy Council in Att. Gen. of Ce~~ojl~Y. 
K.D.J. Perera,23 where, without actually adverting to the Holmes 
dictum, the Privy Council stated that the law in England was that 
21. See :Marston; "Contemporaneity of Act and Intention in 
Crimes" (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 208. 
22. Section 169 (5) Crimes Act, 1961. And see Foster, 315. 
23. [1953J A.C. 200, 206 per Lord Goddard C.J. And see now 
Lee Chun-Chuen [1963J A.C. 200. Parker [1964J A.Co 1369, 
13810 :Martindale [1966J 1 W.L.R. 1564. 
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liThe defence of provocation may arise where a person 
does intend to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm 
but his intention to do so arises from sudden passion 
involving loss of self-control by reason of provocat-
ion ". 
On only one occasion have the New Zealand Courts expressly 
considered the Holmes dictum - in the Full Court on an appeal 
from the High Court of the Cook Islands. 24 There, however, the 
Court was dealing with the Cook Islands Act, 1915, which con-
tained no express provision relating to the defence. Acting 
on the assumption that there might nevertheless be a COlTh"11on 
Law defence of provocation, the Court cited Viscount Simon's 
dictum with approval and ruled that the evidence was quite 
incompatible with provocation as known to English law, and the 
appeal was dismissed. Nor did the Privy Council see fit to 
interfere on a further appeal, even though the appellants 
were under sentence of death, and delivered its advice that 
the appeal should be dismissed without comment. It is sub-
mitted that the decision cannot be taken as representing New 
Zealand law on the point. Although there is no authority 
directly in point, the Court of AppEal has on a number of 
occasions directed a new trial where it is clear that the 
intention to kill had been established,25 and it is significant 
that the Court has never attempted to buttress a verdict of 
murder rather than manslaughter on the ground that an intent-
ion to kill has been proved. 
24. ~t~m~~_Foli~2~eli v. Williams [1954J N.Z.L.R. 
594. The Privy Council delivered its opinion some eighteen 
months after the decision in Perera, and must have decided 
that, notwithstanding the error, there was no merit in 
the appeal. 
25. Kahu [1947J N.Z.L.R. 368. Lewis (1962) unreported. C.A. 
92/62. Doughertz [e66J N.Z.L.R: 890. 
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The law's insistence that, before the plea can operate, 
the offender should be "not master of his mind,,26 has prompted 
one learned corrnnentator to treat provocation and irresistible 
impulse as though they were synonymous. 27 For two reasons, 
it is submitted, this comparison is unfortunate and misleading. 
To begin with, the term "irresistible impulse" is usually 
associated with, and the product of, some form of mental 
disorder, as opposed to the natural anger which a provocative 
incident may inspire. One constant criticism of the M'Naghten 
rules is that they do not cater for conative deficiencies of 
this sort. However, the introduction of that defence is one 
which the law has steadfastly resisted. 28 As Glanville 
Williams has suggested, it may well be that persons who over-
react to some trivial provocation are in some way mentally 
unbalanced, and there is force in his co~~ent that, if so, 
their needs are not then reduced punishment, 
"but the curative and preventive detention supplied 
by the law of insanity". 29 
The second objection is rather more conceptual~ Even 
where the plea is successful, the offender is convicted of 
26. DUfiX [1949J 1 All E.R. 932. 
27.. Turner in "Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law", 19th ed. 
p.171.~ "For many centuries past the corrnnon law has 
recognised one situation in which criminal liability may 
be reduced, although not entirely removed, if it be proved 
that the misdeed Has done under the influence of an 
irresistible impulse." This sole case is that of provocat-
ion. 
28. Burr [1969J N.Z.L.R. 736. 
29. [1954J Crim. L.R. 740, 743. To some extent, the problem 
has been alleviated in England by the introduction of the 
defence of diminished responsibility by Section 2 of the 
Homicide Act 1957. 
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manslaughter and liable to life imprisonment. 30 If the impulse 
was genuinely irresistible, and such that an ordinary person 
would not have been able to resist it either, there would seem 
to be little justification for imposing any punishment at all o 
Surely the assumption underlying the offence of voluntary 
manslaughter is that the impulse could have been resisted, 
but in the circumstances the offender experienced understand-
able difficulty in doing so, and is therefore less culpable. 
(c) Linguistic Difficulties 
Recently, there has been some speculation and disagreement 
as to what actually takes place when a person reacts to a 
provocative incident, which casts some light on what is meant 
when we say of a person that he has lost his self-control. One 
view is that taken by North J. in McGregor,31 who said that 
"The deprivation of self-control implies a sudden 
transition to a state, necessarily temporary, 
during which the power of self-control is absent". 
A similar view is held by those who would argue that the source 
of the provocation should be regarded as irrelevant, and that 
there should be no requirement that the retaliation should be 
d · t d t h h t 11' h . 32 J.rec eat e person w 0 ac ua y gJ.ves t e provocatJ.on. 
According to these critics, once the offender has in fact lost 
his self-control, the insistence on such restrictions is both 
unrealistic and illogical, in that they require control of a 
person who has by definition "lost" that power. On the same 
basis, Counsel in Phillip§33 launched an attack on the so-called 
30. See Section 177 of the Crimes Act, 1961. 
31. [1962J N.~.R. 1069, 1078. 
32.. See E.g. O'Regan; "Indirect Provocation and Misdirected 
Retaliation" [1968J Crim. L.R. 319. And see post p.141. 
33. [1969J 2 A.C. 130, 137; 2 W.L.R. 581, 585. per Lord Diplock. 
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reasonable retaliation rule. The Privy Council dissented from 
the view taken in MCGregor, pointing aut that Counselrs sub-
missions were 
"based on the premise that loss of self-control is 
not a matter of degree but is absolute; there is no 
intermediate category between icy detachment and 
going beserk. This premise, unless the argument is 
purely semantic, must be based upon human experience 
and is, Ln their Lordships· view, false. The average 
man reacts to provocation according to its degree 
with angry words, with a blow of the hand, possibly 
if the provocation is gross and there is a dangerous 
weapon to hand, with that weapon." 
It is submitted that the JUdicial Committee1s description 
of the argument as being "purely semantic" is an apposite one, 
and that at least some of the difficulties which pervade this 
area of the law can be traced to linguistic ambiguities. 
Frequently, the mistaken assumption is made that the words 
"self-control" must have reference to, or "stand for" some 
entity which is in some way possessed and capable of being 
lost. Consequently, when we say that a person has "~ost his 
self-control", we are making a statement of fact which is of 
the same logical character as the statement that a person has 
lost his umbrella. This assumption distorts the various complex 
functions which the words actually perform as an integral part 
of .the law of provoca tion o 34 
In fact; the predominant function of the sentence "he 
has lost his self-control" is usually descriptive of the actor1!s 
conduct at the relevant time; the person who has observed the 
behaviour of the offender (not infrequently it will ~ the 
34. The locus classicus warning of the dangers of building 
such "theory on the ba definition" is the article 
by Hatt; "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence" (1954) 
70 L.Q.R. 37. 
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offender himself) draws inferences from such phenomena as 
changes in the actor's colouring, what he says, and indeed 
what he does, and concludes that the actor did not resist the 
impulse to react to antagonism. In addition, the observer's 
statement performs a number of subsidiary functions. 
Inferences of a comparative nature may be drawn. Thus he may 
say of a person who swears vehemently in response to some 
trifling vexation that the actor "lost his self-control", even 
though it is obvious from the context of his remarks t~ 
there was no possitility of the actor's killing anyone. To 
some extent then, our usage varies according to the degree of 
provocation offered, the nature of the retaliation to it, and 
the context in which the description is made. In this sense, 
there are degrees of provocation and loss of self-control, 
and it is only when the statement is taken out of context 
and at face value that the observer appears to be making a 
statement of fact. 
Sometimes too, a dispositional judgment is being made. 
I.e. the speaker is inferentially passing COIThllent as to the 
degree of control which might have been expected of the actor 
in the circumstances, according to his prediction a s to wha t 
might be expected to happen when a person is confronted by 
the particular situation in which the actor was placed. 
Thus, we might properly way of a man who swore even vehemently, 
that he "displayed self-control" if we knew that he had just 
discovered his wife committing adultery. Our usage in such a 
case is qualified by the 'fact that we might have expected his 
reaction to have been rather more vigorous. This prediction 
may be made either according to what we know about the actor 
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himself, or according to some standard of a more abstract and 
~ypothetical sort. It may well be that, because of this 
consideration, it was inevitable that the standard should have 
become, in law, the ubiquitous reasonable man, if only because 
of the evidentiary difficulties involved in enquiring into 
the past behaviour patterns of the offender himself. Wnat is 
important in all this, it is submitted, is that in none of 
these cases does the statement that a person has "lost his 
self-control" act as a statement of fact which is in any way 
capable of empirical verification. EVen accepting that an 
offender is telling the truth when he makes such a statement 
about his own behaviour, there is nothing "illogical" in 
requiring the retaliation to be reasonable or well-directed. 35 
In addition, the concept of self-control performs an 
equally important, if rather different function. That is, it 
serves as a link in the chain of causation between what was 
36 done to the offender, and what he himself did in response~ 
and is used in this sense in the Crimes Act 1961 itself,37 
which speaks of the offender being "thereby induced ." 0 to 
commit the act of homicide". Arguably, this function is one 
reason in itself why the law has not found it necessary to 
eraquire too deeply into the meaning of the "loss of self-
35. Which is, of course, an entirely different thing from 
saying that the requirement is nevertheless "unrealistic". 
And see post p. 100. 
36. In the earlier law, this same function was performed by 
the "heat of passion". See esp. Thol!!§.§ (1837) 7 C.&P~ 
817, in which the direction of Baron Parke is a imed at 
ensuring that the jury satisfy themselves that thisre-
quirement is established by the evidence. And See Williams 
[1954] Crim. L.R. 740, 751. 
37. For the full text of the relevant Section (169 2(b)} see 
supra p. 43. 
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control". If it is clear in any individual case, that the 
offender was caused to behave as he did by what was done or 
said to him, then it may safely be assumed that he has "actually 
lost his self-control". This much, at least, would remain if 
the objective test were to be abandoned. But by the same 
token, the reasonable man test does provide a useful evidentiary 
yardstick to assist the tribunal of fact in its task of 
ascertaining the true cause of the formation of the intention 
to kill. 38 
Several further co~ments about the way in which the 
concept is used may be made. The Crimes Act 1961 refers to 
the "power of self-control". 39 Although the point has never 
been taken in New Zealand, 40 this phraseology is open to the 
same objections as were made in the context of irresistible 
impulse. If the offender's powers of self-control are absent 
in circumstances in which an ordinary man would have been 
affected in the same way, then he is being punished for sone-
thing which it is by definition outside his power to control. 
The difficulty here is reminiscent of that which arose in 
connection with the defence of intoxication. In D.P.P. v. 
41 Beard, the House of Lords spoke of taking into account 
incapacity to form an intent, along with other factors, in 
-...--------------~.-.~,.-~~= =-- ----------
38. This is Turner's explanation of the evolution of the 
reasonable man test in the first place. As to which 
see supra p. 33. 
39. In Sections 169 (2) (a), and 169 (4). 
40. No such objection could be taken in the U.K. because the 
Homicide Act 1957 is worded differently on this point, 
and, it is submitted, more felicitously. 
41. [1920J A.C. 479. 
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ascertaining the state of the accused's mind. But as Lord 
D 1 · h b l' d 42 of h d 11 ev 1n as su sequent y p01nte out, 1 t e accuse rea y 
is. incapable of forming the intent, then he cannot possibly 
have formed it, and no other factors can poeibly be of any 
relevance. Surely the true view in the case of provocation 
is tha t 
"if we punish at all we punish less, on the footing 
that, though the accused's capacity for self-control 
was not absent, its exercise was a matter of abnormal 
difficulty." 43 
It is submitted that the Crimes Act must be interpreted in 
the light of these remarks. To hold otherwise would mean 
either that the defence would never succeed at all, or that, 
in punishing the of fender even for manslaughter, the law is 
engaged in a useless exercise of retribution, or a morally 
unjustified exercise in general deterrence. 
2. Evidentia~x_Difficulties 
Before an offender is entitled to have a plea of provocat-
ion entertained by the tribunal, there must, as a matter of 
law, be evidence of provocation, including evidence that the 
accused has in fact lost his self-control. 44 For several 
rea sons, one of which ha s a lready been touched upon,45 this 
is the least formidable of the hurdles facing. :the offender, 
and the element of the defence which has caused the law the 
least difficulty. TWo further probable reasons for this 
suggest themselves, the first of which being the existence of 
;;;;;;;...---------------------------_.= .. ~".~ ... ~ .. --
42. Broadhurst [1964J A.C. 441, 461-
-'43. H.L.A. Hart; "Negligence, Mens Rea, and Criminal Respons-
ibility". In P. and R. 153. 
44. Section 169(3) of the Crimes Act, 1961. 
45. Supra p. 55. 
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the objective condition. If it is shown that the incident 
wa s such tha t any ordinary man might have been promptEd by it 
to lose his self-control, then unless it can be shown that the 
offender was peculiarly sanguine, it is probable that he did 
so too. And if the ordinary man test cannot be sa tisfied, 
the ,defence cannot be relied on in any case. Another probable 
reason for this lack of difficulty is the very character of the 
self-control concept; it is incapable of proof or disproof as 
a matter of fact, because tha t is not one of the functions 
which the concept performs. At best, it is possible that 
onlookers may agree in their interpretations of the conduct of 
the offender as they saw it. 
Throughout the criminal law, the state of a man~s mind 
is evidenced by what he has done or said at the time when he 
did the act for which he is being tried. But as often as not, 
"proof" of the loss of self-control takes the form of direct 
evidence given either by the accused himself or by an onlooker. 46 
With the possible exception of Hampton,47 this has generally 
been held to suffice. In that case, the appellant, who had 
expressed a desire to marry the woman who subsequently became 
his victim, was seen with his hands clasped around her throat. 
The observer, a nine year old brother of the victim then ran 
upstairs, dressed, and on his return, saw the appellant, who 
had by this time moved the victim to another part of the room, 
_____________ ~.,~~~-v·-~.·~~_~ ____________ _ 
46. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the accused was 
not permitted to give evidence on his own behalf. Crim-
inal Code Act, 1893 (N.Z.) Section 398; Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1898 (U.K.) Section 10 
47. (1909) 2 Cr. AppoR. 274. And cf. Fitzgibbons (1912) 
7 Cr.App.R. 264. 
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still holding her by the throat. Hampton later made two 
statements, admitting the killing, but alleging tha t he was 
at the time angry because the woman had said that she would 
have nothing further to do with him. At the trial, he did not 
give evidence, but the defence put forward on his behalf was 
that, in his anger, he had used more force than was intended; 
in effect he pleaded that the killing was an accident. The 
trial Judge, Phillimore J. directed the jury that the case 
was one of murder or nothing, and the Court of Criminal Appeal 
refused to interfere, holding that 
"when certain facts are proved by the prosecution, 
and the prisoner wishes to have a certain view of 
those facts accepted, it is imcumbent upon him to 
give evidence with regard to it". 
Although this decision has never been expressly over-
ruled, it has almost certainly been overtaken by subsequent 
cases. For reasons of tactics, an accused person may very 
often be reluctant to give the sort of direct evidence which 
Hampton would seem to demand. This is particularly the case 
where the allegedly provocative incident takes the form of an 
assault, or a general skirmish, and either self defence or 
accident are possible alternative verdicts. In such circum-
stances, the law will not now place the accused ina fatal 
dilemma by insisting upon direct evidence. Instead, it 
allows the facts to speak for themselves; what is required is 
a "credible narrative of events", which may come from the. 
evidence of either the prosecution or the accused himself, 
from which the loss of self-control may be inferred. The 
48 law was formulated in this way in Lee Chun-Chuen, and although 
48. [1963J A.C. 220. 
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the Privy Council was addressing its remarks to "the three 
elements" of provocation, the actual reason for the decision 
was that, even if the accused's version of the fatal incident 
were to raise doubts in the mind of the jury, there could be 
no suggestion that the appellant had in fact satisfied the 
subjective requirements. 
This decision wa s merely a synthe sis of a number of 
earlier cases. In Hopper,49 the main defence advanced was 
accident, and the accused actually stated in evidence that he 
was not angry at the time when the fatal incident occurred. 
No attempt is made in the judgment to distinguish Hampton; 
instead the Court adverted to several circumstances surrounding 
the killing as be-ing potentially evidence of provocation. It 
then held that it is the duty of the Court, with the assistance 
of the jury, to arrive at as true a view of what actually 
occurred as was possible. As a result, the Court could and 
should disregard the accused's own version of the facts if, 
in the circumstances, he had some ulterior purpose in distort-
ing them. It follows from this that the trial judge has a duty 
to seek the opinion of the jury on the question of manslaughter 
should such a verdict seem possible to him on the facts. This 
is the ca se ev.en though the accused or his Counsel has expressly 
disclaimed reliance on the defence, or made no mention of it. 
50 Hopper has been followed in a number of subsequent cases, in 
the most recent of which,51 the Privy Council stated that 
----.------~------~ 
49. [1915J 2 K.B. 431. 
50. Kwaku Mensah [1946J A.C. 83. Bullard [1957J A.C. 635. 
Bharat [1959J AGC. 533. Porritt [1961J 1 W.L.R. 1372. 
It was also approved in Mancini [1942J A.C.1. 
51. Rolle [1965J 1 W.L.R. 1341. 
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the accused had merely to show that there was a "possible 
inference from the facts that the offender momentarily lost 
the power of 's-elf-control". 
Apart from Lee C.!l.lLJ1:.g];1u~, the writer has been able to 
trace only one (incompletely reported) decision, ClS!£!s,52 in 
which the issue of provocation was held to have been properly 
withdrawn from the jury o.n the grounds that there was no 
evidence of actual loss of self-control. Because of its 
novelty, the case merits consideration in some detail. Early 
on the day of the fatal incident, the offender's'mistress had 
humiliated and taunted him by referring to her relationship 
with another man. The 'couple returned to his flat later in the 
day to collect her belongings. In the interval, the appellant 
had procured ammunition and a shot-gun, which he had sawn off. 
The Court of Appeal held that it would be unsafe to conclude 
that, when they actually arrived at the flat, the intention 
to kill had been forrred. There was evidence that she then 
swore at him, and that, shortly before the fatal incident, 
the two had once again been quarrelling in the kitchen of the 
------,,--,,---------------------~~--
52. [1971J N.Z.L.R. 589. The case is reported on another 
point. Cf. Malonev (1861) 9 Cox C.C. 6. The defence 
advanced on, behalf of the accused was that the victim 
had committed suicide. It was held that there was no 
evidence of provocation, but the Court is not specific 
as to what particular feature of the defence it consid-
ered to be absent, and the case is explicable on the basis 
that there was no evidence of a provocative incident. And 
see Simpson (1915) 84 L.J.K.B. 1893, which is also perhaps 
explicable on this basis, although the stated grounds for 
the decision were that the provocation did nee move from 
the victim" King [1965] 1 Q. B. 433, 455 where it is 
sta ted tha t liThe Court thinks tha t it is quite incredible 
that the jury would have given any serious consideration 
to the suggestion that he killed his own child by reason 
of los,S of self-control induced by the stimulus of seeing 
the injury which the mother-in-law, according to him, had 
inflicted upon that same child". per Winn J. 
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flat. Evidence was given by an eye-witness that when the 
appellant first presented the rifle and pulled the trigger, 
the weapon did not discharge because the appellant had for-
gotten to load it. He then did so, fired a shot and rang the 
police. After a brief telephone conversation, he then 
returned to the room where the victim was lying, and realising 
that she was still alive, fired a second and fatal shot. 
At the trial, Quilliam J. directed the jury on the pasis 
that there was no provocative act after the appellant had 
acquired the rifle. early in the afternoon. The Court of Appeal, 
although prepared to assume that the quarrel in the kitchen 
could have been provocative, considered that there was no real 
substance in Counsel's criticism of the direction on this 
point. Counsel had also urged that the case should be viewed 
as one similar to Porritt53 and Parke~,54 in both of which the 
provocation extended over a period fo some time, and to which 
the killing could be regarded as a climax. Porritt was dis-
tinguished by the Court which, after reciting the facts, says 
that "nothing like that ••• can be said in the present casen .. 
No attempt is made to distinguish Parker at all, although again 
the facts are fully recited. In the event, the Court ruled 
that 
"In our op~n~on then the lapse of time between the 
first in~ffectual effort on the part. of the 
appellant to shoot Ethel Kirk and the second shot 
which killed he r shows only too plaihly- that even 
if it was possible, though improbable, that at the 
beginning of the incident he had lost his power of 
self-control, he had regained control when the act 
of killing occurred." 
53. [1961J 1 W.L.R. 1372. 
54. [1964] A.C. 1369. 
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Earlier the Court had said that the time lapse was compelling 
evidence that the killing was "deliberate and premeditated", 
and made reference to the trial judgeWs ruling that there 
must be a "sudden and temporary loss of self-control" with 
evident approval. 
It is submitted tha t the decision sets a rather unhappy 
precedent 0 To say of a person that he might have lost his 
se1:f-contro1 to the extent tha t he formed the intention to 
kill, and then that he definitely regained his composure 
within a space of three minutes, (at a time when he believed 
that he had just killed a person of whom he was admittedly 
extremely fond) is surely only one possible interpretation of 
what had actually occurred. But having regard to the slight 
55 burden on the of fender, and the inherently vague nature of 
the self-control concept, is it not at least "possible" ~that 
a jury would infer a loss of se1f-contro1?56 
3. A Note on Factors to be Taken into Account 
In practice, the variety of factors which the tribunal 
may take into account in deciding whether this subjective 
~element of the defence has been satisfied overlap to a consid-
erable extent with those by reference to which it forms its 
opinion on the question of sufficiency. Incidents which will 
move the offender to wrath will in general be a provocation 
to other, ordinary, men. 57 One of the difficulties encountered 
----------_._-----
55.. It need only be shown that there was a "possible inference"" 
See supra p .61. 
56. Although comparisons on the basis of- facts may be 
invidious in this area of the law, it is instructive to 
compare the case of MCPherson (1957) 41 Cr.App.R. 213. Post 
p. 86 .. 
570 This generalisation is subject to exceptions which are 
considered post p. 121. 
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in ascertaining the state of the early law is the confusion, 
evident in both the cases themselves and the work of the 
commentators, between the way in which the offender himself 
reacted, and the way in which he ought to have behaved 
according to the ordinary canons of human behaviour. Because 
of this overlap, a more detailed examination is better 
postponed until the ordinary man test has been dealt witQ. 
C) "Ob je.~:t~Y~~~J§.,gl1ir~~.i. 9.££!.i.!.'!sry Loss of Self-Control 
1. Introduction 
When New Zealand first codified its criminal law in 
1893,58 the "reasonable man" had become firmly entrenched as 
part of the Common Law. In the New Zealand law, he reappeared 
in the slightly different guise of the "ordinary man",59 and 
it is as such that he takes his place in the modern prOVisions, 
which stipulate that 
Section 169 (2) "Anything done or said may be provocation if -
(a) In the circumstances of the case it was 
sufficient to deprive a person having the 
power of self-control of an ordinary person, 
but otherwise having the characteristics of 
the offender~ of the power of self-control .. " 
This requirement~, commonly described as the "objective 
condition fl ,60 has been strenuously criticised to the extent 
58. The Criminal Code Act, 1893. 
59. No rea sons are given fDr the change by the Comnlis sioners 
in the Criminal Code Commission Report 1878. The Full 
Court of Victoria suggests. why "ordinary" is preferable 
to "reasonableu in this context in Enright [1961J V.R. 663, 
669, where it is said tha t the word "ordinary" "points to 
the fact that he is brought into the doctrine for the 
purpose of denying the benefits of it, not to all those 
who react unreasonably to provocation, but only to those 
whose reactions show a lack of self-control falling out-
side the ordinary or common range of human temperaments." 
60. Smith and Hogan; 2nd ed .. p.208. 
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that there have been numerous calls for its abolition.61 Quite 
apart from the fact that this would leave actual loss of control 
and the causation test a s the sole criteria for the application 
of the defence, (a .prospect which, in view of what has already 
been considered cannot be faced with any degree of equanimity), 
such drastic proposals tend to overlook the function which 
the ordinary man test actually performs as part of the doctrine. 
Whilst it may readily be conceded that some aspects oJ the 
test give cause for disquiet when they are mea sured aga inst 
the rationale of the doctrine, it can be shown that, properly 
understood and applied, the ordinary man test is not as 
"objective" as some of its critics would have us believe. If 
any change in this area of the law really is warranted, might 
it not be better to probe behind, and if necessary discard, 
the time-worn terminology of the COlTh'11on Law, and recognise the 
test more explicitly for what it really is? 
61. Ibid., p.214. Turner, "Russell on Crime". 12th ed. 535. 
Evidence given to the English Roya 1 CORlc'11ission on Capital 
Punishment, Cmnd 8932, para 141. Brown; "The Ordinary 
Man in Pro·vocation" (1964). 13 I.C.L.Q. 203, 228. Samuels; 
"Excusable Loss of Self-Control in Homicide" (1971) 34 
M.L.R. 163. A New Zealand proposal for the abolition of 
the test was contained in the Crimes Bill, 1957, Clause 
181 . (2) of which provided that "Any wrongful act or course 
of conduct, or any. insult, may be provoca tion if it wa s 
SO likely to deprive the person charged" of •. f?e.lf-control 
that he should not be held fully responsible,· and if it 
actually deprived him of self-control and induced him to 
commit the act of homicide". In a Report which Finlay J. 
prepared on the Bill, it is stated that this "substituted 
an objective test for the subjective standard which has 
always been the accepted test in both New Zea land and 
the United Kingdom". Quite apart from the confusion 
between "subjective" and "objective", it is not entirely 
clear tha tthe draft proposal would have succeeded in 
achieving its object, because of the ambiguity in the 
phra se "likely to deprive the person charged" .By what 
criteria is this likelihood to be assessed? Is it 
according to what we know about the accused himself, or 
according to the effect which the incident would have on 
other, ordinary, men? 
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2. Ra tionili 
It has already been argued62 that, underlying the con-
cession to human frailty implicit in the doctrine is a crude 
socio-ethical judgment that a killing as the result of 
antagonism is less serious than a killing from motives such 
as greed or revenge, and does not deserve to be visited by 
the infliction of the ultimate penalty, which should be 
reserved for use in the most serious cases. It is a recog-
nition that, for understandable if not acceptable reasons, 
self-restraint may on occasion fail. In this respect, the 
doctrine is a classic illustration of what H.L.A. Hart has 
referred to as the "grading function" of the doctrine of mens 
rea. 
Such a rationale is, no doubt, a product of retributive 
thinking, and some commentators have attempted to explain the 
doctrine on other, more "acceptable" bases. In attempting 
to reconcile the doctrine with a utilitarian standpoint, 
Glanville Williams says that 
"The true view of provocation is that it is a concession 
to the lfra il ty of human natur.e r in those exceptional 
cases where the legal prohibition fails of effect." 63 
This concession must, however, be rega!:,ded as something of 
an anachronism since 
"there are in this orderly age hardly any circumstances 
in which it can be asserted that an ordinary man would 
kill another person merely out of passion". 64 
--------------~-~.-.-----
62. See Chapt. II. This assessme,nt is described as, "crude~" 
because it does not take account of other killings which 
proceed from equally understandable motives. E.g. from 
necessity or under duress, which the law treats as murder. 
63. [1954] Crim. L.R. 740, 742~_ 
64. Ibid. One may be permitted to wonder whether there is 
anything peculiar to "this age" which makes it any more 
"orderly" than the age of a hundred years ago, when the 
test was first formulated. 
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To overcome this difficulty, Williams argued that there are 
"categories of provocation", such as serious blows, or the 
sight of one'~ s spouse com..mi tting adultery, of which the rea son-
able man test is but a "misleading reformulation". When it is 
found that the conduct of the offender comes within the terms 
of one of these categories, there is no further rule that the 
blow or discovery is provocation only if an ordinary or 
reasonable man in the same circumstances would have killed. 
He reinforces this view by arguing that if the legal prohibit-
ion is not present to the mind of the offender at· the time 
when he is com~itting the offence, when it would not be present 
to the mind of the ordinary man either, it is a "curious 
confession of failure" on the part of the law to suppose that 
an ordinary man will still commit it, and to punish him even 
for a lesser offence. 
If this analysis were correct, provocation would be 
reduced to a series of rules, explica ble perhaps in terms of 
their history, but lacking any basis in current social 
attitudes and values. MOre important is the consequence that 
the reasonable man has been reduced to a functionless nonentity. 
With respect, Williams over-emphasises the need for special 
deterrence. Even if it is true that under provocation, a person 
does not reflect on the punishment awaiting him, it does not 
follow that the prohibition fails cf effect entirely. Nor 
does it follow that all jus~ification for imposing punishment 
is absent, or even that, in punishing the provoked person, the 
law is engaging in an exercise in general deterrence. Further, 
there need be nothing "absurd" in the statement tha t a 
reasonable or ordinary man may commit an offence punishable 
68. 
by life imprisonment, as Williams asserts, if the ordinary man 
test is seen as a reformulation of the idea that society, 
through the law, demands certain standards of restraint from 
its members. If the offender fails to comply with these 
standards, when an ordinary man would have done so, and the 
offender himself could have done so, a refusal to allow him 
the benefit of the defence is not only not absurd, but 
ethically perfectly defensible. 
No authority is needed for the proposition that, in the 
normal class of criminal case, the Co~~on Law65 requires 
proof of conduct on the part of the person whom it seeks to 
punish, coupled with certain mental attitudes towards that 
conduct g Until recently, it has been felt that, with occasional 
exceptions, the only culpable states of mind are intention and 
recklessness. 66 Both of these involve some measure of 
foresight and knowledge on the part of the actor, of the 
consequences and circumstances which constitute the actus 
reus of the crime with which he is charged. In general, these 
cognitive criteria have been regarded, as the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of responsibility; necessary because, 
without knowledge and foresight, a person is unable to avoid 
bringing about the prohibited consequence, and sufficient 
because it has been assumed that that possession of knowledge 
in some way includes the ability to control. 67 Hence, it has 
65. And in New Zealand by virtue of Section 20 of the Crimes 
Act, 1961. 
66. For a general discussion, see Smith and Hogan; 2nd ed. Ch. 5. 
67. These assumptions have been the object of criticism by, 
inter alia Cross, who argues that greater emphasis should 
be placed on "the accused IS control of the situation as 
distinct from his knowledge of relevant circumstances and 
foresight of relevant consequences". "The Mental Element 
in Crime" (1967) 83 L.Q.R. 215, 226. 
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been argued tha t there is no moral justific.ation in punishing 
negligence, which is the state of mind of a person who does 
not advert to the consequences of his actions, and which is, 
therefore, beyond his control. 68 
Similar objections have been levelled at the reasonable 
man test in provocation. Thus, Turner asserts that 
"It conflicts with the original basic jUstification 
for the admission of the defence of provocation for 
any man, which was that it could not be expected 
that man should be born with impregnable powers of 
self-control (omnipotentl!)nature' being responsible 
for this frailty) and that it would be morally wrong 
and cruel to punish a man for what he could not 
prevent himse lf from doing. II 69 
Recently, the view that it is morally objectionable to 
punish negligence has been subjected to the withering scrutiny 
70 
of Hart, who points out that the concept of negligence 
involves something more than the mere failure to advert; it 
includes also a standard of care, and is a failure to advert 
in circumstances in which the reasonable man would have adverted 
and complied with the standard demanded. Hart is not concerned 
with the more general question of why it is ever morally 
justifiable to punish at all, but only with the criteria 
according to which we select those whom we will punish and 
those whom we will not. The reason why intention and reckless-
ness are chosen is that the person who does think about his 
conduct could have done otherwise. His conclusion is that a 
person is punished in the case of negligence for failing to 
68. Turner; "Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law" M.A.C.L. 
195. 
69. Russell,' 12th ed. 535. And see Brown; "The Ordinary Man 
in Provocation" (1964) 13 1. C. L. Q. 203, 230. 
70 0 "Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibilityll. 
P. and R. 136 • 
70. 
advert when he could in fact have done so. 
"In some cases at leat: we may say 'he could have 
thought about what he was doing' with JUBt as much 
rational confidence as one can say of any,intent-
ional wrongdoing 'he could have done otherwise'." 71 
It is submitted that, with one or two minor modifications, 
this analysis is applicable with equal force in the context 
of provocation, which also involves assessing the conduct of 
the offender by reference to a standard. As was said by Lord 
72 Simonds L.e. in Bedder, the purpose of the objective test 
"is to invite the jury to consider the act of the 
accused by reference to a certain standard or norm 
of conduct and with this object the 'reasonable' 
or the 'average' or the hormal' man is invoked." 
Hart then qualifies his general principle by pointing 
out that 
"What is crucia 1 is that those whom we punish should 
have had, when they acted, the normal capacities, 
physical and mental, for doing what the law requires 
and abstaining from what it forbids and a fair 
opportunity to exercise these capacitie s." 
It has already been argued that, when an accused person pleads 
that he acted under the stres·s of a provocative incident, he 
is not saying that these capacities were entirely absent, 
but merely t!hat their exercise was for him a matter of abnorm::d 
difficulty. If,as Turner asserts, it genuinely is the case 
that the offender "could not prevent himself" from doing what 
he did, why is he not absolved from responSbility altogether? 
And how does the addition of the reasonable man test make the 
imposition of punishment any more morally indefensible? Since 
a successful plea of provocation involves a finding that the 
offender lost his self-control in circumstances in which an 
71. Ibid., 152. 
72. [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1119, .. 1123. 
71. 
ordinary man might 73 be expected to have done so, should he 
not still be acquitted altogether~ In either case he has showl 
according to Turner, that he could not prevent himself from 
committing homicide. 
There are, of course, some differences in the standard 
demanded in each case. In negligence, the standard is one of 
care, and in provocation, one of restraint. Further, 
compliance with the standard of care leads to a complete 
acquittal, whereas compliance with the standard of- restraint 
is a mitigating factor only. In the former, it is accepted by 
the law that the accused could" not have complied, wl~reas in 
the latter, the concession is only that the failure is under-
standable. 
But the two do share a significant number of features 
in common, and in particular th.e justification tha t the 
failure to comply with a standard with which the person being 
held responsible is capable of complying is punishable because 
others placed in the same situation would not have acted as 
he did. 
If this is the real function of the ordinary man test, 
the description of it as lIobjective" is somewhat misleading. 
That term is generally applied only where the question of 
responsibility is determined entirely independently of the 
accused himself. Since the doctrine of provocation does 
allow for the capacities of the accused to be taken into 
account, in the way which has been just outlined, insistence 
73. The word "might" is used, although in Nuttall [1956J 
Crim. L.R. 125, an appeal was taken on the grounds that 
the triaL judge had used "would" rather than "might". 
This argument was dismi,ssed on the grounds th~t the 
argument was "really verbaln _. There is no uniformity 
of usage throughout- the cases. 
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on the objectivity of the test tends to divert our attention 
from the fact that, in the majority of cases, the standard is 
one with which the of fender could have complied. 
Two considerations arising from this rationale, which have 
serious repercussions in the application of the test, must 
however, be mentioned. To begin with, not all persons have an 
equal capacity to measure up to the standard which the law 
demands. Some have idiosyncracies which render them more 
susceptible or vulnerable to incidents which would leave 
others without those traits, ordinary men, completely unmoved. 
In addition, it would seem that temperaments differ, and that 
some persons are more easily moved to wrath than others. The 
i.nevitable clash with the ordinary man test to which these 
considerations give rise will be considered at greater length 
below. 74 
The other serious difficulty is that views as to the degree 
~ 
of restraint which the law should demand are bound to differ; 
as the Privy Council has recognised,75 speculations as to what 
an ordinary man might have done, which form the basis of the 
test, are more accurately characterised as matters of opinion 
than as matters of fact. This introduces an element of 
uncertainty and flexibility into the application of the ordinary 
man standard. 
3. Factors to be Taken Into Account 
The range of incidents which prompt ordinary men to 
retaliate, and the factors wh.ich govern the ordinariness or 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
74. ,Post p g 121. 
75. Philli~ [1970J 2 A.C g And see Section 3 of the Homicide 
Act, 1957. 
73. 
otherwise of their behaviour, once the path of retaliation has 
been embarked upon, are many and varied. For this reason 
alone, it is readily apparent why Lord Goddard C.J. should 
76 have said in MCCarthx that 
"No Court has ever given, nor do we think can ever 
give, a definition of what constitutes a reasonable 
or an average man. That must be left to the 
collective good sense of the jury •• ' •• " 
But in every case in which the possibility of manslaugl1er by 
provocation arises, some considerations remain constant, and 
have been the subject of more particularised rules. 
(a) Reasonable Relationship 
One such, which has come into prominence in recent years, 
which is of particular importance where the alleged incident 
takes the form of an assault, is the degree of similarity 
between what was done to the offender and the way in which he 
behaved in response. The rule which has been formulated to 
govern the issue, and which is variously known as the reason-
able relation, retaliation, or proportion rule, was succinctly 
'stated in Mancini77 by Viscount Simon, who said 
"the mode of resentment must bear a reasona ble 
relationship to the provocation if the offence is 
to be reduced to manslaughter". 
No other aspect of the defence of provocation has been subjected 
to as much critical scrutiny and discussion; the soundness of 
the rule has been assailed from such wideranging standpoints 
as its logic and its practicality, and doubts have also been 
cast on its heredity, and its precise status as part of the 
present law .. 
76. [1954] 2 Q.B. 105. 
77. [1942] A.C. 1, 9.. Hereafter referred to as the "M.a,ncini 
rule" • 
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(i) The Rule Explained 
Before dealing with these criticisms, it is necessary to 
state rather more explicitly precisely what Viscount Simon had 
in mind. An analysis of the cases shows that the reasonable 
relationship rule has manifested itself in two rather different 
waysq In Mancini, emphasis was placed on the nature of the 
weapon used by the offender, and it was held that 
"to retort in the heat of passion induced by 
provocation, by a simple blow, is a very different 
thing from making use, of a deadly' instrument like 
a concealed dagger"o 
Ql.lit:e apart from the fact that a weapon is as dangerous as its 
user intends it to be, a literal interpretation of this would 
seem to require that the person provoked should himself have 
been made the object of a ,near homicida 1 a ttack, before he is 
78 
entitled to the benefit of the defence. Reasonable proport-
ion appears in a slightly different garb, also enunciated by 
79 Viscount Simon, in Holmes Y..2. D.P.P o There it: was said that 
the evidence of provocation must have been such tha t the jury 
could form the view 
"that a rea sonable person so provoked could be driven, 
through transport of pa ssion and loss of self-control, 
to the degree and method and continuance of violence 
which produces the death ". 
What seems to be required by this aspect of the rule is that, 
unless the offender has been subjected to particularly repre-
hensible antagonism, he should expend his fury in the course of 
the first blow or two, and is otherwise not entitled to the 
benefit of the defence. Both aspects of this merge in the 
Mancini Rule. 
78. See post p. 102 for further discussion. 
79. [1946J A.C. 588, 597. 
75. 
(ii) Histo£Y 
It seems to have been accepted by the Institutional 
writers that where a deadly weapon was made use of by the person 
provoked, the provocation must have been greater than where no 
weapon, or a weapon not likely to kill was used. 80 What does 
seem clear is that, if the rule existed at all, it was by no 
means rigidly applied, and the mere use of a deadly weapon did 
not, ipso facto, disqualify the defendant in either Taylor81 
or Snow,82 although in neither case was the offender himself 
the object of an attack with anything more than fES. 
80. See EoG. Brown; "The Subjective Element in Provocation" 
(1959) 1 Malaya L.R. 288, 299. It is suggested with some 
diffidence that the authenticity of thi.s supposed rule is 
not entirely above suspicion. In Welsh (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 
336, W.F. Finlason Esq., the reporter states in a footnote 
that "It is laid down by all the 'authorities that the 
question is as to the amount of provocation, especially 
where a deadly weapon is used. 'If a man kill another 
suddenly, without any, or without considerable provocat-
ion, the law implies malice, and the homicide is murder; 
but if the provocation were great, and such as might 
greatly have excited him, the killing is manslaughter 
only. '" (1 Hale 460; Fost 240) The writer has been unable 
to trace this passage in Hale's History of the Pleas of 
the Crown, ed. Emlyn, pub. E. Lynch 1778, which purports 
to be unedited, and in which the page numbers "correspond 
exactly with those of the Folio". Finlason also cites 
the fo 1 lowing passage from Foster 292. "In considering, 
however, whether the killing upon provocation amounts to 
murder or manslaughter, the instrument wherewith the 
homicide were effected with a deadly weapon, the provocat-
ion must indeed have been great to extenuate the offence 
to manslaughter if with a weapon or other means not likely 
or intended to cause death, a less degree of provocation 
will suffice; in fact, the mode of resentment must be in 
a rea sonable proportion to the provocation to reduce the 
offence to manslaughter." Again, the writer has been 
unable to trace this passage in Foster,3rd ed. Dodson, 
either at the p:1ge cited or elsewhere.. Interestingly, 
when Counsel in Noel [1960J N.Z .. L.R. 212 suggested that the 
Mancini rule was ,not part of the common law before 1942, 
it was this footnote rather than the original text itself 
which the Court of Appeal relied on in refutation. 
81. (1771) 5 BUrr. 2793; 98 E.R. 466. 
82. (1776) 1 Leach 151; 168 E.R. 178. 
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Further, what might actually constitute a "deadly weapon" 
for these purposesdoes not seem to have been particularly close-
ly defined. In Rankin,83 after a brawl in a tavern between 
soldiers, t_he prisoner went outside and procured a pitchfork, 
and the judges held that the case was manslaughter only. By 
contrast, in Thorpe,84 in which the prisoner had been "fighting 
up a.nd down" with his victim, the jury was told by Bayley J. 
that 
"The foot is an instrument likely to produce death. 
If death happens in a fight of that description, 
it is murder and not manslaughter." 
One explanation of the effect and purport of the rule was 
. b N J' W' 85 h ld th' th t . t t g1.ven y ares • 1.n 1.ggS, W 0 to e Jury a 1. was 0 
consider 
"whether the stake which has thus ultimately deprived 
the boy of existence, and which lying on the ground 
~wa.s the first thing the prisoner saw in his heat of 
passion, is, or is not, under such circumsta,nces and 
in such a situation an improper instrument". 
There are a number of other cases which cast doubts on the 
proposition that it was necessary that the offender should 
have observed some proportional limits in his choice of weapon. 
In Wnitely,86 it was considered that if adeadt'y weapon were 
drawn in the heat of blood after an exchange of blows, the 
verdict would be manslaughter only. As a corollary, it was 
decided in Smith,87 that if the person had entered the fight 
83. (1803) R. & R. 43; 168 E.R. 674. 
84" (1829) 1 Lew. 171; 168 E.R. 1001. 
85. (1776) 1 Leach 378. 
86. (1829) 1 Lew" 173; 168 E.R. 1002. 
87. (1837) 8 C. & P. 160. 
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with the purpose of using the weapon all along, the verdict 
would be murder. The same would be true if a person engaged 
in a fight were to run away with the express punpose of 
obtaining a knife, but if his thoughts were solely to protect 
himself, the v.erdict could still be manslaughter. 88 And 
89 in bYncg, it was considered material that the knife which 
the offender had used was one whtch he was accustomed to 
carry about with him. It is submitted that the effect of 
these decisions, and the state of the law was aptly summarised 
by Park B. in Thomas,90 when he said that 
"If a person receives a blow, and immediately avenges 
it with any instrument that he may happen to have in 
his hand, then the offence will be only manslaughter, 
provided the blow is to be attributed to the passion 
of anger arising from tha t previous provocation." 
This line of authority shows that no particular significance 
was attached to the nature of the weapon as such. What it 
does show is that stress was placed on the circumstances in 
which the weapon came to be acquired and used. If the 
offender showed "thought, contrivance and design,,91 in his 
mode of possessing himself of the weapon, he was not entitled 
to the benefit of the defence. This qualification is capable 
of explanation on the basis that the offender was not then 
acting in the heat of passion at all. But it lis equally 
consistent with an assumption, (admittedly inarticulate), 
that no ordinary person would have behaved as the offender 
88. Kessal (1824) 1 C. & P. 437. 
89 0 ' (1832) 5 C. & Po 324 •. 
900 (1837) 7 C. & P. 817. 
91. HayWard (1833) 6 C. & P. 157 0 
did had he had time and. opportunity to reflect on his conduct. 
At the same time, it must be admitted that traces of the 
. 92 
purported rule appeared on occasionQ In Langstaffe, in 
which the twelve year old defendant had been charged tith 
manslaughter, Hullock B. stated quite uncompromisingly that 
"If without adequate provocation, a person strikes 
another with a deadly weapon, likely to occasion. 
death, although he had no previous malice against 
the party, yet he is· to be presumed to have had 
such malice at the moment from the circumstances, 
and he is guilty of murder." 
Th·· . d ( . b' ). Ha 93. 1.S sent1.ment was re1.terate, aga1.n 0 1.ter 1.n gen, 1.n 
which the defendant, who had been requested by his victim, a 
policeman,to refrain from playing his bagpipes in the street 
at 11.30 p.m., alleged that he had been first assaulted by 
the victim. Coltman J. told the jury that if the assault 
had been no more than laying a hand on the of fender "to 
give effect to his remonstrance", the case would be murder, 
because the provocation was slight, and the weapon used, a 
razor, dangerous. Apart from a reference to the dangerous 
weapon rule in Sherwood,94 in which the jury was told tha t not 
every~ovocative blow would reduce murder to manslaughter 
particularly where "the prisoner appears to have resented a 
blow by using a weapon calculated to cause death", and the 
footnote in Welsh,95 there seems to have been no further 
reference to it, even in cases in which one might have 
------_ ..... -------------------
92 • ( 1827 ) 1 Lew. 162 ; 168 E. R. 998 • 
93. (1837) 8 C. & P. 167. 
94. (1844) 1 C. & K. 556; 174 E.R. 936. 
95. See supra n.80. 
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expected it,96 until its resurrection in Mancini. 
From time to time, the law has also been troubled by 
those cases in which the retaliation takes a particularly 
b 1 f B h H 1 97 d H k" 98 1" h f' d" ruta orm. ot a e, an aw Lns, exp aLn t e Ln Lng 
99 
of Holloway, on the basis that the killing was an act of 
deliberate cruelty. Foster, in dealing at some length with 
three cases 100 in which the provocative incident could not 
have been regarded as particularly provocative, both criticises 
them on the basis of the proportion rule, and brings to light 
facts which do not appear in the Reports themselves which 
show tha t the incidents were more provocative than they might 
otherwise appear to have been. East stated that 101 
"Where the punishment inflicted for a slight trans-
gression of any sort is outrageous in its nature, 
either in the manner of the continuance of it, and 
beyond all proportion to the offence, it is rather 
to be considered as the effect of a brutal and 
diabolical malignity than of human frailty." 
There is, however, no evidence that this opinion found any 
favour with the judges, at least where it was clear that the 
offender was acting in response to a legally provocative 
incident such as an assault, and in the heat of pass.ion. 
96. See e.g. Hall (1928) 21 Cr.App.R. 48, and Cobbet~ (1940) 
28 Cr.App.R. 11, in both of which the verdict of murder 
was reduced even though the retaliation was with a knife. 
97 Q 1 Hale P.C. 454. 
98. 1 Hawkins P.C. c.31, s.39. And see Fost. 292. 
99. (1628) Croo Car. 131; 79 E.R. 715. 
100. Fost. 292-295. Stedman, Tranter and Reason and Rowy1ey. 
101. 1 East p.C. 234. 
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Certainly in the case of Ayes,102 in which the heavily built 
offender hit his much smaller opponent with a fist several 
times, pushed him to the ground and then "gave him two or 
three grea t stamps in the stomach and belly", no mention is 
made of the necessity for proportion, and the' only provocation 
which could have been relied on was the conduct of the 
victim in trying to defend hImself, after he had been attacked 
for stealing a fellow prisoner IS tobacco pouch. The case 
most frequently cited in support of the existence of a 
proportion rule in this sense before Mancini, is the case of 
Thomas. 103 There, it is true, Baron Parke said 
"suppose for ins tance, a blow were given and the 
party struck beat the other IS head to pieces by continued, 
cruel and repeated blows; then you could not attribute 
that act to the passion of anger, and the offence wollld 
be murder." 
At first sight, that certainly seems to be impress:he and 
cogent enough authority. But apart from the fact that the 
indictment in this case was not for murder, but malicious 
stabbing, the import of this statement can only be appreciated 
when it is read in context. The offender; who was drunk, had 
been seen in a tavern shortly before the incident marching up 
and down with an opened sword stick in his hand,and was heard 
to say, "If any man strikes me, I will make him repent it", 
a threat which he carried out shortly afterwards when his 
victim assaulted him. The issue before the jury was whether 
this statement was merely an idle 'threat or whether Thomas 
really had determined'beforehand to strike with his sword 
102. (1810) R. & R. 166; 168 E.R. 741. 
103.' (1837) 7 C. & P. 817, 819. See E.g. McCarthY: [1954J 
2 Q.B. 105, 112. Noel [1960J N.Z.L.R. 212~ 219. 
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stick anyone who assaulted him; whether in other words there 
was any causal connection between the assault made upon him, 
and the retaliation. In these particular circumstances, it 
is submitted, the way in which the offender avenged the blow, 
including the number of blows he administered, would be some 
evidence of what he had determined beforehand. It is a long 
step to say that the same consideration will be of relevance 
in every future case. 104 Further, as has already been argued, 
Baron Parke had already decided for himself that the assault , 
.since it was violent, would have been sufficient to provoke 
the offender;. the only question was whether it rea lly had done 
so, and it is contended that Baron Parke meant nothing further 
by his remarks. 
EVen in the very year in which Mancini was decided, it 
is by no means clear tha t anything in the nature of the 
proportion rule existed as part of the law. In Prince, 105 the 
provocative incident consisted of indecent suggestions and 
actions, and, according to the All England Report, but not 
the Criminal Appeal 'Report, a glancing blow with an axe. In 
retaliation, Prince struck his victim at least ten times with 
a fireman !Is axe, four of which would have proved fatal.;> The 
Court of Criminal Appeal substituted a verdict of manslaughter 
on the grounds that the jury had been misdirected as to the 
burden of proof. No mention was made of the proportion 
---------------------
104. Supra po 36 fn. 82. 
105. (1941) 28 Cr"App.R,. 60; 3 All E.R. 37. See the note by 
P.A •. Landon (1943) 59 L.Q.R .. 107, where it is stated that 
'rucker J., a member of the Court of ,Criminal Appeal 
"explained ••• that the indecent words in that case were 
followed by an indecent assault". The occasion of this 
explanation is not specified. 
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rule, whereas it is difficult to see how, had the rule been 
part of the law, it could be sa id tha t . there wa s any evidence 
of provocation (;It all. 
(iii) Present Status 
Whatever doubts there may be about the historical 
credentials of the Mancini rule, it has since become the 
source of speculation, co~~ent and disagreement. One compli-
-
cation is that the status of the rule is, in part, a product 
of the respective functions of judge and jury. Essentially, 
the problem is whether the rule is an element of the defence 
in addition to the ordinary man test, or whether it is simply 
a factor to be taken into account by the tribunal in deciding 
how an ordinary man might have behaved. If the former is the 
case, ,then the Mancini rule would seem to have added a new 
element altogether. It would then be open to the trial judge 
to either apply'the test himself and rule that there was no 
evidence of provocation, or jf he did decide to leave the 
issue, to direct the jury that they must decide for themselves 
whether some degree of reasonable relationship existed. In 
these senses, the rule may be said to be one of law. If, 
however, the latter more accurately describes the status of 
the rule, the judge could again decide for himself whether 
there was evidence of provocation,106 but he would have to 
decide the issue as part of a more general question of how an 
ordinary man might have been affected bywhat: was done or said 
to the offender. He would then be required to direct the jury 
106. Unless enjoined by Statute not to do so, as is the case·in 
England. Sectio·n 3 of the Homicide Act, 1957. 
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in the same way .. 
It is suggested that these are the logically consistent 
possibilities inherent in the problem if an attempt is to be made 
to force the rule into a fact/law dichotomy. Not surprisingly, 
ion view of the complicated nature of the issues involved, the 
rule has tended to defy any such attempts at classification, and 
has hovered instead somewhere between the two stools. Further, 
since Mancini was decided, legislation impinging on the question 
has been passed both in England and New Zealand, and the respective 
laws may not be identical. 
Immediately after the decision in Ma.ncini, the Courts tended 
h " "d dIG h" 107 to treat t e reqULrement as an ~n epen ent one. n aut ~er, 
the trial judge refused to permit counsel to address the jury on 
provocation, and the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed tha t he had 
taken the correct course, saying that 
"the,m6de of resentment must bear some relation to the 
alleged provocation. A Bren· gun which fires bullets in 
quick succession is one thing, but a woman showing 
preference for a particular lover is another". 
108 In Att. Gen. for CeyLon v. Perera, the trial judge permitted 
the issue to go to the jury, but directed it tha t the plea could 
not succeed unless the action taken by the offender was "reasonably 
commensurate" with the degree of provocation offered to him. The 
Court of Criminal Appeal of Ceylon set aside the conviction, but 
this was restored by the Privy Council. It was held that the 
Mancini rule applied in Ceylon, on the basis of what can only be 
described as a non-sequitur. In the section of the Code with which 
" 109 the JUdicial Comm~ttee was concerned, the words "grave" and 
~---------------------------------------------.---------------------------------
107. (1943) 29 Cr.Atrp.R. 113, 119. 
108. [1953J A.C. 200, 206. 
109. Section 294 of the Ceylon Penal Code. 
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"sudden" were used. Lord Goddard expressed the opinion, it is 
submitted correctly, that such words are "relative". He then 
says, however, that the standard by which the re lativity is 
to be measured is the nature of the provocative act. Serious-
ness 
"must at least to a great extent be decided by comparing 
the nature of the provocation with that of the retaliat-
ory act. It Ls impossible to determine whether the 
provocation was grave without at the same time consider-
ing the act which resulted from the provocation, other-
wise some quite minor and trivial provocation might be 
thought to excuse the use of a deadly weapon. A blow 
with a fist or with the open hand .. is undoubtedly 
provocation, and provocation which may cause the 
suf ferer to lose a degree of· control, but will not 
excuse the use of a deadly weapon." 
But if the' offender dd lose his self-:-control and kill, surely 
he at least regarded the provocation was "grave". If a- man 
were, quite unexpectedly, to discover his wife co~~itting 
adultery, and to react in the most phlegmatic of ways, could 
we not still properly say that the provocation was "grave"? 
Surely 'the standard which the law has chosen, the anticipated 
reaction of a hypothetical ordinary man is not only a "possible" 
test of gravity, but a perfectly adequate one. If the issue 
were to be judged from the way in which the offender reacted, 
would it not always be possible to say that the provocation 
giv.en wa s "grave". 
Lord Goddard's use of the word "justify" suggests, it 
is contended, that he considered Mancini to have added a 
further element to the defence. 110 A similar approach to the 
rule is evident in McCarthy.111 In the course of argument he 
110. cf. contra in Noel [1960J N.Z.L.R. 212, 219. 
Ill. [1954J 2 Q.B. 105. And see Southgate [1963J 1 W.L.R. 809, 
in which the trial judge assented to counse I' s submission 
that the use of the word "justify" was apt to be misleadi,ng. 
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posed the following question: 
"Assuming that there was provocation which could cause 
a man to lose his self-control, how can that degree of 
violence be justified even if he were drunk. Have you 
considered Mancini?" 
The facts of MCCarthy bear a striking resemblance to those of 
P . 112 -ll!l~. The appellant claimed that he had been the object 
of indecent suggestions and a sodomitical attack. He then 
beat his victim's head on the ground, inflicting four fractures 
of the skull. Provocation was left to the jury by the trial 
judge, but with the direction that it was a question for them 
to decide whether a reasonable man could have been driven to 
the degree, method and continuance of violence displayed by 
the offender. This direction was upheld. It was considered 
that the alleged provocation would have extenuated 
"a blow, perhaps more than one,~ it could not have 
justified the infliction of such injuries.... If 
a man who is provoked retaliates with a blow from 
his fist on another grown man a jury may- well 
consider, and probably would, that there was 
nothing excessive in the retaliation even though 
the blow might cause the man to fall and fracture 
his skull, for the provocation might well merit a 
blow with a fist. It would be quite another thing, 
however, if the person provoked not only struck the 
man, but continued to rain blows upon or to beat 
his head on the ground." 
Finally, Lord Goddard repeats the sentiment which he expressed 
in Att.-Gen for Ceylon v. Perera, that what would govern the 
opinion of the jury as to what constitutes the reaction of a 
rea sona ble man 
"would be the nature of the retaliation used by the 
provoked person". 
It is submitted that this case clearly elevates the 
proportion test into something more than a mere factor to be 
taken into account by the tribunal. True, Lord Goddard does 
112. (1941) 28 Cr.App.R. 60; 3 All E.;R. 37. 
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rationalise the test in reasonable man terms, but because he 
says that the reasonable man always reacts with proportion, a 
. . h h" h h d' 113 h . . . v~ew w~t w.~c ot ers ~sagree, e ~s ~n ect stat~ng 
a proposition of law. 
This seems to have been how the test was subsequently 
understood. 114 In Bedder, the jury was told by the trial 
judge that 
"The provocation. must be such as would reasonably 
jus tify the violence used, the use of a knife". 
However, in Chan Kau, 115 the Privy Council quashed a conviction 
of murder after the .trial judge had ruled that the jury could 
not find a verdict of manslaughter upon provocation, and 
refrained from comt"llenting on Crown Counsel IS argument that the 
requirements of the reasonable retaliation rule had not been 
116 
satisfied. More surprisingly, perhaps, in MCPherson, a 
conviction of murder was upset by the Court of Criminal Appeal 
on the basis of a misdirection as to the burden of proof. On 
the day before the fatal incident, the offender had bought a 
shot-gun and sawn it off. As the victim cycled past him, 
hurling abuse and threats, he was shot four times, an action 
which required the offender to break and re-load the weapon. 
Lord Goddard C.J. said that, had the. trial judge refused to 
put 'the is sue of provocation at all, the Court would not have 
113. See E.g. the Supreme Court of Hong Kong in Ng Yiu-nam [1963J 
Crim.LoR. 850 where the proposition is described as 
"contrary to connnon sense". 
114. [1954J 1 W.L.R. 1119. 
115. [1955J A.C. 206. 
116. (1957) 41 Cr.App.R. 213. Cf. Fantle [1959J Crim. L.R. 584, 
where the absence of any reference to the Mancini rule is 
commented upon, and Elliot, "The Interpretation of the 
Homicide Act, 1957". [1960J Crim. L.R. 5, 11. 
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interfered, but he considered that, since the trial judge had 
adopted that course, he was obliged to put the issue fairly 
before the jury, and the verdict was "reluctantly" set aside. 
With the passage of the Homicide Act, 1957,117 the English 
law may have changed somewhat. Indeed, some commentators have 
gone so far as to suggest that the Mancini rule may have been 
abolisbSd altogether. lIS In a thorough discussion of the 
subject,119 English has shown fairly conclusively that such a 
change was not intended by the legislature, and doubts that the 
rule has been abolished aLtogether. However, because Section 3 
undoubtedly does confer on the jury alone the task of deciding 
whether or not a reasonable man would have reacted as the 
accused did, the status of the rule has been affected to the 
extent that it is now only one of the factors which the jury 
may consider in its determination of that question. 
-
This opinion seems to be borne out by' the latest judicial 
pronouncements. In Walker,120 the Court of Criminal Appeal 
acknowledged .that there may be some force in the submission 
that the Mancini rule is no longer good law) but a t the same 
117. In particular, Section 3 which reads, "Where on a charge 
of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find 
too t the person charged was provoked (by things done or 
by things said or by both together) to lose his self-
control, the question whether the provocation was enough 
to make a reasonable man to do a s he did shall be left 
to be determined by the jury; and in determining that 
ql.le stion the jury shall take into account everything both 
done and said according to the effect which, in their 
opinion, it would have on a reasonable man." 
lIS. [1963J Crim. L.R. 507; [1965J Crim. L.R. 304 and 729. 
[1967J Crim. L.Ro 711; [1969J Crim. L.R. 249. 
119. "What DID Section Three do to the Law of Provocation" 
[1970] Crim L.R. 249. 
120. [1969J 1 W.L.Ro 311, 316. 
time stated that 
"one vital element for the jury's considerationin 
all these cases is the proportion between the 
provoca tion and the retaliation". 
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And in Phillips,121 in which the Privy Council was considering 
an appeal from Jamaica based on a provision worded identically 
to the Homicide Act,122 the view was expressed that the :Mancini 
rule remains part of the lawo However, it was also said that 
the defence consists of two elements only, namely 
"'Was the defendant provoked into losing his self-
control? '" and "'would a rea sonable man have reacted 
to the same provocation in the sane way as the 
accused did?'" 
It is in deciding the second of these questions that the 
:Mancini'rule is of releva,nce, al though it may be "prudent to 
avoid the use of the precise words" in which Viscount Simon 
formulated the rule in :Mancini, presumably because there is 
a danger that the jury might think that the rule was one of 
123 law which it was bound to apply. 
If this is the case, the statement of Lord Devlin in 
Lee Chun-Chuen12~ can no longer be regarded as good law. 
There, it is stated that 
"Provocation in law consists mainly of three elements -
the act of provocation, the loss of self-control, 
both actual and reasonable, and the ret'aliation 
proportionate to the provocation". 
Similar views vere expressed after the Homicide Act in Wardrope~25 
121. [1969J 2 A.C. 130, 137. 
122. Section 3c of the Offences Against the Person (AmendmemJ.t) 
Law (Jamaica), 1958. 
123. For a discussion of·· the apparent -inconsistencies in 
Phillips and Walker, see Glazebrook, "The Bad Tempered but 
Reasonable Man" (1969) Camb. L.J. 172. 
124. [1963J A.C. 200, 231. 
125. [1960J Crim. L.R. 770, 771. 
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Church126 127 and Adams. If what has been said subseque,ntly 
in Walker and Phillips is now the law, these decisions would 
no longer seem to be correct. 
To summarise, the present English law may be stated as 
follows; where it appears thst something was said or done to 
the accused as a result of which he lost his self-control and 
killed, the issue of provocation must be left to the jury. The 
latter must then decide whether the accused did lose his self-
control, and whether a reasonable man would have behaved as 
the accused did,and one factor which they must take into 
account in deciding this is whether there existed a degree of 
proportion between what was done to the offender and his 
retaliation. What is clear is that the trial judge may no 
longer rule that, because the provocation and the retaliation 
were disproportionate, there is no question fit for the 
consideration of the jury. This point was expressly decided 
in Phillips,128 and in its light, it may now safay be concluded 
that, whatever else its status may be, the Mancini rule cannot 
be characterised as a rule of law. 
Whereas the recent English trend ha s been to move away 
from treating reasonable relationship as though it were an 
independent element of the doctrine, the New Zealand law has 
tended to move, if anything, in the opposite direction. It 
is a simple enough matter to state the law, but that simplicity 
is deceptive, and the current status of the rule cannot 
126. [1966J Q.B. 59. 
127. (1961) 12 C.L.Y. 1954. 
128 • [1969 J 2 A. C. 130, 137. And c f • 
2 All E.R. 833. 
Cascoe [1970J 
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readily be seen apart from its application in practice. It 
may be stated in two parts. 
1. "the relationship or disproportion between the acts 
or words of provocation and the mode of retaliation 
is a factor, and indeed a weighty factor, to be 
considered by the jury in considering whether there 
was provocation. It is not, however, to be elevated 
into a matter of law." 129 
2. In deciding whether there is evidence of provocation, 
"It is necessary for the judge to ask himself, 'could 
the evidence support the view that the provocation 
was sufficient to l~ad a reasonable person to do waat 
the accused did?1 In short, 'that a reasonable person 
so provoked cou ld be driven, through the transport of 
passion and loss of self-control, to the degree and 
method and continuance of violence which produces the 
death I." 130 
There was a reference to the dangerous weapon aspect of 
the rule in Jackson,131 where Chapman J. told the jury that 
"It is one thing to provoke a blow with a fist, and 
quite another thing to provoke a stab with a knife 
of the deadly type you see here.... Fists and 
walking-sticks are very different from firearms and 
knives. " 
But the learned judge expressly stated that he was not laying 
down any rule on the subject, and explained that this was one 
factor which the jury should take into account in deciding 
the question of sufficiency. No mention of the rule is made 
in Kahu,132 in which the offender perpetrated a double killing, 
inflicting fatal injuries with a razor and a claw-hammer, 
although Mancini IS case was cited on another point. 
The present law was perhaps adumbrated in Black,133 in 
'-129. Noel [1960J N.Z-.L.R. 212, 219. 
130. Anderson [1965J N.Z.LoR. 29, 36. 
131. [ 1918J NaZ.L.R. 365. 
132. [1947J N.Z.L.R. 368. 
133. [1956J N.Z.L.R. 204. 
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which the Mancini rule was applied, and made the basis for 
the Court's ruling that there had been no miscarrtge of 
justice within the meaning of Section 4 of the Criminal Appeal 
Act, 1945. There was a history of ill-feeling between the 
parties, and in giving evidence, the offender stated that 
his victim had called him a "yellow Irish bastard", and 
punched him in the left eye. It was argued that this con-
stituted sufficient provocation to reduce the killing to 
manslaughter. There is no mention in the Report of the trial 
judge's direction on the issue, but he had earlier told the 
Grand Jury that there seemed to be no "opening" of provocationo 
In effect, the Court of Appeal ruled that there was no 
evidence of provocation, 
"for it is~apparent that the blow- wa s intentiona lly 
delivered at a vital part of the~victim(s body with 
a sharp weapon and with considerable force at a point' 
of time when the appellant was not in personal peril 
and when it could not possibly be said that the 
provocation alleged by the appellant justified the 
use of a knife". 
It is submitted that, having regard to the state of the N.Z. 
Statute in 1956,134 which quite clearly made the question of 
SUfficiency one for the jury, this decision is not above 
criticism. To begin with, the passage cited shows a dangerous 
degree of confusion between provocation and self-defence. 
Further, there was here, evidence, albeit contradicted and 
unpromising evidence, that the offender had been insulted and 
struck. But the fact that there was overwhelming evidence 
134. Section 184(3), Crimes Act, 1908. Which read "Whether any 
particular wrongful act or insult amounts to provocation, 
and whether the person provoked was actually deprived of 
the power of self-control by the provocation he received, 
are questions of fact". And see Jack..§.Q!l [1918J N.Z.L.R. 
365. 
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against the offender does not prevent there being some evidence 
in his favour. HO~N can it be said, in a capital case, that 
there is no "miscarriage of justice" when the jury is 
precluded from considering a point which it may have resolved 
in his favour. As Lord Tucker put it in Bullard,135 
"Every man on trial for murder has the right to have 
the issue of manslaughter left to the jury if there 
is any evidence upon which such a verdict can be 
given. To deprive him of this right must of necessity 
constitute a grave miscarriage of justice, and it is 
idle to speculate what verdict the jury would have 
reached." 
Be that as it may, the idea that the Mancini rule had been 
transplanted into New Zealand law in spite of the wording of 
the relevant legislation, appears to have taken root. In the 
case of Noel,136 almost certainly the origin of the present 
law, the question was canvassed at length, and for these reasons 
the ca se warrants a deta iled examina tion. The offender had 
caused the death of his wife by inflicting thirty stab wounds 
with a pair of scissors which, it was conceded, were readily 
at hand when the parties quarrelled. In his direction to the 
jury, the trial judge laid considerable emphasis on the mode 
of retaliation. He read the jury a passage from Duffy', 137 
commented on the relationship question and concluded his summing 
up with a passage, acknowledged by the Court of Appeal to be 
"unhappily phra-sed", in which he said 
"you must act on the sudden and also with the mode 
of resentment in proportion to the insult_received". 
135. [1957J A.C. 635. 
136. [196~ N.Z.L.R. 212. 
137. [1949J 1 All E.R. 932; 933 which reads. "Secondly, in 
considering whether provocation has or has not been made 
out, you must consider the retalia tion in provocation 
that is to say, whether the mode of resentment bears some 
proper and reasonable relationship to the sort of provocat-
ion that has been given. Fists might be answered with fists, 
but not with a deadly weapon, and that is a factor you have 
to bear in mind when you are considering the question of 
provocation." 
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When the jury returned for further direction on provocation, 
the judge again emphasised the relationship qu:; stion, and 
concluded, 
"The substantial question may be, and this is a 
question for you,'whether or not what the accused 
did bore any proper and reasonable relationship 
to the provocation that he received, If you think 
that it did, then you would be justified in reduc-
ing the charge of murder to one of manslaughter. 
If, as twelve practical men, applying your common-
sense to the whale of the evidence, you should 
consider that what he did was out of proportion to 
the provocation that he received, then you would 
be en titled, ••• to convict him of murder." 
Counsel for the appellan·t does not appear to have argued 
that this raised the proportion test to one of law. Rather, 
he contended that the trial. judge had in effect made the rule 
a "condition precedent" to the application of the provocation 
Section •. He then lev~lled a sustained attack on the rule, 
by arguing that when the Criminal Code was drafted, enacted 
in 1893 and later in 1908, the Mancini rule was not pert of 
the Common law and could not therefore have been i,ntended by 
the legislature. Subsequent developments in the Common law 
could not affect the New Zealand position. By virtue of S,184(3) 
of the Crimes Act 1908, sufficiency was to be treated as a 
jury question. 
In reply, the Court undermined the premise on which this 
impressive argument was based by saying that the Judge had 
I ft th ' t th . . f f 138 e e 1ssue 0 e Jury as a quest10n a act. Having 
done that, the Court then ruled that this approach was 
consistent with both the Common Law and the Crimes Act 1908. 
Reference was made to Att-Gen. for-Ceylon v ,Perera, and in 
138. Cfe the directions of-the Trial Judges in Lewis and 
Dougherty post p.9S. 
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particular to the passage which has been criticised above as 
a non-sequitur.,139 It did not mat'ter that the New Zealand 
provisions do not use the word "grave"; the same consequence 
as that contended for by Lord Goddard was achieved in New 
Zealand by the requirement that the insult or wrongful act be 
of such a nature as to deprive an ordinary person of the 
power of self-control. 
It is submitted that the Court's evident desire to achieve 
conformity with the Common Law gives rise to some misgivings, 
especially where this involves adding to legislation an 
unwarranted gloss. All that the Section required was tha t 
the incident should have been of such a nature as to deprive 
the ordinary person of the power of self-control. It did not 
go on to require speculation by the jury that the ordinary man 
would have reacted in every respect as the accused did. 140 
This is not to deny that the law could logically do so, but 
" "11 b d h h " " 1"" ' 141 ~t w~ e argue t at sUc a requ~rement ~s unrea ~st~c, 
and having regard to the fact that the law did not (and still 
d t) 1 " . 142 h d "." bl oes no express y ~mport ~t, t e ec~s~on ~s a regretta e 
one. 
Be that as it may, Noel is undoubtedly still good law. Not 
only was the point reiterated in McGregor,143 but on two sub-
sequent occasions, the Court of Appeal has directed a new trial 
139. SUpra p.83. 
140. For an elaboration of the importance of this point, see 
White; "A Note on Provocation" [1970J Crim. L.R. 446. 
141. Post p.100. 
142. As it imported the tilllE! element by the use of the word 
"sudden". Section 184(1) CrilllE!s Act, 1908. 
143. [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069. 
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on the grounds that the trial judge elevated the 'rule into one 
of law. In Lewis,144 the Court h~ld that it was a grave mis-
direction to tell a jury that 
"The law is quite clear that the retaliation and the 
mode of resentment must bear a proper and reasonable 
relation to the provocation itself". 
. 145 And in Doughert~, it was held that the trial judge had 
erred when the jury was directed that 
"You as a jury must also consider whether the killing 
bears any proper and reasonable relation to the 
provocation given. You have to consider whether the 
provocation here given, that is to say the blow on 
the head with the chopper, bore a reasonable relation-
ship to the killing in retaliation. If you think the 
act done is altogether out of proportion to the 
provocation given, the defence is not established." 
These directions are cited at some length to show what the 
Court means when it speaks of elevating the test into a 
proposition of law. It is, with respect, very difficult to 
see any difference in sUbstance between what was said in Noel 
and in Lewis and Doughert~. Indeed, in Noel1s case, counsel 
pointed out that many English dicta appeared to treat the 
proportion rule as one of law, and cited Russell on Crime, 
11th ed., 612 in support of this interpretation. The Court 
agreed tha t even if these dicta represented English law, they 
did not apply :in New Zealand. But one of the three cases 
to which Russell refers 146 is the case of Duffy, and the trial 
judge in Noel had actually read the direction on proportion 
147 from Duffy to the jury. This point appears to have been 
blithely overlooked. 
-------------------, 
144. (1962) unreported. C .A. 92/62. 
145. [1966J N.Z.L.R. 890. 
146. The other two are Gauthier (1943) 29 Cr.App.R. 113; and 
McCarthy [1954J 2 Q.Bo 105. 
147. For the text of which see supra n.137. 
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What these cases illustrate very clearly, it is submitted, 
is that it is extremely difficult for a trial judge to direct 
~ 
the jury in terms of the rea sonable relationship rule without 
creating the impression that he is enunciating a point of 
law. The difficulty is perhaps this; there is a ,strong feeling 
that, once a person, (either an ordinary man or the offender 
himself) has "fos t his self-control", he is apt to behave in 
the most irrational of ways; his violence, once he has . 
determined to ) resort to it, and once he has formed the 
. 148 
intention to kill, is likely to be extreme. If a jurynan 
who does hold such views is then told that one of the factors 
which he should take into account is the reasonable relation-
ship rule is he not likely to think that this is a rule which 
he must take into account, even when he is told tha t the 
question is one of "fact" for him to decide? If his own 
experience leads him to·believe differently, how can he think 
otherwise than that the law is imposing some sort of limitation 
which he is not free to ignore? It is appreciated that 
difficulties in explaining the law to a jury are no argument in 
themselves for criticising the substance 0;E the law, but it is 
submitted this is a practical factor which should be weighed in 
the balance when testing the merits of the Mancini rule. 
A further difficulty in alLocating the Mancini rule a 
status in New Zealand law is the facti that, although the Courts 
have repeatedly insisted that it should not be elevated into a 
matter of law, the trial judge may, on the basis of a lack of 
proportion between what was done to the offender and his 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
148. This is a feeling which the writer shares, a lthough it is 
appreciated that others may believe differently. There is 
no statistical data to substantiate either viewpoint. 
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retaliation, withdraw the issue from the jury on the basis 
that there is then no evidence of "provocation". It may well 
be a fruitless exercise to a ttempt to cla ss ify a 11 of the 
considerations arising for determination as either law or 
fact, but it would seem that, in this sense at least, the 
Mancini rule more closely resembles the former than the latter. 
That it undoubtedly states the law is clear from Anderson,149 
in which the offender, after tis de facto wife had confessed 
unfaithfulness to him at a party, and after assuring others 
at the party that. he had "calmed down", proceeded to deliver 
a prolonged and sustained beating as a result of which she 
died. 
No proof of what the victim had actually said was given at 
the trial, and on that basis the issue was withdrawn from the 
jury. Although the Court of Appeal disagreed with this ruling, 
it held that the issue need not have been left in any case 
since, 
"the brutal and long-sustained attack made on the 
girl could not have oeen provoked. by the material 
here suggested. Therefore there was no evidence fit 
for consideration by the jury which might have been 
held by them to raise a douht as to wl~ther the 
homicide was murder or manslaughter." 
In reconciling this approach with Noel and Lewis, the Court 
pointed out that it had not there been called on to decide 
whether there was evidence fit ·for consideration by a jury, 
but was concerned with the correctness and adequacy of the trial 
judge's directions. 
Despite that, Anderson's case marks a significant new 
direction in the New Zealand law and practice, as is evident 
149. [1965J N.Z.L.R. 29. 
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by comparing it with Jackson. Although the Court made no 
reference to it, a significant change had been made in the 1961 
legislation which goes some way towards explaining the new 
approach. That was the introduction of Section 169(3) to provide 
that 
"Whether there is any evidence of provocation is a 
que s tion of law". 
Criticism of the decision may well be a work of superergation, 
but it is submitted that the case is objectionable in a number 
of respects. 
To begin with, it is difficult to see any warrant for 
introducing tests in addition to those contained in the clear 
words of the Section. In New Zealand, what may amount to 
provocation is defined as being anything said or done if 
"in the circumstances of the case it was sufficient 
to deprive a. person having the power of s"elf.:-_control 
of an ordinary person, but otherwise having the 
characteristics of the offender, of the power of 
self-control". 
In deciding Anderson, the Court refers extensively to the 
Common Law, including Holmes and Lee Chun-Chuen, the effect of 
which, as has been pointed out earlier, was nullified by the 
Homicide Act 1957. 150 The Court also relies on the Homicide 
Act itself, which provides that the test (for the jury) is 
"whether the provocation was enough to make a 
reasonable man db as he (the accused) did". 
As the Court points out, "Section 169 of our Act is expressed 
somewhat differently, but in our opinion the Common law rule 
still applies". With respect, if the legislature bad wanted 
. to adopt the prOVisions of the Homicide Act, the opportunity 
went begging in 1961. Worse, the Court, admittedly without the 
150. See supra p. 87. 
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benefit of Phillips,151 misinterpreted the Homicide Act. 
Further, it is submitted, the difference in wording between the 
respect~ provisions is in this instance crucial. 
An interesting and important analysis of the Homicide 
Act 1957 is undertaken by Stephen White, who points out that 
the phrase lido as he did" may mean one of three things. It 
may mean that the jury must be able to posit ody that a 
reasonable man would have lost" his self-control, or, that 
a reasonable man would have killed, or it may mean that it must 
be possible to posit that the ordinary man would have acted in 
every respect precisely as the accused himself did. If the last 
of these is the correct interpretation, then the reasonable 
retaliation rule would be retained in the wording of the 
Statute itself. He also points out that the words "provoked" 
and "provocation" may be subjected to the same analysis, 
pointing out that, if it is ever intended to dispense with the 
Mancini. :rule, it may also be necessary to either avoid using 
the words "provocation" and "p.t:'0voked ll altogether, or at least 
to define them in such a way that the rule cannot be re-intro-
duced by a process of judicial interpretation. 
The importance of this for New Zealand is that the Crimes 
Act does not use the phrase "do as he did", and it does 
define "provocation". According to the Statute, it is 
necessary only that it be possible to posit that the conduct 
Was sufficient to deprive an ordinary man of the power of self-
control. No further limits are imposed. Even taking into 
account the change effected by Section 169(3), it must then be 
concluded that the extent of the defence is limited by 
151. [1969J 2 A.C. 130. 
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considerations not expressed in the Section itself. On 
principle, it is submitted, the construction of a penal statute 
in such a way that it operates aga inst the offender, is 
unde s ira ble. 
(iv) Criticisms of the Rule 
Apart from the difficulties presented by the state of the 
law itself, the Mancini rul.e is open to a number of other 
criticisms. Some of these will be considered. 
It is frequently asserted that the rule is "illogical",152 
tha t once a per son ha s "lost his self-control", we cannot as 
a matter of logic expect him to select his weapon with care, 
or to restrict himself to one or two blows, As has already 
been suggested, the logic supporting this criticism is largely 
semantic. 153 Probably, this criticism is a cloak for those who 
believe that the rule is unrealistic. The rationale of the 
ordinary man test is tha tthe concession to human frailty is 
made because others placed in the same circumstances as the 
offender might have retaliated in the same way. EXperience, 
nd h . d h' 154 a sue eVL ence as t ere LS, seem to indicate that some 
people, who cannot· be called other than ordinary, when pressed 
beyond the threshold of their endurance, will select whatever 
weapon comes to hand, whether it be a Bren gun, a machete, or 
even the bare hands. Although it may well be that no judge 
would ever withdraw the issue from the jury in such circum-
stances, there is no doubt that, should he· feel so inclined, 
152. Ng Yiu-nam [1963J Crim. L.R. 850. 
153. See supra p. 53. 
154. For a consideration of this, and a balanced discussion of 
the merits of the Mancini rule generally, see English, 
op.cit., 264. 
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he is entitled to do so. There is the added danger, already 
mentioned, that special reference to the rule as a "weighty fact-
or" will only cause confusion in the minds of the jury. For 
these reasons, it is submitted that the dangerous weapon aspect 
of the Mancini rule could well be dispensed with altogether. 
Difficulties still remain i,n those cases where the violence 
used is prolonged and brutal. Insufficient is known about the 
causes of such violence to enable us to say that no ordinary 
man, would ever resort to it. 'But is it not at least possib,le, 
as a matter of common sense, that.fi:'ustrations built up over a 
prolonged period of time, once released, are likely to manifest 
themselves in particularly vicious violence? Certainly, it is 
arguable that to formulate a rule to the contrary, which a 
jury should take into account, and which a judge may use as 
the basis for withdrawing the issue, places too great a premium 
on only one view as to what constitutes ordinary behaviour. 
One further criticism, which has been levelled in particular 
at the dangerous weapons aspect of the Mancini rule, that "fists 
may be answered with a fist, but not with a deadly weapon", 
is that its effect is to make the defence converge with self-
defence, to the extent that, if literally construed, provocat-
- 't d f ld d- altogether. 1S5 ~on as a separa e e ence wou, ~sappear 
Commentators took some delight in querying how the mere sight 
of one's spouse'in,adultery could ever be proportional to a 
killing, a criticism made even more pertinent when the Homicide 
Act, 1957 includes words and gestures as potential provocation. 
Were the legislators giving the lie to the old adage that 
155. See Iliffe, "Provocation in Homicide and Assault Cases" 
(1954) 3 I.C.L.Q. 23, 38. 
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"names will never hurt"? 
It is submitted that, as far as the New Zealand law is 
concerned, some of the barbs are drawn from these taunts 
because of the fact tha t, whether the rule is considered by the 
judge or the jury, this is done only as one factor in 
deciding how an ordinary man might hae behaved. The criticism, 
on the other hand, proceeds on the footing that the rule is an 
element in addition to the ordinary man test. This comes 
about because the critics virtually assume that the rule is 
unrealistic, and they are then forced to explain it on a 
. different basis. Iliffe states156 that 
"it will be clear that if the accused has really lost 
what is regularly called his 'self-control r, he may 
readily return violence with whatever weapon he may 
have in his hand", 
and Williams, 157 
"if he (the offender) intended to kill, it is a 
. little difficult to see why importance should 
be attached to the mode of killing, provided of 
course that the killing was in hot blood". 
The only possible alternative is then that the Mancini rule 
states a quasi self-defence rule in addition to the ordinary 
man test. Unrealistic as the New Zealand law might be, it 
clearly treats the rule as a part of the ordinary man test. 
(b) The Time Factor 
(i) Introduction 
The lapse of time between what was done to the offender 
and his subsequent retaliation is the other factor present in 
every case in which provocation is pleaded. It is perhaps the 
156. Ibid. 
157. Williams, "Provocation and the Reasonable Man" [1954J 
Crim. L.R. #0, 748. 
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classic example of a consideration which is of dual relevance, 
indicating both whether the offender had actually lost his 
self-control, and whether an ordinary man would have regained 
his composure in the time which elapsed before the offender 
struck. For both purposes, it may be said that as a rule, the 
further removed in point of time that the retaliation is 
from the provocative incident, the more likely it is that the 
fatal conduct was precipitated by considerations other than 
that incident. 
(ii) Historv 
Historically, the proper emphasis to be placed on the 
time factor caused far less difficulty than was raised by the 
reasonable retaliation rule. Some of the earlier writers 
contemplated that this period might extend over a surprising 
length of time. Hale instances the case of two men who, 
having quarrelled, go away to fetch weapons and return to 
f · h 158 h d 1 h 1 I ~g t; suc eases were treate as mans aug ter on y. t 
is by no means certain that, prior to Welsh,159 the lapse of 
time was taken into account for purely' subjective reasons. 
I d d 0 b ' 160 h hi' d n ee ,as ne y s case sows, t e aw was q~te prepare 
to place limits on the duration of a man's passion, :even 
though it was clear that he acted in a fit of temper. In 
that case, the lapse of time was the subject of express 
c01Il!Ilent. But not infrequently, in cases where the interval 
was particularly lengthy, a killing would be treated as murder 
rather than manslaughter on the broad ground that wickedness 
158. 1 Hale P.C. 453. 
159. (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336. 
160. (1727) 2 Ld. Raym. 1485; 92 E.R. 465 and see supra p. 30. 
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and thus malice could more readily be inferred. Thus in 
Willoughby,161 two soldiers were refused service by a publican 
late one evening. They departed, and returned armed after an 
interval of an hour and a half, and when they were again refused 
service by the publican, they killed him. This was held to be 
murder because the evidence showed that they returned with the 
deliberate and wicked intention of using personal violence. 
Because of the lack of authority on the point, the precise 
weight accorded the time factor cannot be ascertained with any 
c~rtainty. It has already been argued that, if a considerable 
period of time elapsed, the Courts would treat a killing as 
murder other than manslaughter, and this was the approach 
adopted in Onebv itself. However, as th; practice of requiring 
special verdicts became less frequent, the method of treatment 
seems to have changed somewhat. One incongruous result of this 
h " d" "II t d" h f F" h 162 c ange ~n proce ure ~s ~ ustra e ~n t e case 0 ~s ere 
The provocative incident relied on was the commission of an 
(apparently consensual) sodomitical act between the victim 
and the of fender's son, an incident of which the offender was 
apprised the day before the killing. Park J. decided to leave 
the issue to the jury, reminding them that 
IIThere must be an instant provocation to justify a 
verdict of manslaughter". 
Having left the issue, he then attempted to withdraw it again 
by saying 
liThe counsel for the prisoner admits, that if the 
blood had time to cool, it will be murder. But I 
say, in the hearing of two very learned persons, 
161. Vol. 3 Russell, C. & M.; p.42 6th ed. And see Mason's case 
(1756) Fost 132; 168 E.R. 66. 
162. (1837) 8 C. & p. 182. 
106. 
that that is not exactly a question for you. Whether 
the blood had time to cool or not, is rather a 
question of law. But the jury may find the length 
of time which elapsed." 
Although this does reitera te, almost verbatim, what wa s said by 
Holt C.J. in Oneby, Park J. appears to have failed to appreciate 
the difference ca used by the change in procedure; and the jury 
not only returned a verdict of manslaughter, but also added 
a recommendation to mercy on the ground of provocation. 
Fisher was decided at a time when the judges were develop-
ing the practice of leaving the issue of provocation to the 
jury. It is probable that, in 1837, Park J. could have told 
the jury not to return a verdict of manslaughter a tall, since 
the evidence· 'as to the lapse of time appears to have been 
uncontradicted. But shortly before the case, there are 
several references to the time factor in the reported directions. 
Without exception, these references are ambiguous, in the 
sense that they are capable of interpretation in both subject-
ive and objective senses. Thus in Lypch,163 Lord Tenderten 
C.J. told the jury that 
"If you think that there was not time and interval 
sufficient for the passion of a man proved to be of 
no very strong intellect, to cool, and for reason 
to regain her dominion over his mind, then you will 
say that the prisoner is guilty only of manslaughter". 
Similar ambiguities may be seen in the directions in Haywarg, 164 
and Selten,165 which was decided, significantly enough, after 
the enunciation of the reasona ble man test in Welsh. 166 
163. (~32) 5 C. & P. 324. 
164. (1833) 6 C. & P. 157. 
165., (1871) 11 Cox C.C. 674. 
166. (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336. 
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Nothing occurred to further clarify the common law 
position before the codification of New Zealand's criminal law 
in 1893. 167 That considerable emphasis was placed on the 
time lapse is evidenced by the fact that the Criminal Code, 
re-enacted verbatim in 1908, contained no less than three 
references to it. Section 165{1) provided the Offender must 
have been actuated by "sudden provocation", and Section 
165{2) stipulated that the conduct of the victim could only 
constitute provocation 
"if the of fender acts upon it on the sudden and 
before there has been time for his passion to cool". 
Although no cases are reported in which the interpretation 
of these provisions was decisive, several comments may be made 
as to the way in which they were administered. Unlike the 
position with the, reasonable relationship rule, there has never 
been any question that the time factor is only one facet of the 
reasonable or ordinary man test. In England, this eventually 
became a factor which was taken into account by the judge in 
deciding whether the issue of provocation should be considered 
by the jury at all. This change in treatment is illustrated 
by a comparison of the case of Albis168 with several later 
decisions. Albis alleged tha t, some thirteen hours before 
the fatal incident, he had been invited by his victim to 
commit sodomy. When his victim was ~eep, Albis struck him 
several blows with an axe. In dismissing the appeal, Darling J. 
laid particular emphasis on the period of time which had 
elapsed. He then said that 
"If the provocation took the form of blows, and 
-----------'~----------------
167. Criminal Code Act, 1893. In particular Section 165. 
168. (1913) 9 Cr.AppoR. 158. 
only a short time elapsed between the blows and a 
murder, a jury might be warranted, on receiving a 
proper direction from the judge, in reducing the 
verdict to one of manslaughter". 
Several years later, Viscount Simon L.C. in Mancini169 
108. 
rationalised the lapse of time more explicitly in reasonable 
man terms. Conduct would amount to provocation only where a 
judge or jury was left in some doubt 
"whether a sufficient interval has elapsed since 
the provocation to allow a reasonable man time to 
cool". 
Thus, it would have been open to a judge, prior to the 
Homicide Act, 1957, to rule that because too great a period of 
time elapsed between the provocation and the retaliation, that 
no jury issue was raised at all. 
The single reported instance shedding light on New 
Zealand practice prior to 1961 is found in Kahu. 170 Evidence 
was given to the effect that the wife of the offender, and a 
neighbour, had for a considerable period of time, to the 
knowledge of the offender, been indulging in an adulterous 
relationship. It appeared that Kahu and his wife had effected 
a reconciliation of sorts. No evidence was given as to what 
actually sparked the killings,171 but the offender killed both 
his wife and the neighbour. In directing the jury on the time 
factor, the trial judge said 
"In this particular case, it is suggested that there 
had been a long series of adulterous associations 
169. [1942J A.C. 1, 9. and see Holmes v. D.P.P. [19461 A.C. 
588, 597 and Kwaku Mensah [1946J A.C. 83, 93. 
170. [1947J N.Z.L.R. 368. 
171. This could now be the subject of adverse comment by the 
trial judge. Section 4 of the Crimes Amendment Act, 1966. 
between Mrs Kahu and Massey Amundsen - that such 
hall been going on for some time. Therefore, it 
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was no sudden provocation. I do not know how, on 
the evidence, the defence is going to get over the 
fact that it was no sudden provocation. You cannot 
come along six months later and say you were 
suddenly provoked into it. If the pos i tion were tha t 
he suddenly found them in the act of adultery when he 
thought that such associations had ended, I can 
understand that, because in such a case the sudden-
ness is there. You are asked to accept that suggest-
ion, and it is for you to say whether or not you 
accept that." 
It is not possible to draw firm conclusions from this, since it 
seems that the jury were. permitted in effect to speculate that 
some incident must have occurred to precipitate the killings. 
What is significant, it is submitted, is that even though the 
trial judge himself was clearly of the opinion-that the defence 
advanced did not satisfy the requirements of "suddenness", he 
did not withdraw the issue from the jury altogether as a 
result. Nor did the Court of Appeal take the point, when it 
allowed an appeal on the grounds of a misdirection as to the 
burden of proof. Furthermore, Mancini's case, which contains 
such a clear statement as to the effect of English law, was 
cited to the Court on a different point. 
(iii) The Present Law 
In 1961, the Crimes Act was amended:" and all three 
references to the time element in the 1908 legislation were 
deleted from the new provisions. Notwithstanding this, it 
would seem that the present law is, if anything, less 
advantageous to an accused person than was formerly the case, 
in the sense tp,at the trial judge may now withdraw provocation 
from the jury if he considers that too much time elapsed. 
This change in the law occurred as the result of the 
insertion of Section 169(3), which provides that 
"Whether there is any evidence of provocation is a 
question of law". 
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The relevance of the time lapse to the question of actual loss 
of self-control is most clearly illustrated in a passage in 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Clar~.172 There it was 
stated that 
"I .. h n our 0pl.ul.on t en the lapse of time between the 
first ineffectual effort on the part of the appellant 
to shoot Ethel Kirk and the second shot which killed 
her shows only too plainly tha t even if it was possible 
though improbable, that at the beginning of the ' 
incident he had lost his power of self-control he had 
. d ' regal.ne control when the act of killing occurred. 
This being the view we take it follows that in our 
opinion Quilliam J. was right in ruling that there 
was no evidence of provocation to support a finding 
of provocation." 
In addition, the time factor is still of considerable 
importance when the tribunal is considering whether an ordinary 
man would have lost his self-control. A thorough review of the 
law on this point was undertaken for the first time in New 
173 Zealand in the important and difficult case of McGregor. 
For some time, the offender and his neighbour had been engaged 
in a series of minor disputes, mainly over fencing matters; 
trivial arguments which nevertheless generated a considerable 
degree of animosity. On the day in question, McGregor's father, 
who resided with McGregor as a member of the household, accepted 
the neighbour1s invitation to drinks. It was expressly noted 
by the Court of Appeal that there was no evidence that this 
invitation was made with the intention of riling the offender, 
172 [1971J N.Z.L.R. 589. C.A. 46/70. The case is unreported on 
this point. 
173. [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069. Cf. Parker (1963) III C.L.R. 610 (H.C.) 
(1964) III C.L.R. 665 (P.C.). In which the prouocative 
conduct of the victim persisted over a period of six weeks, 
culminating in an incident which occurred some thirty minutes 
before the fatal injuries were inflicted. It was held that 
neither of these lapses of time was suffisient to prevent 
there being at least a case to go to the Jury. 
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but McGregor, who had himself been cirinking, interpreted his 
father's acceptance as an act of disloyalty. When he 
challenged his father with this, an argument ensued, but 
McGregor permitted himself to be pacified. Not long afterwards, 
however, he was seen walking through the house with a rifle, 
and heard to utter imprecations against his neighbour. As 
luck would have it, the neighbour chose that precise moment to 
emerge from his house, and he was shot and killed. 
It is not entirely clear from the Report exactly what 
event or events counsel relied on as constituting the 
provoca tive incident, but he appears to have advanced a two-
pronged defence, relying on both the conduct of the father in 
. h" . 174 d h b t accept~ng t e ~nv~tat~on an on t e past argUments e ween 
the parties, culminating in the invitation, the last act of the 
victim himself which could possibly be interpreted as 
provocation. On those somewhat unpromising materials, it is 
scarcely surprising that the defence failed, but the Court 
indicated at some length the way in which the time factor 
should now be treated. 
Counsel for the offender advanced the somewhat optimistic 
argument that, since the 1961 Crimes Act did not ~efer to the 
time element, it had become entirely irrelevant. In his words, 
"Once suddenness is no longer required, there is no end to the 
remoteness of possible provocation." Therefore, he contended, 
the trial judge had misdirected the jury in telling them that 
the words or acts complained of could amount to provocation 
only when they occurred immediately before the killing. 
174. As to which see post p. 147. 
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As a preliminary step towards the refutation of this 
argument, the Court outlined the relevant common law, conclud-
ing that 
"Throughout the development of the doctrine it is 
empha sised both in the ca ses and by the insti tutiona 1 
writers that there must be a close relationship ih 
point of time between the provocative act and the 
retaliatory act, and more often than not the word 
I sudden' was used to describe this relationship". 
Having ascertained this, attention was then directed to the 
statutory provisions. It was considered that, were it not 
for the change in the tex.t of the legislation, there would be 
no warrant for the inference that the common law was no longer 
relevant. However, the Court adopted the submission of the 
Solicitor-General that the com.-non law had been expressly 
retained by the use, in S.169(1), of the phrase "under 
provocation". It is implicit in these words that the offender 
should react suddenly, and because it is for a trial judge 
to indicate to the jury what the law means the direction was 
perfectly proper. Indeed, he should tell the jury that 
"it was of the essence of provocation that it should 
cause a sUdden and temporary loss of self-controL ••• 
This being so, it necessarily followed that the Judge 
was quite right in telling the jury that the time 
element was of importance." 
Had the Court left the matter there, this aspect of the 
case would have raised few difficulties. Perhaps because the 
Section was a new one, the Court allowed itself to speculate 
as to why the legislature should have omitted all reference to 
the time element, and proffered the opinion that the legislature 
intended to 
. "ensure tha t none of the common law guides for 
determining whether provocation had been established 
was elevated into a matter of law •••• We agree that 
it would have been wrong if he (the trial judge) had 
told the jury that a s a rna tter of law it was necessary 
that the provocation should occur immediately before 
the killing." 
113. 
In the abstract, this suggestion seems plausible enough. What 
really causes puzzlement is the clear ruling of the Court that, 
because the conduct of the neighbour was not sufficiently 
closely related in point of time to the killing, there was no 
, . 175 
evidence of provocation fit for consideration by the Jury. 
To put the point at its sharpest, Section 169(3) expressly 
states tba t this is a question of law, and that is the sub-
section which the trial judge utilises when he withdraws the 
issue from the jury. 
The cQnundrum which these apparent contradictions present 
has already been referred to in connection with the reasonable 
relationship rule. At the risk of appearing to labour the 
point, if the judge may withdraw the issue of provocation 
because the lapse of time is too great, but the time lapse is 
not to be elevated into a question of law, then what precisely 
is its status? Is there any point in denying that, ultimately, 
the time factor is and must be a matter of, law? And if this 
is an element of the defence, why should the jury not be told 
that it is? Surely the normal practice in a criminal trial 
is that the judge describes the elements of the offence charged 
and the availa ble defences, and leaves the jury to apply that 
law to the fact.s of the instant case. 
Part of the difficulty is caused by the peculiarly open-
textured character of the word "provocation". In at least one 
sense, the word seems naturally to import some sort of 
immediate reaction on the part of the person said to be "provoked" 
175. Cf. too Anderson [1965J N.Z.L.R. 29, 38. "There clearly 
was time for passion of an ardinary person to cool •••• " 
Hence, it was ruled, there was no evidence of provocation. 
114. 
But in fact, our usage is a matter of degree. Thus, if a penon 
berates another immediately upon the occurrence of an annoying 
incident, we readily say that he is "provoked" into doing so. 
Should he delay his reaction for an hour or so, we would be 
less lnclined to describe his reaction in such a way. If a 
day or so elapses, then it would strain language too far 
altogether to say that the reaction was "provoked", although 
it may in fact be the real cause of his tirade. Insofar as 
the law, in deference to these considerations, places outer 
limits on the meaning of the word "provocation", it does not 
deviate from this ordinary language meaning. But difficulties 
inevitably occur in the penumbral cases falling somewhere in 
between the instantaneous reaction and the day or so lapse. 176 
Crudely put, the point is that opinions may differ as to the 
use of language, and as to which side of the dividing line any 
particular case falls. Judges are not i~mune from this 
difference of opinion. But once a judge rules that the 
offender has waited too long, he is placing a limit on the 
meaning of the word "provocation", and preventing the jury from 
disagreeing with his interpretation of the facts. In this 
sense at least, the time factor cannot be anything other than 
a rule of law. 
(iv) The Slow Burning Temperament 
Express reference to the time element by a trial judge is 
less likely to cause confusion in the minds of the jury than 
176. Hale 1 P.G. 453 says that "If there were deliberation, as 
that they meet the next day, nay, tho it were the same 
day, if there were such a competen.t distan<;::e of time, tha t 
in common presumption they had time of deliberation, then 
it is murder." 
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is reference to the reasonable relation rule. MOst critics 
are prepared to accept that ardinary men do cool off within a 
reasonably short space of time. But reaction periods do vary, 
and it has been said tha t Samoans in particular are prone to 
brood about their grievances for a considerable period of time 
before anything is actually done by way of resentment. 177 
As the Solicitor-General pointed out in MCGregor, this 
peculiarity is not necessarily confined to Samoans, and in his 
submissions, the legislature may have deleted reference to the 
time element in the 1961 legislation to cater for this 
-d t' 178 cons~ era ~on. 
This possibility is not without its difficulties and it 
was dealt with by the Court with some circumspection. 
"It is unnecessary, and perhaps undesirable that we 
should impress any concluded opinion on this sub-
mission, though we would point out that if [heJ be 
right, caution would be called for at this point 
because the longer the lapse of time the greater 
the probability that the accused acted from feelings 
of vengeance and not while suffering from a loss 
of self-controL" 179 
It is submitted that the difficulty adverted to by the Court is 
-------------------------------
-1-12. Marsack, "Provocatio.n in Trials for MUrder". [1959J Crim. 
L.R. 697. 
178. In the House of Representatives, this was one of the two 
changes referred to by the Minister of Justice, the Hon. 
J.R. Hanan. He said, "There is one other change in the 
law relating to provocation which requires mention. For 
provocation to be successfully pleaded today in order to 
reduce murder to mans la ughter, one must establish the 
act of provocation was immediately prior to the commission 
of the offence. This disregards psychological reality 
for it may well happen that instead of blazing up at once 
a man may brood perhaps for hours over a provocation until 
his contrpl snaps. It all depends on the type of person. 
In the Bill there is no such artificial restriction, and 
if there has been in fact provocation, and loss of control 
it is open to the jury if it thinks fit to return a verdict 
of manslaughter." N.Z. Parliamentary Debates, VoL 328, 
p.2681. 
179. [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069, 1078. 
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purely an evidentiary one, and if the offender's allegation 
that he was suffering from a loss of self-control is believed, 
or rather not disbelieved, by the tribunal, he is entitled to 
a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder. 
A rather more substantial difficulty is that the taking 
into account of individual reaction times involves some 
deviation from the ordinary man test. As the Crimes Act is 
worded, this need not necessarily' affect the result, provided 
that the conduct of the victim was 
"sufficient to deprive a person having the power of 
self-control of an ordinary person ••• of the power 
of self-control". 
It is arguable that the length of time which elapses does not 
affect the provocative character of the conduct of the victim, 
the quantum of the provocation offered; in cases of the slow-
burning temperament, the loss of self-control simply manifests 
itself in an unusual way. I.e. that an ordinary man would lose 
his self-control when confronted by the same conduct, the 
only difference being that he would do so more immediately. The 
difficulty with this interpretation is that the offender must 
be treated as though he has the "power of self-control of an 
ordinary person", and the Court may well hold tha t this must 
be the case in every respect, and that there is no warrant for 
tI::e construction suggested. All that can be said is that on 
one interpretation it is open to the Courts to allow the slow-
burning temperament to be considered, and it may be that trial 
judges will be reluctant to withdraw the issue from a jury 
where the pecul~arity is traceable to race. 180 
180. The issue is further complicated by the fact that Section 
169(2)(a) now permits the characteristics of the offender 
to be taken into account as to which see post p. 133. 
(c) Other Circumstances 
(i) General 
117. 
It would be a possible, if not particularly profitable 
exercise, to analyse the cases in terms of the various other 
factors which were taken into account by the tribunal in 
deciding whether the plea of provocation should succeed. 
Thse considerations are compendiously imported by the Crimes 
Act, 1961, Section 169(2)(a) of which provides that the issue 
is to be. judged "in the circumstances of the case". Such 
circumstances would include the relative status of the 
offender and his victim,181 and the previous relations between 
them. If there has been a history of disharmony between the 
parties, it may be that an otherwise trivial incident will 
spark off the killing. 182 The possible list of such circum-
stances is endless, and each case must be dealt with by the 
trial judge on its facts. 
(ii) Drunkenness 
One circumstance which the layman may be forgiven for 
thinking to be highly relevant is the offender's state of 
sobriety. In one sense he would be correct. Intoxication may 
be taken into account in deciding whether or not the offender 
had in fact lost his self-control. It is also probably 
181. E.g. husband and wife in Maddv (1672) T. Raym. 212; 83 E.R. 
112, father and son in Fisher (1837)8 C. & P. 182. And in . 
Hopper [1915J 2 K.B. ,431, it was considered highly 
material that the offender was a sergeant, and his provoker 
a mere private. 
182. MCGregor [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069, 1080. And see Hopkins (186~ 
10 Cox C.C. 229 in which evidence was admitted that on 
several occasions prior to the fatal incident, the victim 
had twisted a handerchief around her husband's throat. 
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relevant when the offender, as a result of drunkenness, makes 
a mistake and interprets as provocative, conduct which was not 
J."ntended to be. 183 B t th 1 ft . "t" 1 u e common aw, a er some J.nJ. J.a 
prevarication, has steadfastly declined to permit the plea that 
a person, as a result of drink, more readily gave way to his 
anger. 
80me critics cavil at this aspect of the doctrine on the 
basis that it is tantamount to holding that ordinary men are 
never drunk. It is submitted that such criticisms are facile, 
although rephrased as a contention that the law can afford to 
be more realistic, they represent a value judgment which has 
some validity. But the rule that drunkenness is ipso facto 
irrelevant was evolved long before the reasonable man test was 
articulated. 
Hale184 and Hawkins 185 were of the opinion that a drunken 
person should be treated as though he were sober, whereas 
Blackstone,186 who reiterated the views of Coke thought that, 
if anything, drunkenness aggrava ted the seriousness of the 
crime. That this surprisingly harsh view was rapidly mollified 
is illustrated by the fact that, exactly fifty years after 
Blackstone wrote, Holroyd J. in Grindley187 stated that, 
drunkenness wa s a "circumstance proper" to be taken into 
consideration in deciding whether the accused really had acted 
183. Marshall (1830) 1 Lew.C.C. 76; 168 EoR. Letenock (1917) 
12 Cr.App.R. 221. And see post p.149. 
184. 1 Hale PQC. 32. 
185. 1 P.C., C.1, 8.6. 
186. Bl. Corom. Vol. IV, C o 2, 8.111, 25. 
187. (1819) 1 Russell C. & M. 6th ed. 144. 
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Ln the heat of the moment, and maliciously. This view he 
twice retracted shortly afterwards. 188 The basis of the 
189 190 present law was laid by Park J. in Pea~g and Carroll. 
In the former, he said that 
"drunkenness may be taken into consideration to explain 
the probability of a party's intention in the case of 
violence committed on sudden provocation", 
by which he appears to have meant that drunkenness may be taken 
into account in deciding whether the offender was caused to act 
as he did by the provocation offered to him. The same point is 
made with greater clarity by Parke B. in Thomas191 when he 
directed the jury that 
"drunkenness may be taken into consideration in cases 
where what the law deems sufficient provocation has 
been given, because the question is, in such cases, 
whether the fatal act is to be attributed to the 
passion of anger excited by the previous provocation, 
andtha t passion is more easily excitable in a 
person when in a state of intoxication than when he 
is sober". 
But in deciding the prior question whether the provocation given 
was sufficient, Park J. in Carroll held that Grindley had been 
wrongly decided, and that drunkenness could not be considered. 
This view has been held to be good law in Stopford192 and 
193 Mason, and was the subject of considered dicta in the House 
of Lords in D. P. P. v. Beard, 194 Notwithstanding this impressive 
188. In Burrow (1823) 1 Lew. C.C. 75; 168 E.R. 965 and Rennie 
(1825) 1 Lew C.C. 76. 
189 (1835) 2 Lew. C.C. 144. 
190. (1835) 7 C. & P. 145. 
191. (1837) 7 C. & P. 817, 820. 
192. (1870) 11 Cox. C.C. 643. 
193. (1912) 8 Cr.App.R. 121. 
194. [1920J A.C. 479. Although cf. Hopper [1915J 2 K.B. 431. 
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array of authority, counsel in McCarthy195 appealed, contending 
that the trial judge had misdirected the jury by telling them 
that they were not entitled to consider the fact that the 
offender was the worse for drink. Not surprisingly, the appeal 
failed, and Lord Goddard buttressed the drunkenness rules 
by reference to the reasonable man test, saying that 
"We see no distinction between a person who by 
temperament is unusually excitable and pugnacious, 
and one who is temporarily made excitable or 
pugnacious by self-induced intoxication. It may 
be that an excitable, pugnacious or intoxicated 
person may be more easily provoked than a man of 
quiet or phlegmatic disposition, but the former 
cannot rely on his excitable state of mind if the 
violence used is beyond that which a reasonable, 
or, as we may perhaps say, an~average person would 
use to repel an act which can in law be regarded as 
provocation." 
It is quite clear that this also represents the law in New 
196 Zealand. In Jackson, Chapman J. was ~ great pains to 
distinguish an ordinary person from one inflamed by drink. And 
Ln McGregor,197 it was held that a transitory state induced by 
liquor could not amount to a "characteristic". It is perhaps 
a telling social commentary that, in only two of the cases 
reported on the subject in this country was there no evidence 
that the offender had been drinking. 198 In eight others, 
there was evidence either that the accused was drunk or had been 
d . k' 199 d' 11 f h h . . d h h' rLn Lng, an Ln a 0 t em, t e pOLnt LS ma e t at t LS 
195. [1954 J 2 Q. B. 105, 112. 
196. [1918J N.Z.L.R. 363. 
197. [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069, 108l. 
198. Kahu [1947J N.Z.L.R. 368. Noel [1960J N.Z.L.R. 212. 
199. Jackson (supra n.196). Black [1956J N.Z.L.R. 204.Lewis 
(1962) unreported C.A. 92/62. McGr~.Q£ [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069. 
Anderson [1965J N.Z.L.R. 29. QQugherty [1966J N.2.L.R. 890. 
Downey [1971J N.Z.L.R. 97. Clark [1971J N.Z.L.R. 589. 
Millar (1971) unreported C.A. 96/71. 
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fact was not to be taken into account by the tribunal in 
deciding whether the conduct of the offender would have provoked 
an ordinary man. 
(d) "Characteristics" 
It was earlier argued that, embodied in the ordinary man 
test are the twin notions that society thereby demands that 
its members exhibit certain standaras of restraint. At the 
same time, the standards are not set so high that the majority 
of those members are unable to comply with them. Hence, if the 
ordinary man might have behaved as the offender did, the 
conduct of the latter is treated as understandable but not 
completely excusable. And it was contended that society is 
enti tled to demand such standards; tha t there is nothing 
morally objectionable about assessing the conduct of the 
offender in this way. 
Not infrequently, where the law sets standards of conduct, 
it will not countenance arguments based on the individual's 
inability to conform as a result of either incapacity or lack 
of opportunity. There are, of course, some well-recognised 
incapacitating conditions such as infancy and insanity; but 
where, as in negligence, the selected basis of liability is the 
failure to conform to a standard of care, it is no defence for 
the offender to say that he is innately clumsy of slow-witted. 
Similarly, where liability is strict, neither incapacity 
falling outside one of the recognised categories nor the lack 
of opportunity to conform to the laws demands will in general 
excuse.
200 H.L.A. Hart has pointed out that the objection to 
200. For a discussion of some exceptions, see Patient; "Some 
Remarks about the Element of Voluntariness in Absolute 
Offences" [1968J Crim. L.R. 23. 
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punishing in such si tua tions is not the mere factor tha t the 
offender was unaware of relevant surrounding circumstances, 
or failed to forsee that the prohibited consequence would or 
might occur, but simply that he was unable to prevent its occurr-
ence. He argues that 
"what is crucial is that those whom we punish should 
have had, When they acted, the normal capacities, 
physical and mental, for doing what the law requires 
and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair 
opportunity to exercise these capacities". 201 
When a person has been provoked, such capacities are not 
entirely absent, but their exercise is a matter of such abnormal 
difficulty, for both the offender himself and for ordinary men 
placed in his situa tion, tha t we punish less. 
The difficulty is that the ability to conform to general 
standards, whether they be standards of care or self-restraint 
must inevitably vary from person to person. Where provocation 
and standards of restraint are in issue, two broad reasons for 
this diversity of capacity may be suggested. It seems to be the 
case that, temperamentally, some persons are more irascible 
or short-tempered than others. Although one ca.n only speculate 
on the causes of this diversity, physiology and environmental 
circumstances (including historical circumstances) no doubt all 
play their part. In addition, the temperament is conditioned 
by more transient influences; illnesses, some debilitating 
condition such as pregnancy, even tiredness. Some people are 
also marked off from the remainder of the community, and the 
hypothetical norm envisaged by the ordinary man test, by their 
physical or mental makeup, and their status or position in 
201. Hart; P. & R. 152. 
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the conununity. As a result, they are susceptible to taunts or 
provocative action which would leave a person differently 
constituted completely unmoved. There is a conceptual difference 
between the two types of trait, althagh the two may in reality 
overlap, but they share in common the fact that a person 
afflicted by them will lose his self-control in circumstances 
in which an ordinary man would not do so. 
Any attempt to i,ndividualise the conditions of liability 
by taking account of such considerations is rendered the more 
difficult because 
"if the notional person by whom the defendant is 
judged is invested with every characteristic of 
the defendant, the standard disappears. For, in 
that case, the notional person would have acted 
as the defendant did". 202 
The law may confront this problem either by ignoring diversities 
altogether; or it may, as the New Zealand legislature has done, 
a ttempt to steer a middle course by taking into account some 
characteristics but not others. 
(ii) The pre-1961 Law 
Initially the law catered for these peculiarities without 
any real difficulty. Perhaps the earliest examples are the 
cases of Williams203 and Taylor,204 lin both of which the 
offender was held guilty of manslaughter only, after he_ had 
been made the butt of racial jokes and antagonism. A clearer 
202. Williams; C.L.G.P. 1010 
203. 
204. 
(1639) Jones W. 432; 82 E.R. 227. The case was in fact a 
prosecution brought under the Statute of Stabbing. Williams 
whose nationality may remain unspecified, was wearing a 
leek in his hat. A passerby pointed to a Jack of Lent, and 
told Williams to "look upon your countryman", a jibe which 
so enraged Williams that he inunediately took upa hammer and 
threw it at his antagonist. He missed his mark, but struck 
and killed another bystander. The verdict of manslaughter 
was found upon a special verdkt. In Mawgridge (1706) Kel.119 
84 E.R. 1107, Lord Holt C.J. is highly critical of the 
decision, and says .that the verdkt should have been murder. 
(1771) 5 Burr. 2793; 98 E.R. 466. 
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example of the way in which the personal equation was taken 
into account is found in the direction of Lord Tenderton C.J. 
205 in Lynch, where the jury was told that 
"If you think that there was not time and interval 
sufficient for the passion of a man proved to be of 
no very strong intellect to cool, and for reason to 
regain her dominion over his mind, then you will say 
that the prisoner is guilty only of manslaughter". 
This case has been treated as evidence that the question of 
provocation was originally "subjective", and that the II,J.reason-
able man' doctrine did not at once crystallise into a rule of 
1 206 aWe It is submitted that the case is equally open to the 
interpreta tion that the law had a lready begun to steer a 
middle course. 
Apart from these three cases, there is insufficient material 
upon which to base any assessment as to how far the law would 
go in taking account of the pecuBartties of the offender. 
Undoubtedly, the turning point in the law was the articulation 
of the reasonable man test by Keating J. in ,Helsh. 207 It was 
over fifty years before the logical consequences of the decision 
began to manifest themselves as they eventually did in ~-
208 
andere There, the provocative incident relied on was a 
statement by the de facto wife of the offender that she intended 
to live with another man. Counsel was prevented by the trial 
judge from addressing the jury on provocation. Before the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, he argued that although 
205. (1832) 5 C. & P. 324, 325. 
206. Russell; 535 12th ed. 
267. (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336. 
208. (1913) 23 Cox C.C. 604. 
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the conduct of the deceased might not have caused a "normal" 
man to behave as Alexander had, the offender was mentally 
deficient, and this fact ought to be considered. Unfortunately, 
he did not refer to the direction in Lynch, and Darling J. who 
delivered the decision, called this an "ingenious argument". 
It was nevertheless one which the Court would not countenance. 
Perhaps this refusal to consider Alexander's deficiency cannot 
be regarded as decisive, because the incident relied upon 
consisted of words alone, and there was a delay of two hours 
between the incident and the retaliation. But by the same 
token, Alexander's deficiency, had it been relevant, would have 
diminished the importance of these matters, at least to the 
extent that a jury question was raised by the evidence. 
S " "1 1 " L b" " 209" h" h th 11 d" °d h LmL ar y Ln es LnL, Ln w LC e a ege LnCL ent was t e 
racial "joke", "Does Ikey wat: some shots?" Again, it was argued 
that the offender suffered from "want of mental balance" 
combined with "defective self-control". Counsel's argument 
that Welsh should not be taken to its logical limits was 
unsuccessful, and the Court said that it could see no reason 
to depart from what had been said in Alexander. 
With these two decisions, the reasonable man die was decis-
ively cast. And in the same year as Lesbini was decided, a 
similar mould was fashioned for his female counterpart in 
Smith,210 in which it was held that the fact that the offender 
was pregnant when she killed her young child must be treated as 
irrelevant. Only one case, Ran~,211 seems to have slipped 
-----------------------------------------
209. [1914J 3 K.B. 1116. 
210. (1914) 11 Cr.App.$.. 36. 
211. (1942) 29 Cr.App.R. 14. 17. 
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through the net. Raney, who was one-legged, became engaged in 
a quarrel with his victim, in the course of which his crutch 
was knocked away from him. An appeal was brought onfue basis 
that the trial judge had erred in not adverting in his summing 
up to the offender's deformity. 
"It seems to us that if the judge had repeated that 
part of Raney's evidence it would have been very 
proper to do so, because a blow to a one-legged man's 
crutch might well be regarded by the jury as an act 
of provocation". 
It is to say the least difficult to reconcile this statement 
with either Alexander or Lesbini, and it must be regarded as 
clearly wrong in the light of the decision in Bedder,212 in 
which the House of Lords heldfuat it was correct to regard as 
irrelevant the impotence of the offender, when the provocative 
incident relied upon was the jeering of a prostitute at this 
affliction. Furthermore, in the interim between the decisions, 
the House had on two occasions emphatically restated the view 
tha t the rea sona ble man must be treated a s tho ugh he had no 
distinguishing features whatsoever. 213 
In Bedder,214 Viscount Simonds L.C. stated the objections 
to deviating from the strictness of the reasonable man test. 
"It was urged on your Lordships that the hypothetical 
reasonable man must be confronted with the same 
circumstances as the accused, and that this could not 
fairly be done unless he was also invested with the 
peculiar characteristics of the accused. But this 
makes nonsense of the test. Its purpose is to invite 
the jury to consider the act of the accused by 
reference to a certain standard or norm of conduct 
and with this object the 'rea sona ble I or the 'average' 
212. [1954J 1 W.L.R. 1119. 
213. In Mancini [1942J A.C. 1; and to a lesser extent in 
Holmes v. D.P.P. [1946J A.C. 588. 
214. [1954J 1 W.L.R. 1123. 
or the 'normal t man is invoked. If the reasonable 
man is then deprived in whole or in part of his 
127. 
rea son, or the norma I man endowed with a bnorma I 
characteristics, the test ceases to have any value." 
(iii) Present New Zealand Law 
Undaunted by these remarks, the New Zeil..and Parliament ha s 
attempted to give some effect to individual idiosyncracies by 
providing that conduct is provocative if 
Section 169(2)(a) "In the circumstances of the case it was 
sufficient to deprive a person having the 
power of self-control of an ordinary 
. person, but otherwise having the character-
istics of the offender,of the power of 
self-control". 
That Bedder was uppermost in the minds of the reformers is 
evidenced by the fact that the Hon. J.R. Hanan, in the House of 
215 Representatives, actually referred to the case by name. 
There can be no reason to doubt that, prior to 1961, that case 
would have been decided in the same way in New Zealand. 
Shortly after the legislation came into effect, the Court 
216 
of Appeal in McGregor took the opportunity to indicate in 
reasonably specific terms the way in which the new provisions 
should be construed. In so far as no peculiarities were asserted 
by counsel to constitute "characteristics", what was actually 
said must be regarded as. obiter dictum. The Court was also 
at paLns to point out that its analysis was not intended to be 
exhaustive, and that it was speaking in general terms only. 
215. N.Z. Parliamentary Debates, Vol.328, p.2681. Further 
evidence tha t Bedder was the main target of the legislation 
is the fact that virtually the e,ntire section on provocat-
ion in Sir George Finlay's Report is devoted to discussing 
the case and its ramifications. 
216. [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069. 
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Nevertheless, what was said there remains the only usefu1217 
judicial comment on the way in which the Section is likely to 
be interpreted when problems arise, and for this reason, the 
case is of considerable importance. 
Underlying the Court IS approach is the view tha t, where 
persons are afflicted by "characteristics", their ability to 
control their behaviour is diminished or impaired, and it 
is for this reason that the legislature has included them as 
relevant considerations. Thus, it is said that 
"If the phrase Ibut otherwise' were construed to 
mean 'in other respects' then the test of the power 
of self-control of an ordinary man would remain 
unaffected". 
Instead, the Court interpreted the words to mean "save in so 
far as" the power of self-control is weakened by a "character-
istic". This would clearly incorporate any peculiarity 
which diminished the offender's self-control, and for this 
reason, the Court then instanced several such peculiarities 
which would not qualify~ 
Sir Francis Adams has strenuously criticised this basic 
premise, and contended tha t it 
"confessedly rejects the obvious prima:y meaning of 
the words 'but otherwise! and appears to give no 
force to them whatever". 218 
With respect, the words are given some force, but it is con-
ceded that it may not be that intended by the legislature. In 
the learned author's submission, 
217. In Millar (1971) unreported, C.A. 96/71, it was argued 
that the offender suffered from a "characteristic". This 
was rejected by the Court, which did not, unfortunately, 
summarise the evidence advanced for the offender, it being 
stated simply that "the facts in this case do not come 
anywhere near the legal requirements in a case like this." 
218. Adams; para. 1265, 344. 
"The words 'but otherwise' really dominate the 
meaning, and make it clear that the offender's 
characteristics are not to be taken into account 
in so far as they may affect lis power of self-
control". 
129. 
Instead, the relevance of characteristics is tha t they heighten 
an individual's sensitivity or susceptibility to provocation. 
At first sight, these objections seem to be little more than 
a verbal quibble. Conceptually, a heightened susceptibility 
to provocation and a diminished power of self-control seem 
to be opposite sides of the same coin. But to begin with, the 
approach advocated by Sir Francis has the considerable merit 
that it pays more heed to the actual wording of the Section. 
In addition, the Court had to reconcile with its approach the 
fact that the legislature clearly,intended to retain as the 
test of sufficiency the power of self-control of an ordinary 
man. Having conceded tha t this is diminished by characteristics, 
it is then forced to limit such characteristics, a task rendered 
the more difficult by the fact that 
"The legislature has given no guide as to what 
limitations might be imposed". 219 
In so doing, no attempt can be made to restrict the limitations 
to those implicit in the use of the word "characteristics", 
and some traits or dispositions are excluded even though 
prima facie, they appear to constitute characteristics. Once 
the start has been made in such an exercise, there is no 
logic al stopping place. As Sir Francis put s it, 
"There appears to be no warrant for imposing any 
limitations on the meaning of 'characteristics', 
save and except what the word itself implies, 
viz., that they must be characteristics of the 
offender and not merely transitory or temporary". 
219. [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069, 1081. 
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In its interpretation of "characteristics", the Court 
stipu~ed what may be considered, what may not be considered 
and fina lly imposed the limitation tba t the provocative 
conduct or words must in some way be directed at the 
characteristic which the offender seeks to invoke. Each 
aspect will be considered in turn. 
A characteristic may be either physical or mental, or a 
matter of colour, race or creed. This rejects the distinction, 
advocated by counsel in Bedder,220 between physical and mental 
peculiarities. It is respectfully submitted that the decision 
of the Court is correct, and obviates what might have been 
the very difficult task of distinguishing one from the other. 
Nor is there any logic behind the proposed distinction, and 
a s the House pointed out, it ignores the 
"fundamental fact that the temper of a man which leads 
him to react in such and such a way to provocation is, 
or may be itself conditioned by some physical defect". 
Ln addition, the characteristic must constitute "part of the 
individua 1 Us character or personal i ty", and could not: there-
fore be something temporary or transient. This is implicit in 
the use of the word "characteristic", but whilst the propriety 
of this interpretation is in no sense challenged, it is 
suggested that its application in a given situation may be a 
matter of some difficulty. Permanence and transience are 
relative, and the Court, apart from ruling out self-induced 
intoxication, gives no real hints a3 to the time span envisaged. 
Would pregnancy, or a broken leg necessitating the use of 
crutches qualify? And as Brown points out,221 the more 
220. [1954J 1 W.L.R. 1119, 1123. 
221. Brown; "Killings No.n Sedato Animo" (1962) N.Z.L.J. 489. 
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permanent the characteristic, the greater the period of time the 
offender has had to come to terms with his affliction. Finally, 
it is said that the characteristic must be something of 
sufficient significance to make the offender different from 
the ordinary run of mankind.. If the Adams approach is adopted, 
it is not entirely easy to see why this limit should be 
imposed. It must be assumed that the standard envisaged by the 
"ordinary 'run of mankind" is no more than a collection of 
the ordinary or reasonable men created by the common law. 
Thus, any devia tion from this would seem to be a "characteristic", 
and Sir Francis would include all the idiosyncracies of the man 
in the dock .. 222 In practice, the characteristic invoked is 
likely to be significant, and the law virtually assumes that it 
will be by the requirement tha t t he provocative incident be 
directed at the characteristic which it is sought to introduce. 
Conversely, 
.·"a disposition to be unduly susp~c~ous, or to lose 
one1s temper readily will not suffice, nor will a 
temporary or transitory state of mind such as a 
mood of depression, excitability or irascibility. 
These matters are not of sufficient significance 
or not of sufficient permanency to be regarded 
as characteristics which would enable the offender 
to be distinguished from the ordinary man". 
Several features of this dictum require comment. It may 
be noted that the disposition to lose one's temper readily is 
excluded from consideration for the express reason that it is 
not sufficiently significant a:' permanent. The "unusually 
excitable or pugnacious individual" referred to in Lesbini223 
222. The learned author specifically challenges the Court's 
exclusion of mental deficiency or weakmindedness, and 
would no doubt also disagree with the Court's reference 
to "undue suspicion". 
223. [1914J 3 K.B. 1116.· 
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is excluded on the same grounds. With respect, although the 
conclusion may be unexceptionable, the reasons are scarcey 
convincing. The psychopath, surely, suffers from a condition 
which is significant enough, and his condition may be life-
long. Again, it is submitted, the approach advocated by Sir 
Francis demonstrates its superiority; short-temperedness, excit-
ability and exceptional pugnacity are in effect synonyms for 
lack of self-control, and the reason why such traits should 
be excluded from the benefit of the defence is not that 
they cannot be called "characteristics", nor that they are 
too transient or insignificant, but simply that the Statute 
requires that persons with these characteristics be treated as 
though they had the power of self-con:trol of ordinary men. 
One important practical limitation is that 
"there must be some rea 1 connection betwee,n the 
provocation and the particular characteristic of the 
offender by which it is sought to modify the ordinary 
man test. The words or conduct must have been 
exclusively or particularly provocative to the 
individual because, and only because, of the character-
istic. In short, there must be some dir ect connection 
between the provocation or conduct and the character-
istic so ught to be invoked a s warranting some depart-
ure from the ordinary man test". 
This prevents the offender from placing reliance on those 
many factors whose real importance is ;that they diminish his 
general power of self-control. Thus, tiredness, a pain-
causing illness and pregnancy would be ruled out. Interestingly 
h h ' ld h Al d 224 L b' ,225 d enoug , t ~s wou mean tat exan er, es ~n~ an· 
Smith226 would all still be decided in the same way, a fact 
224. (1913) 23 Cox C.C. 604. 
225. [1914J 3 K.B. 1116. 
226. (1914) 11 Cr.App.36. 
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which may well cause the Court of Appeal to reconsider its 
exclusion of feeble-mindedness were such a characteristic to 
be singled out for special attention from a provoking victim. 
It may also be noted that the practical importance of this 
limit is greatly magnified under the Adams approach, since 
the man in the dock, having been invested with all his 
idiosyncracies, is then stripped of them all save those 
specifically referred to. 
Finally, the Court has to some extent left open the 
problems caused by racial characteristics. This subject has 
1 d b h . fl· 22 7 d· . a rea y een t e occas~on 0 vo um~nous conunent, an ~t ~s 
not proposed to explore it in depth here. One point is clear 
enough. Where conunent is directed at the race or colour of 
the offender, he is no longer to be treated as though he did 
not possess such characteristics at all. Greater difficulty is 
caused by the fact that it is frequently suggested that some 
races are more excitable than others, and that some races, 
particularly Polynesian, tend to brood about their grievances 
before reacting. By what standard is the conduct then to be 
judged. 
The mere fact that a person is excitable is said by the 
Court to be irrelevant. Similarly 
"it would not be sufficient for the offender to 
claim merely that he belongs to an excitable race, 
227. See genera lly Marsack, "Provoca tion in Tria ls for Murder" 
[1959J Crim.L.R. 697. Howard; "What Colour is the 
'Reasonable Man'?" [1961] Crim.L.R. 41. Morris and 
Howard, 93 et seq., Brown, "The Ordinary Man in Provocat-
ion" (1964) 13 I.C .L.Q. 203. And see Cannon [1963J Crim. 
L.R. 748, 759. For consideration by the Courts see 
Latoatama [1954J N.Z.L.R. 594, 604 and King [1965J 1 Q.B. 
443; [1964J Crim.L.R. 133. 
or that members of his nationality are accustomed 
to resort readily to the use of some lethal 
weapon. Here again, the provocative act or words 
require to be directed at the particular character-
istic before it can be relied upon." 
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This seems to suggest that if a person is a member of such a 
race, and if tha t race is referred to.~ it may be taken into 
account, an approach which has much to commend it in terms 
of humanity and common sense. But it is, with respect, fraught 
with analytical difficul tie s. Race and excita bility are two 
separate characteristics. Must both be referred to, or is it 
sufficient that one be referred to only? And for that matter, 
why should a person excitable by temperament be at a disadvant-
age by comparison with a person excitable by race? 
Slightly different considerations apply in the case of the 
slow-burning temperament. Adams would include this as a 
"characteristic", since it is an idiosyncracy of the offender. 
It is arguable that the Court of Appeal may not do so, but 
regard it instead as a peculiar way in which self-control is 
lost. The point is important because, if it is treated as a 
"characteristic", the offender would not be permitted to rely 
on it unless some reference were made at leatt to his race, even 
though he was confronted by the most provocative of conduct. 
For this reason, coupled wi th the fact that the legislature 
may well have deleted reference to the time element specifica lly 
to cater for this problem, the slow-burning temperament should 
not be treated as a "characteristic" and subject to the 
limitations which this implies. 
1. Introduction 
In the majority of cases so far dealt with, little 
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difficulty has been occasioned by this third essential element 
of the defence of provocation. Coupled with this is the fact 
that the elements are, like the familiar triumvirat~ of duty, 
breach and damage in the law of negligence, closely interwoven, 
and for these reasons, its separate examination has been 
deferred until last. Generally, it is both necessary and 
sufficient that the conduct of the victim satisfied the first 
two tests, viz. that it in fact caused the offender to lose his 
self-control, and that it might have caused an ordinary man to 
do so in the circumstances. But the question arises as to 
whether there are any other limits as to the sort of incident 
which may amount to provocation. Indeed, to stretch the 
problem to its outer limits, the question may be asked whether 
there must necessarily be any incident at all, or whether it 
is sufficient that the offender merely believed that something 
had occurred which would satisfy the other two tests. 
2. The CommofLLaw 
Welsh228 has frequently been criticised because of the 
limits within which it confined the defence. But the reasonable 
man test, once it had been fully enunciated, was potentially 
capable of freeing the law from the confines of the Common 
Law. This point is illustrated by Rothwell,229 decided two 
years later, in which the jury was told by Blackburn J. that 
"if a husband suddenly hearing from his wife that 
she had committed adultery, and he having had no 
idea of such a thing before, was thereupon to kill 
her, it might be manslaughter". 
----------------,-------------------------------------------------
228. (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336. 
229. (1871) 12 Cox C.C. 145. 
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This involved extending the law in two ways. Words alone were 
for the first time treated as being potentially provocative, 
and in consequence, in the circumstances, the requirement of 
"occular inspection" of the adultery230 was dispensed with. 
What is more important is that, in creating these extensions, 
Blackburn J. expressly invoked the reasonable man test. The 
rule thus created that confessions of adultery may amount to 
" 1" d" J 231 provocatLon was app Le Ln ones. 
Rothwell, and to a lesser extent Jones, were decided at a 
time when the judges readily left the question of sufficiency 
to the jury •. Unfortuna tely, they proved to be something of a 
false spring; the creative potential of the reasonable man test 
was never fully nurtured by the Courts, and it had to be 
replanted, in England at least, by Statute. 232 In Pal~, the 
Courts declined to extend the rule established in Rothwell to a 
sudden confession of unfaithfulness by the fianc~e of the 
offender, and in Greening,233 it was held that the relationships 
between husband and wife on one hand, and de facto spouses on 
the other were "entirely dif ferent". No mention is made of 
Welsh or of the reasonable man test in either case. 
Once these cases had been decided,. the old rule that words 
alone would not amount to provocation, which had been momentar-
ily checked in Rothwell, and could have been halted altogether 
had Welsh been fully developed, gained fresh impetus. In 
230. Pearson (1835) 2 Lew. 216; 168 E.R. 1133.' 
231. (1908) 72 J.P. 215. 
232. [1913J 2 K.B. 29. 
233. (1913) 23 Cox C.C. 601. 
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234 Birchall, the offender, who was arguing with his wife 
over her suspected infidelity, was called a .,"coward" by his 
brother, who was also the object of the offender's suspicions; 
it was held that the killing was murder because, inter alia, 
the provocation was by words alone. Palmer was followed in 
235 Alexander, in which the de fac1D wife of the offender told 
him tha t she was going to leave him and live with another 
d h ' Ph'll' 236 h ff d h d person, an WL en J.n J. J.s, teo en er soug t to persua e 
his errant wife to return to him, to be contemptuously told 
that he should go and live with someone else, the Court of 
Criminal Appeal upheld the trial judge's ruling that there was 
no evidence of provoca tion. 
By the time that Ell2£237 was decided, it was far too late 
to a ttack these decisions on the basis tha t they were inconsistentq 
with Welsho The fact that the law in this instance might 
override the realities of the provocative effect of words is 
illustrated by an exchange between counsel and the Court of 
Criminal Appeal. Counsel; W.N. Stable, urged that 
"where provocation arises from words and the jury 
think that becauee of such provocation an ordinary 
mod reasonable man would be deprived of his self-
control, it is open to them to return a verdict of 
manslaughter u • 
Lord Reading C.J. countered: 
"If that is true, an angry word used may be sufficient 
to deprive a man of his self-control. The law of 
England has alweJiS been that it is not sufficient to 
-2.34. (1913) 23 Cox C.C. 579. 
235. (19.8) 23 Cox C.C. 604. 
236. (1916) 32 ToL.R. 414. 
237. (1920) 15 Cr.App.R. 41. 
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reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter". 
If these decisions were not enough to overrule Rothwell, 
Blackburn J. IS ruling most certainly received its quietus from 
238 the House of Lords in Holmes v. D.P.P. Viscount Simon 
sounded a note of hope by recognising that 
"one can imagine in these days at any rate, words 
of a vile character which might be calculated 
to deprive a reasonable man of his customary self-
control even more than would an act of physical 
violence". 
However, the House also said that this would occur only 
"in circumstances of a most extreme and exceptional 
chara cter" • 
Suffice it to say that the Courts themselves never elaborated on 
what these circumstances might be. It was left to the 
legislature, upon the recommendation of the Royal Commission 
on Capital Punishment,239 to enact that either deeds or words 
might be provocation provided that, in the opinion of the jury, 
they satisfied the reasonable man test. 240 
3. The New Zealand Law 
When the Criminal Code Bill Commission Report was present-
ed,241 the Com.mon Law was in a state of uncertainty. The 
Commissioners, (one of whom had been the trial judge in Rothwell), 
238 •. [1946J A.C. 588, 601. 
239. Cmnd. 8932, at p.56 para.152. The Commission rejected a 
submission that, liberally interpreted, the limits placed 
in Holmes would cater for all situations in which a 
reasonable man might commit homicide in response to words 
alone, largely on the grounds that the issue would rarely 
if ever be placed before juries. 
240. See Simpson [1957J Grim.L.R. 815 and Fantle [195~.Crim.L.R. 
584. These would almost certainly have been decided 
differently had the Homicide Act, 1957 not been passed. 
See Eddy.; "The New Law of Provocation" [1958J Crim. L.R. 
778. 
241. 1878-9 [c.2345J XX - 169, p.24. 
reported that 
"There is no definite authoritative rule on the 
subject, but the authorities for s~ng that words 
can never amount to provocation are weighty. We 
are of opinion that cases may be imagined where 
language would give a provocation greater than 
any ordinary blow." 
139. 
It was no doubt to give effect to this view that the Criminal 
Code Act, 1893 provided in Section 165(2) that "any wrongful 
act or insult" might constitute a legally relevant provocative 
:incident. 
Tha t this provision ameliorated the New Zealand law by 
comparison with the Common Law is quite certain. However, the 
extent to which it did so is more problematic, and it is by no 
means clear that the SUfficiency of the incident, when it took 
:the form of words alone, was adjudged solely in terms of the 
242 
ordinary man test. In the second edition of Garrow, the 
opinion is expressed that 
"In all these cases243 the question of provocation 
would, under New Zealand law, be one for the jury 
to decide on the facts in each case". 
This passage is replaced in the following edition by the 
statement that 
"intercourse between an engaged girl and a man other 
than her fianc~ is not wrongful within the meaning 
of the section and would not constitute provocation 
for murder hy her fianct". 244 . 
In the absence of decided cases, it is not possible to express 
an opinion a s to the correctness of this as sertion. If it is 
242. Garrow; "The Crimes Act, 1908" 2nd ed. by Jas. M.E. Garrow 
(1927) p.98. 
243 Rothwell, ~ning, Birchall, Alexander, Ellor and Phillis 
are referred to in this context. 
244. "Garrow f s Crimina 1 Law in New Zealand" 3rd ed. by C. Evans-
Scott (1950) p.118. 
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correct, then a fortiori, it is difficult to see how the 
confession of infidelity by one non-spouse to another could be 
treated as "wrongful". Indeed, it is arguable that although a 
confession of adultery may convey information which a recipient 
spouse finds distasteful, it cannot be described as an "insult" 
at all, and it may.· .-well be that Rothwell would not have been 
good law in New Zealand, and that Greening and Pal~, at least, 
would have been decided in the same way here. 245 
These doubts have been allayed by the changed phraseology 
of the Crimes Act, 1961. The words "wrongful act or course of 
conduct, or any insult" were used to describe the provocative 
incident in the Crimes Bi~l, 1957, but this was later amended 
a long the lines of the Homicide Act, 1)57 (U .K,,) to provide that 
"anything done or said may be provocation" 246 
provided that it satisfies the other criteria. Henceforth, it 
would no longer be open to a trial judge to rule that there was 
no evidence of provocation on the ground that the incident 
complained of consisted of words alone. The changes wrought are 
illustrated by A.nde£§.Qf!,247. in which the facts gave rise to an 
inference that the de facto wife of the offender confessed 
that she had been unfaithful. It was expressly conceded by the 
Solicitor-General that, apart from the question of sufficiency, 
such an incident could now be provocation. 
245. Cf. per contra Taylor [1948J 1 D.L.R. 545. Although, there 
the confession was accompanied by a slap, and was made in 
a way Which might be interpreted as insulting. 
246. Section 169(2) of the Crimes Act, 1961. 
247. [1965J N.Z.L.R. 29. 
4. Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation 
(a) The Problems Posed 
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Generally, it may be said that provocation consists of some 
248 
act or series of acts done by the dead man to the accused. 
But incidents may occur which satisfy the general definition 
of provocation contained in Section 169(2), but which either 
were not done to the victim, or not done to the offender. The 
offender's aim may be astray, .or he may mistakenly think his 
antagonist to be A when in fact he is B. It may be that 
nothing is done or said at all, but the offender, suspecting 
or honestly believing the worst, kills before the true position 
is known to him. He may misinterpret either the conduct or 
the remarks of his victim, and attach to them unintended 
connotations. And what is the position where the offender, 
already riled by the behaviour of one person is then made the 
object of provocative conduct by another, conduct which would 
not in it self satisfy the ordinary man test? The third person 
may, in such a situation have done nothing to the offender at 
all. Finally, a problem is raised where one person acts in 
such a way as to provoke A, and his conduct has the incidental 
and unintended effect of provoking B. 
All of these situations have one feature in common, which 
is that, vis-a-vis the offender, the victim cannot be said to 
be the author of his own destruction. Can it be said in such 
circumstances that the offender was "provokedlf , or acted "under 
provocation"? According to Howard, 
"The idea underlying the doctrine of provoca tion is 
248. It was so described by Devlin J. in Duffy [1949J 1 All E.R. 
932Q In the case ~unnamed) with which the learned judge 
was concerned, these conditions were in fact satisfied. 
tha t it is unjust to convict D of the most serious 
form of homicide if V's death is partly his own 
fault". 249 
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There is no evidence that the Courts embark on any subsidiary 
enquiry into the part played by the victim in his own demise; 
indeed if the law is examined. from the point of view of the f aul t 
of the victim, a complicated web of conflicting trends and 
tendencies is to be found. At times, the suggestion that such 
fault might be relevant is eschewed; but in some cases, although 
the lack of fault is not elevated into an articulate premise 
upon which the Courts proceed, it is submitted that it may be 
found lurking not very far beneath the surface of the legal 
niceties. 
Until 1961, no mention of these problems was made in the 
New Zeala,nd legislation, and no case is reported in which they 
were considered. Although it is conceivable that the legis-
la ture intended that these questions should be dealt with solely 
in terms of the definition of provocation contained in Section 
184 of the Crimes Act, 1908, it is almost certain that the 
Common Law would have prevailed. However, in 1961, a new 
sub-section, Section 169(6) was included, which provided that 
"This section shall apply in any case where the 
provocation was given by the person killed, and 
also in any case where the offender, under 
provocation given by one person, by accident or 
mistake killed another person". 
Two problems of interpretation arise in particular. Do the 
words "was given" prevent the of fender from invoking the 
defence where the conduct of the victim is directed at a third 
249. Howard; 2nd ed. p.84. In fairness, it should perhaps be 
added that this is not a theme wHch the author develops. 
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person? Second, is the requirement that the provocation be 
given by "the person killed" intended to be exhaustive, or is it 
the law tha t, in tho se rare ca ses in which the vic tim in no way 
contributed to his own death, the ordinary man test still 
prevails as the test of sufficiency? According to the explan-
atory note to the 1959 Crimes Bill, the sub-section is ','declar-
atory of the case law". It is intended to examine each question 
in the light of this case law. 
(b) "Was given" by the ~~ killed:,Jndirg,g.:!:...Provocation 
In two of the earliest reported cases, the fact that the 
victim had directed his conduct at another person did not 
250 prevent a manslaughter verdict being reached. In Anon, 
the offender went to the aid of a friend who had become involved 
in a quarrel over a game of bowls. 251 And in Royley, the 
offender was informed that his son had been beaten in a fight 
with another boy.' He immediately took up a "cudgel", ran a 
considera ble distance, and slew his son r S adversary. Probably, 
252 
as Turner comments, too great a 
253 placed on these cases, although 
reliance sho uld not be 
254 in the case of Huggett, 
at least one of the judges cited the Anon case in support of 
the proposition that an unlawful imprisonment may be provocat-
250. (1611) 12 Co.Rep. 87; 77 E.R. 1364. 
251. ibid. 
252. Russell; 12th ed. p.531. 
253. Foster confesses that he finds the case"a very extraordinary 
one as Coke reports it, the provocative incident being "a 
disaster slight enough, and very frequent among boys". He 
prefers the account of Croke, Which, he suggests, shows 
tha t beca use the fa tal blow delivered wa sa" single stroke" 
with a "small cudgel" was most probably accidental. See 
Foster,294-5. 
254. (1666) Kel. 59; 84 E.R. 1082. 
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ion to a bystander. Huggett and three others had gone to the 
"rescue" of an unknown person who was being pressed into 
service against the Dutch, and who was not himself protesting. 
The crrest wa s unlawf ul, and in the ensuing melee, Huggett 
killed one of the persons arresting. When the judges were 
asked for a preliminary opinion, they ruled that the case was 
manslaughter only. Kelyng himself considered the case murder, 
and distLnguished the Anon case by pointing out that the person 
arrested was making no protest or attempt to escape, and because 
"they who medled were no friends of his". Certainly, the 
facts give ample cause for suspicion as to the genuineness 
of Huggett's wrath. It appears that the judges, having been 
persuaded by Kelyng's arguments, then ruled that the case was 
murder, but compromised by imposing a penalty of eleven 
th t .. t 1 H . T 1 255. t mon s ~mpr~sonmen on y. owever, ~n 00 ey, ~ was 
decided tha t the unlawful imprisonment of a third person could 
be sufficient provocation. Five of the judges thought 
the ca se murder, and sought to draw a distinction between 
ca ses in which the third party was a rela tive or a friend, 
and cases in which he was a stranger; this did not, however, 
commend itself to the majority which included Lord Holt C.J. 
on the grounds tha t it wa s "not to be met with in our books". 
Fostert s criticism of the case is $rcastic and trenchant. 
He contrasts the situation where provocation is given by words 
a lone to the of fender himself, pointing out tha t 
"affronts of that kind pierce deeper, and stimulate 
the veins more effectually, than a slight injury 
done to a third person". 256 
---255. (1709) 2 Ld. Raym. 1296; 92 E.R. 349. 
256. Foster,312. 
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He also makes the point that, althoughmdignation might be 
aroused by the sight of a wrongf ul arrest, this is the product 
of cool reflection and reason rather than instinct or human 
infirmity. But Foster does not rule aut altogether the 
possibility that provocation given to a third person may also 
be provocation to the off ender. 
The problem does not appear to have arisen again in the 
Reports for more than a century, when in Harrington,257 Cockburn, 
C.J. allowed the defence to go to the jury When the provocative 
incident eonsisted of an attack on the daughter of the offender 
by her husband. There are, however, two relevant Commonwealth 
258 
a uthorit ies. In Mouers,· the decea sed attacked a young girl, 
whose companion ran to inform the offender of what had happened. 
Mouers immediately went to the scene and shot the deceased. It 
was held by the Court that there was no evidence of provocation, 
principally because the offender had not actually witnessed what 
had occurred between the deceased and the young girl. Finally, 
259 the question arose for consideration in Terry, in which 
provocation was offered by the deceased to the sister of the 
offender, who was also the wife of the deceased. Pape J. ruled 
tha t there was evidence of provoca tion fit to place before the 
juryo In so doing, he drew an analogy with cases of the 
defence of one's relatives, but he expressly left open the 
257. (1866) 10 Cox C.C. 330. But see "Roscoe's Law of Evidence" 
14th ed. by H. Cohen (1921) p.861 where it is said that 
"It was held by Rolfe B. that a blow given to defendant's 
wife would afford the same provocation as a blow given to 
h~mself, so as to reduce [murderJ to manslaughter. RQ2gers 
(1842) (earlier editions of this work.)" 
258 0 (1921) 57 D.L.R. 569. 
259. [1964J V.R. 248. 
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question whether the operation of the doctrine was, or should 
be, confined to relatives. He did, however, insis t tha t the 
offender must have been present when the provocative incident 
occurred, a restriction which may be explained by the fact 
that words alone could not constitute provocation according to 
Victorian law. 
In all of these cases, it may be said that the victim is 
at fault in two respects; he is doing something to someone other 
than the offender which would be provocation to that other 
person. It need not be shown, however, that he intended to 
provoke the offender, although it would seem that in each case, 
he was at least negligent in that respect. Both of these 
elements are not, however, necessary to the operation of the 
defence, as is shown by the adultery cases. Smith and Hogan 
suggest that, even here, the case 
"might also be considered as one where something 
is Idone to~ D by the guilty pair. At least they 
are committing a matrimonial offence against him". 260 
But the conduct could not be provocative to the offending 
spouse, and in Fisher ,261 in which Park J. said that the 
adul tery rule could possibly be extended to the situation 
where the victim had committed an unnatural act with the son of 
the offender, there is no evidence that the act was anything 
other than consensual. Again, however, Park J. insisted that 
such an extension could only be contemplated where the offender 
had actually witnessed the incident. 
To summarize thus far, it is sUbmitted that it may be 
260. Smith and Hogan 2nd ed. p.206. 
261. (1837) 8 C. & P. 182. 
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said that the provocation "was given" by the person killed in 
each of the cases considered, whether that conduct was 
provocative to the third person or not. It is also submitted 
that the question whether the person attacked or insulted is 
a relative of the offender 
"is a relevant factor when the question whether an 
ordinary man would be likely to lose his self-
control as a result of seeing the provocative 
incident is being considered by the jury". 262 
Similar comments may be made of the apparent Common Law rule 
that the of fender must have been present when the provocative 
incident occurred, although it may be that, where the offender 
was not present, there will also be a time lapse between the 
incident and the retaliation. But it is submitted that, to 
elevate either of these two factors to necessary preconditions 
may conflict with the provisions of the Crimes Act 1961, itself, 
and where this occurs, it is the provisions of the Act which 
must prevail. 
(c) "by the person killed": Misdi~ed"'£'§!.S....1iatio!! 
263 In :McGregor, it was argued for the offender that the 
provocative words or deeds referred to in Section 169(2) could 
emanate from any source, and need not necessarily come from 
the victim himself. Counsel submitted that the terms of 
Section 169(6) were ambiguous, and at least consistent with 
this submission. The Court of Appeal replied; 
"We cannot agree. In our opinion the subsection 
makes quite plain what in any event is inherent in 
the use of the word 'provocation', namely that the 
law shows a measure of indulgence to a person who 
kills another who has provoked him. It may well 
--~~---------------------------------------------------
262. [1964J V.R. 248, 251 per Pape J. 
263. [1962J N.Z.L.R. 1069, 1080. 
be that earlier happenings between the appellant 
and [deceasedJ could be taken into account in 
determining whether a subsequent comparatively 
trivial act of provocation on the part of [deceasedJ 
could cause slumbering fires of passion to burst 
into flame, but in the present case [deceasedJ did 
or said nothing to arouse the passion of the 
appellant •••• " 
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In other words, it would seem that the policy of the law is that 
the actual incident which sparks the offender's passion must 
be something done by the victim. If this stateme.nt is definitive 
of the New Zealand law, then the Crimes Act, 1961 did rather 
more than merely state the case law. Further, the present 
English law which requires that the issue be judged from the 
point of view of the of fender rather than tha t of the victim, 
appears to be more advantageous to the offender, and more 
consistent with the general principles of criminal responsibilityo 
It is not entirely easy to find reasons why the defence 
should be limited to those cases in which provocation did move 
from the person killed, particularly in those situations in 
which it is conceivable that an ordinary ma~nwould have behaved 
as the offender did. It is submitted that the only reasonable 
explanation for this departure from the ordinary man test is that 
the victim is in such circumstances not at fault. 
Even ro, this rationale is not as Howard would suggest, 
consistent throughout the law. Thus, the Crimes Act, 1961 
itself provides for exceptions where the offender "by accident 
or mistake" kills someone other than the person provoking. 
This is consistent with the case law. In Williams,264 Gross,265 
and Porritt266 it was decided that the offence was manslaughter 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
264. (1639) Jones W. 432; 82 EoR. 227. 
265. (1913) 23 Cox C.C. 455. 
266. [1961J 1 W.L.R. 1372. 
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only when the person killed was an innocent bystander. Indeed, 
in the last case, the person to whom provocation was offered 
was in fact the person killed. Cases in which the victim is 
killed as a result of mistaken identity are rare, the only 
1 0 d 1 bOB 267 0 whO h h 0 0 common y cLte examp e eLng rown, Ln LC t e vLctLm 
was thought to be one of a group of keelmen who had attacked 
the offender. In these cases, it is difficult to see how it 
can ~ said that the victim is at fault. It should also be 
pointed out that where the offender makes a mistake, not as 
to the identity of the persons provoking and killed, but as to 
the circumstances by which he is confronted, the issue is 
judged from his point of view rather than in terms of what the 
victim intended by his conduct. Glanville Williams asserts 
that 
"T!iere seems to be no doubt that a mistaken belief 
in provocation is equivalent to actual provocation. 
The mistake is a defence to the same extent as if the 
facts supposed were true". 268 
As the chief authority for this proposition, he cites the case 
of Letenock,269 in which the offender, a drunken soldier, 
mistakenly thought that his corporal was about to attack him. 
The Court replaced a verdict of murder with one of manslaughter. 
~ 
Although the Crimes Act, 1961 does not specifically refer to 
this problem, it is submit ted on genera 1 principle that this 
case applies in New Zealand, and that if an offender mistakenly 
267. (1776) 1 Leach 148. 
268. [1954J Crim. L.R. 740, 752. There is some doubt as. to 
whether the mistake need be objectively reasonable. 
Williams argues that it need not, but in other contexts 
the Courts have consistently refused to adopt a subjective 
approach, and the question must be regarded as an open one. 
269. (1917) 12 Cr.App.R. 221. And see the submissions of Counsel 
in Millward (1931) 23 Cr.App.R.119. 
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believes that a provocative incident has occurred, and loses 
his self-control and kills, when an ordinary man would have 
lost his self-control, he should not be excluded from the benefit 
of the defence whether the person killed is in any way at 
fault or not. 
Be that as it may, the ruling 
is consonant with what was said in 
270 
of the Court in MCGregor 
S · 271 Th ff d l.mpson. e 0 en er 
was a returned soldier whose wife had been in the habit of 
returning home with other men in his absence. She also spent 
the housekeeping money on drink, and neglected their two year 
old child who was suffering from water on the brain. Wnen 
the offender returned one day to find his wife absent, he 
killed his son with a razor. On appeal, the verdict of 
murder was upheld on the grounds that the defence applies only 
where provocation is given by the deceased. However, the 
correctness of this ruling has been doubted, and the decision 
272 has been explained on other grounds. To begin with there 
was nothing in the nature of an assault by the wife on the 
offender, which was required by law at the time. In addition, 
the defence was really attempting to dress up as provocation 
a killing which in reality proceeded from other motives, and, 
however understandable those motives may have been, they could 
not be treated as though they proceeded from provocation. 
If 2impson created such a rule, it seems to have been 
extended slightly in the case of Hall. 273 
-------------------------------------------------------------,-------
270. Supra n.263. 
271. (1915) 84 L.JoK.B. 1893. 
272. See e. g. Morris and Howard; 93n. and 0 'Regan; "Indirect 
Provoca tion an d Misdirected Reta liation" [196 8J Crim. L.R. 
319, 321. 
273. (1928) 21 Cr.App.R. 48. 
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The case for the Crown was that the accused had killed one 
person while angered by provocation received from another. 
There was, however, a conflict of evidence, and the offender 
alleged that the offender was one of a party Which had earlier 
attacked him. On the basis that the offender's story might 
be true, the Court of Criminal Appeal substituted a verdict of 
manslaughter for one of murder. Any extension of the rule in 
Simpson is slight, because it is implicit in the offender's 
argument that the deceased had earlier afforded him provocation. 
A more troublesome situation arose in the Victorian case 
of Scriva (No.2)~74 The offender witnessed his child being 
run over, and, a s he thought, killed, by a recklessly driven 
car. This sight moved him to attack a passenger in the car, 
whereupon a bystander intervened and was stabbed to death. ,It 
was held by a majority in the Full Court that there was no 
evidence of provocation because no ordinary person would have 
behaved as the offender did. In the light of this ruling, it 
became unnecessary for the Court to decide wha t the rules as 
to misdirected retaliation were, but the question was never-
theless considered briefly. It was considered that, although 
the doctrine was not confined to those cases in which the 
provocation was actually given by the victim, the victim must 
nevertheless be one of a party giving the provocation, a person 
whom the offender killed by mistake or one of a party whom 
the accused rea sona bly believed to be giv ing provocation. 
Finally, the doctrine might apply Where the victim was killed 
by accident, when the offender intended to kill another falling 
---------------------------------------
274. [1951J V.L.R. 298. 
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within these categories. 
Before commenting on this analysis, it may be as well to 
point out a different problem arising from Scriv~, and which 
is present to a lesser extent in MCGregor. In Scriva, it 
seems tolerably clear that the offender was already enraged 
at the time when the bystander intervened. However, it 
would appear that when the Court considered the question of 
sufficiency, it examined the conduct of the victim as though it 
wee in some wayan independent incident. Further, the Court 
laid considerable emphasis on the worthy motives with which the 
hapless bystander had acted. But in fact, the victim had done 
something which directed the attention of the offender towards 
himself. Similarly in MCGreg2r275 the victim had done something 
by which the offender said lB had been angered. Although it 
was expressly mentioned by the Court of Appeal that it was not 
contended tha t 
"the invi ta tion intended to the appellant's father 
was given for the purpos e of annoying the appellant", 
the fact remains that the offender interpreted this as one 
further blow struck in the continuing feud between himself 
and his victim. In both cases, then, the victim had done 
something to annoy the offender, and which in some way con-
tributed to the offender's loss of self-control. 
In ruling as it did that the provocation, to be efficacious, 
must move from the victim, the Court of Appeal clearly appeals 
t th . f th d . 276 o e meanJ..ng 0 e wor provocatJ..on. Wha t the Court 
appears to be saying, it is submitted, is that conduct is 
---------------------------, 
275. [1362J N.Z.L.R. 1069, 1073. 
276. Supra n. 263. 
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provocative or not according to its author's intentions. With 
respect, although the intention of the person provoking is 
certainly one factor to be taken into account, it is not the 
sole criterion by which the provocative tendency of conduct 
is judged. Moreover, it has already been argued that the law 
in effect concedes this pon by treating as provocation, 
277 
conduct which was at most negligent in this respect. Surely 
at lea~ one of the factors which we normally treat as a 
criterio,n of provocation is the way in which the offender 
himself actually reacts to what is said or doneo Thus, if a 
person wa:e to slap his small child for constantly spilling 
its milk, there would be ro objection to saying that he was 
"provoked" into doing so, or that he acted "under provocation", 
despite the child's obvious lack of guilt. Clearly enough, 
if the victim acts with the deliberate intention of riling 
the offender, the retaliation of the latter is the more 
ordinary, but it is submitted that this is not the only or 
even the main criterion according to which we characterise 
his actions as provocative. 
For these reasons, it is submitted, the analysis of the 
Court of Appeal in McGregor is defective. Moreover, it is 
arguable that the question could have been treated otherwise 
consistently with the present Crimes Act, which provides 
in Section 169(2)(a) that the question of sufficiency is to 
be decided "in the circumstances of the case". Thus, the 
argument would proceed, although initially the conduct of 
the victim did not move the offender to kill, the later 
-----------------------------------
276. Supra n.263. 
277. Supra p.146. 
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circumstances of the conduct of the father must be considered 
when the question of sUfficiency is being determined. It is, 
to say the least, highly unlikely that, even considering 
the matter in this way, it could be said that an ordinary man 
would have hehaved a s McGregor did, but the correctness of the 
result should not be permitted to obscure the fact toot it was 
arrived at by a questionable route. Similarly, should a case 
such as Scriva arise in New Zealand, it is submitted that one 
of the't:ircumstances of the case" which ought properly to be 
taken into account in deciding the question of sufficiency is 
the fact that the offender is already enraged by something 
said or done to him by a third person. 
Cd) Conclusions 
This examination of the cases shows that there may still 
be some limits on the operation of the ordinary man rule in 
New Zealand when the provocation is given by someone other than 
the person killed. Yet it is impossible to find any consistent 
rationale by which these limitations might be explained. EVen 
in the various situations envisaged in Scriva, the degree of 
fault displayed by the victim ranges from the completely 
innocent to the wilfully antagonistic. It is not contended 
that the question of fault is entirely irrelevant. Rather, 
it is submitted that the present categorisation places too 
great a premium on the participation of the victim in some 
cases but not in others, and is an unnecessarily complicated 
way of dealing with the sufficiency of a provocative incident. 
An alternative method is provided by the present English 
law. In Twine,278 the conduct of the girlfriend of the offender 
278. [1967J Crim.L.R. 710. The facts of which appear more 
fully in Smith and Hogan, 2nd ed. p.206. 
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caused him to lose his self-control and to strike and kill the 
man she was with. It appeared that, not only did the victim not 
intend to insult or provoke the offender, but he was entirely 
unaware of the offender's presence. Notwithstanding this, 
Lawton J., having decided that there wa s evidence from which 
it might be inferred that the of :fender had lost his self-control, 
left it to the jury to say whether or not the offender was 
provoked enough to make a reasona ble man do as he did. As the 
learned judge pointed out, the Homicide Act, 1957 had changed 
the Common Law on this point, and it may now be confidently 
a sserted that Simpson wo uld be approached dif f erently today. 
It is submitted that, having regard to the unnecessary 
complexity of the present New Zealand law, this example may 
well merit consideration for the purposes of reform. And 
just as these dif ficulties were introduced by the inclusion 
of subsection (6), they ca.n and should be, obviated by its 
abrogation. If this were achieved, there would no longer 
be any limits on the sort of incident which might potentially 
. . 279 const~ tut e provoca t~on. 
279. This is subject, perhaps, to the opening words of Section 
169(5) of the Crimes Act, 1961, which provide that "No 
one shall be held to give provocation to another by lawfully 
exercising arty power conf erred by lawo ••• II There may be 
some reasons of policy why this should override the ordin-
ary man test, but the purpose of the subsection is obscure. 
Adams 2nd ed. para.1274 p.346 suggests that lawful arrest 
or imprisonment would be 1;K>ical of the powers contemplated, 
and argues that is to such matters that the provision is 
mainly or wholly directed o As to unlawful arrest.. See 
Section 170 Crimes Act, 1961. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE BURDEN-2E-PROOF 
A) Introduction 
Notoriously, expressions such as "the burden of proof" 
and "the onus of proof" are used by the Courts and the 
commentators to convey a multitude of different meanings. For 
present purposes, however, it is ;sufficient to distinguish 
between the persuasive and the evidentiary burdens. The 
"persuasive bufden" connotes the task, (which may be undertaken 
by either the prosecution or the defenc~, of establ ishing"8 
case. More specifically, it governs the question as to who 
must discharge the task of persuading the tribunal that a killing 
was murder rather than manslaughter. It also governs the extent 
to which the tribunal, at the end of the day, must be satisfied. 
This aspect of the defence of provocation has, in general 
caused little difficulty. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the evidentiary 
burden. Briefly, this dictates what factors must be apparent 
in or capable of infer.Gnce from the evidence before a defendant 
is entitled to have the issue which he wishes to raise 
considered by the tribunal. It also determines who is to 
decide, as between judge and jury, whether those factor s are 
present. In short, it raises the whole question of the respect-
ive functions of judge and jury. That these questions are of 
considerable importance and complexity is indicated by the fact 
that it is impossible to expkin the substantive law without 
numerous references to them. Inso.tr as possible, repetition 
of what has already been said will be avoided; but the 
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collation of these points, and the addition of others not 
already ment ioned is necessary to place the present New Zealand 
approach in some perspective. 
B) The Persuasive Burden 
Before this century, very little seems to have been written 
or said about where the onus of proving provocation lay; 
certainly, there is no case in which the problem was expressly 
considered. Foster l stated that 
"I have already premised, that whoever would shelter 
himself under the plea of provocation must prove his 
case to the satisfaction of his jury. The presumption 
of law is against him, till that presumption is 
repelled by contrary evidence." 
Although no authority is given for this assertion, it does 
find echoes in subsequent cases. In Thomas,2 the jury Was 
told by Parke B. tha t 
"whenever death ensues from violence inflicted by 
the hand of another, the law presumes, prima facie, 
that it was murder; and it must be so treated, 
unless, upon the evidence for or against the accused, 
the jury are induced to come to a conclusion that 
the off ence is of a less degree". 
This shows, a t lea st, tha t evidence of provoca tion ne ed not be 
found exclusively in the evidence given on behalf of the 
offender. But the expression "induced to come to a conclusion", 
although it appears to suggest that the jury must believe that 
the accused was provoked, was probably, in fact, used rather 
loosely. And in Kirkham,3 Coleridge J. probably had the 
evidentiary onus only in mind when he said 
"if you had heard nothing more than simply that the 
prisoner taking a knife in his hand had stabbed his son 
1. Foster, 290. 
2. (1837) 7 C. & P. 817. 
3. (1837) 8 C. & Po 115. 
that would have put it on him to clear himself from 
the charge of murder. The law requires from him 
and will allow him to shew that there were some 
mitigating circumstances." 
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It would no doubt be possible to compile a long list of 
similarly inconclusive instances. But the matter was not 
seriously considered by the Courts at all until WOdmington v. 
4 D.P.P. Were it not for the fact that the House specifically 
refers to the question, the case would be of too general 
application to warrant more than a passing mention. As it is, 
however, Woolmington I s case is highly relevant and provides 1:t'E 
basis of the present law rela ting to the question. 
The direction of the trial judge bears a striking similarity 
to what was said in Ih2-~ and Kirkham; he directed the jury 
that 
"if the Crown satisfy you that this woman died at the 
prisoner's hands, then he has to show that there are 
circumstances to be found in the evidence which has 
been given from the witness box in this case which 
alleviate the crime so that it is only manslaughter". 
This was held to be a misdirection. Beginning with the 
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the House 
then reasoned that earlier authorities, including Foster, 
and in particular Lord Tindal C.J. in Greenacr~5 were either 
wrong or must have been referring to the evidentiary onus 
only; the next step in the process of proof. However, the 
House took the matter rather further by holding that if all 
that .appeared in the evidence was that the accus ed killed the 
deceased, there was evidence upon which the jury may - not, 
must - find him guilty of murdero To establish that a killing 
4. [1935J A.C. 462. 
5. (1837) 8 C. & P. 35. 
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is murder, the Crown must show that it was accompanied by 
maliC'e, and 
"malice may be implied where death occurs as the 
result of the voluntary act of the accused which 
is (i)' intentional and (ii) unpro'lked. When 
evidence of death and malice has been given (this 
is a question for the jury) the accused is 
entitled to show by evidence or by examination of 
the circumstances adduced by the Crown that the 
act on his part which caused death was either 
unintentional or provoked. If the jury are either 
satisfied with his explanation or, upon a review 
of all the evidence, are left in reasonable doubt 
whether, even if his explanation be not accepted, 
the act was unintentional or provoked, the prisoner 
is entitled to be acquitted." 
If this was a new approach, the Courts do not appear to 
have had immediate difficulty in giving effect to it, in the 
context of provocation, and it was not until six years la ter 
. p' 6 ~n r~nce that a verdict of manslaughter was substituted for 
murder on the basis of a misdirection as to the burden of proofo 
There, the trial judge had told the jury in general terms that 
if there was any reasonable doubt, such doubt should be 
resolved in favour of the prisoner. The main objection was that 
he did not specifically tell the jury that this was the case 
even if the explanation given by the prisoner was not acceptedo 
In Mancini,7 the House of Lords reiterated what had been said 
in Wo61mington, pointing out that when Viscount Sankey had said 
that the prisoner was entitled to be "acquitted", he meant 
simply that the prisoner was entitled to the benefit of the 
doubt. The House also laid emphasis on the fact that it is 
the overall effect of the summing up which is important; 
provided that the warning as to reasonable doubt is given, it 
6 • ( 1941) 28 Cr. Ap p • R • 60. 
7. [1942J A.C.1. 
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need not be repeated agp in and again. 8 However, on subsequent 
, 'McPh 9 d C -10 th C h h d occas~ons, ~n erson an ascoe, e ourts ave quas e 
convictions of murder where the trial judge has made no 
reference in his summing up to the question of where the onus 
of proof lies in cases of provocation. 
As far as New Zealand is concerned, the position was not 
bl ' h d 'h . '1 Kah 11, h' h . esta ~s e w~t any certa~nty unt~ __ u, ~n w ~c ~t was 
argued for the Crown that WoolmingtQ!1 did not apply in New 
Zealand o The trial judge directed the jury to find the 
offender guilty of manslaughter if they were "satisfied,r that 
he had been provoked. Counsel for the Crown contended that 
the question here was to be decided as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. Since, however, there'was no reference to the 
onus in the Crimes Act 1908, the law in New Zealand remains as 
it used to be in England prior to Woolmington. The Court of 
Appeal refused to accept the se submissions, and prayed in aid 
the decision of the Privy Council in Kwaku Mensah12 which, it 
said 
"manifests a strong disinclination by their Lordships 
that the. rule as to the burden of proof as enunciated 
in Woolmington and :Mancini has been displaced by 
legislation" • 
For this reason, the conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered. 
In Parker,13 the Privy Council in fact held that the relevant 
< •• , ~ - ~ 
8. See Hodges [1962J Crim. L .R. 385 and Ryder [1)64 J Crim. L.R. Ig~ 
9. (1957) 41 Cr.App.R. 213. 
10. [1970J 2 All E.R. 833. 
11. [1947J N.Z.L.R. 368. 
12. [1946J A.C. 83. 
13. (1964) III C.L.R. 665. 
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legislation had displaced Common law rules as to the burden of 
proof. However, in Anderson,14 the Solicitor-General was invited 
to make submissions as to the correctness of Kahu. For what 
the Court considered to be "good and suf f icient reasons", he 
declined to argue that Kahu should be reconsidered, and it was 
accepted by the Court that the position had not been affected 
15 by the 1961 legislation. This view WlS applied in Downey, 
in which one reason given for the quashing of a verd:id: of 
murder wa s tha t the trial judge must have given the jury the 
impression that it was necessary that they should "accept" 
the evidence of the offender before they could find a verdict 
of manslaughter. 
C) The Evidentiary Burden 
None of the foregoing is relevant until the decision has 
been taken to permit the jury to consider provocation. 
Common law practice in this respect was stated by Viscount 
S · L C . }fa . . 16 l.mon •• l.n nCl.nl.. 
"Taking, for example, a case in which no evidenee 
has been given which would raise the issue of 
provocation, it is not the duty of the judge to 
invite the jury to speculate as to provocative 
incidents of which there is no evidence and which 
cannot be reasonably inferred from the evidence". 
The real problem is the meaning of "provocation" in this context. 
Unfortunately, the Crimes Act 1961 is of little real assistance. 
Basically, it defines "provocation" as consisting of three 
elements; something must have been "done at:' said", which 
14. [1965J N.Z.L.R. 29. 
15. [1971J N.Z.L.R. 97. 
16. [1942J A .. C. 1, 12. 
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caused the offender to lose his self-control, and which was 
suf ficie.nt to deprive an ordinary man of the power of self-
control.. It then provides for the respective functions of 
judge and jury by stipula ting tha t 
Section 169ill "Whether there is any evidence of provocation 
is a question of law." 
Section 169(4) "Whether, if there is evidence of provocation, 
the provocation was sufficient as aforesaid, 
and whether it did in fact deprive the offender 
of the power of self-control and thereby 
induced him to commit the act of homicide, are 
questions of fact .. " 
Slightly different considerations apply to each of the 
three elements, partly because each is of a different logical 
character. The question whether something was done or said is 
a question of fact, capable ci proof or disproof in the ordinary 
way. It has earlier been argued that actual loss of self-
control is not a question of fact, and the evidentiary 
difficulties to which this gives rise have already been 
. d d 17 consl. ere • Fi.nally, the question whether an ordinary man 
would have lost his self-control is best characterised as one 
of opinion; and it is over this issue tha t many of the difficult-
ies associated with the defence arise. 
Of the three elements of provocation, the actual occurrence 
of an incident which caused the offender to lose his self-
control is the one which most readily lends itself to proof by 
direct evidence. But there need not be any such evidence; and 
although, as Viscount Simon states, the jury should not be 
invited to speculate, where there is no direct evidence, some 
17. Supra p.S7. 
163. 
degree of speculation is of necessity involved. The extent to 
which this is permissible is illustrated by a comparison 
18 19 between MCLaren and Ande~Q8. In the former, it appeared 
that the offender had become involved in an altercation after 
he had approached a group of men. Provocation was not pleaded 
at the trial, and counsel on appeal suggested that it should 
20 have been. In rejecting this submission, Lush J. said 
"This defence had not been suggested before, and if 
there had been provoc ation it wou Id have been ea sy 
to prove it by calling the appellant; this was not 
done". 
By comparison in Anderson, evidence was given tha t the offender 
had become upset when his de facto wife said something to him 
at a party. No evidence was given as to the "ip.sssima verba", 
and for this reason the trial judge withdrew the issue from the 
jury. The Court of Appeal held ttat he should not have adopted 
this course o Instead, the Court pointed to' the circumstances 
surrounding the offence, including the offender's immediate 
reaction and his subsequent statement~ the police (which was 
tendered in evidence by the Crown), and concluded that these 
were sufficient foundation for an inference that the deceased 
18 .. (1913) 9 Cr.App.R. 107, 109. 
19. [1965J N.Z.L.R. 29, 34. 
20. It should be interpo~ed at this point that it is for the 
judge to say whether there is evidence of such a.n incident, 
and the rule which obliges the trial judge to leave 
provocation to the jury when there is evidence to support 
it (discussed supra pp.59-61) is also relevant in this 
context. However Hopper [1915J 2 K.Bo 431, in which this 
duty was first spelled out, was not decided until after 
McLaren 9 This rule has recently been reiterated in 
Cascoe [1970J 2 All E.R. 833, 837 where it is said that 
"whether the issue is raised at the trial or not, if there 
is evidence which might lead the jury to find provocation, 
then it is the duty of the Court to leave the is sue to the 
jury". per Salmon LoJ. 
164. 
had confessed infidelity. The limits to permissible speculation 
were to some extent set by the Court, which said 
"when the incident which gives ris e to the defence c:£ 
provocation takes the form of words only, then it is 
necessary that SUfficient should be known of what was 
said or claimed to have been said to enable the 
Judge to rule whether thaB is any evidence of provocat-
ion to go to the jury.... But we do not think that 
there is any justification for concluding that the 
exact words must be known. We are of opinion the 
Solicitor-Genera 1 was right when he conceded, as he 
did, that it was enough if there was sufficient 
material to enable the Judge, and ultimately the jury, 
to infer the general content of what was said." 
It is submitted that these comments apply, mutatis mutandis, 
where the provocation alleged consists of something "done" 
rather than "said". This follows from the fact that there need 
only be a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to 
whether or not the offender was provoked. In Lewis,21 the 
Court of Appeal said that 
"It is very important, when dealing with a defence such 
as provocation, to make it quite clear to the jury that 
they are not under the necessity of deciding what the 
true facts are upon which the defence rests. It is 
enough if the evidence raises a reasonable doubt in 
their minds, as to whether the homicide was, in tru~ 
murder." 
Most difficulty is caused by the third element, the ordinary 
man test. In a large majority of cases in which the plea of 
provocation failed, it did so because the provocation alleged 
was thought for one reason or another to be insufficient. 
Hovering in the background is the question who is to decide, as 
between judge and jury, the SUfficiency of a provocative 
incident. In the course of its history, the doctrine has run 
the complete gamut. At one end of the spectrum, provocation 
was initially treated as being entirely a question of law. 22 
210 (1962) unreported CoA. 92/620 
22. Supra pp.20-22. 
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At the other, the Homicide Act, 1957 now confides the issue to 
the jury alone. For the remainder, the degree of latitude 
permitted to juries has waxed and waned; creating an uneasy and 
unstable compromise. 
For two reasons, the judges have guarded their powers to 
make this decision rather jealously. There is, to begin with, 
the traditional judicial mistrust of juries, the influence of 
which in this sphere was frankly acknowledged by the Court of 
Appeal in McGregor. 23 A nice twist on this theme is provided 
by the judges in one of their resolutions in the case of 
24 Lord Mbrl~, in which it was said that the Statute of Stabbing, 
1604 
"was only a declaration of the common law, and made 
to prevent the inconveniences of juries, who were apt 
to believe that to be a provocation to extenuate a 
murder which in law it was not". 
Perhaps implicit in this desire to co'ntrol juries is a desire 
to achieve uniformity in the application of the law. In one 
sense, justice requires that like cases be treSted~alike, and 
it is a t lea st argua ble that the vagaries of juries frustra te 
the accomplishment of this object. 
In order to achieve co,rtrol, the judges have utilised three 
devices. Originally, there was an insistence that malice was 
25 
a question of law. Since the effect of provocation was to 
"cast off the presumption of malice", it too was treated as a 
question of law. Coupled with this, and perhaps as a result 
of it, the judges tended to place limits on the sort of 
23. [1962J N.ZL.R. 1069, 1075. 
24. (1666) Kel. 55; 84 E.R. 1079. 
25. Onebv (1727) 2 Ld. Raym. 1485; 92 E.R. 465. Fisher (1837) 
8 C. & P. 182. 
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incident which could or could not constitute provoca tion. The 
use of this artifice led to fragmentation to the extent tha t, 
on occasion, the law threatened to founder in a quagmire of 
single instances. This point was appreciated by Stephen. Shortly 
before the enunciation of the reasonable man tsst, he criticised 
the law rela ting to indirect provocation saying; 
"It is easy to imagine injuries inflicted on near 
relations, vb ich wai.d be far harder to bear tha n 
blows. Most men would resent an asssult on their 
parents, children, wives or sisters, at least as 
much as an assault upon themselves. In short, 
the question of provocation is one which must be 
dealt with as it arises which ought not to be made 
the subject of rigid rules." 26 
To some extent, these criticisms were blunted by the substitution 
of the reasonable man test for rigid rules five years later in 
27 Welsh, but eVen after that case, judges continued to withdraw 
provocation on the basis that certain things done or said could 
not constitute provoca tion whether they might satisfy the 
28 
reasonable man test or not. In addition, Welsh laid the 
foundation for a further check, the importance of which was only 
gradua lly appreciat ed. Sinc e the rea sona ble man test had express-
ly become an element of the defence, and sine e there must be 
evidence from which a jury could infer the existence of each 
element, there must be "evidence" that a reasonable man would 
have behaved as the offender did. Whether there is evidence of 
something in a criminal trial is a question of law for the 
judge to decide. This simple logic has created a potential 
26. "Capital Punishments" in FraserRs Magazine, Vol. LXIX, 
pp.766-7. Noted in the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
ment Report of 1953. Cmnd. 8932, para. 146. 
27. (1869) 11 Cox C.C. 336. 
28.. See e.g. Supra _ pp.135-138. 
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stranglehold over the application of the defence, not greatly 
different in its effects from the malice rule which it replaced. 
It is proposed to examine the gradual evolution of this check, 
and the different approaches to it in England and New Zealand 
respectively. 
1. The Common Law 
In the half-century or so immediately preceding Welsh, 
the judges developed the practice of more readily leaving the 
sufficiency to the jury. Control was not abandoned entirely, 
and the course was adopted as a matter of practice, about which 
th h ' Ibl' 29 Th f' d' h' ere was not ~ng 0 ~gatory. e con us~on surroun ~ng t ~s 
issue was the subject of a lengthy footnote in Eagl~,30 in 
which the judge is commended for allowing the jury to say whether 
there was "not malice". That no clear rule existed can be 
gathered from the direction of Keating J. in Welsh itself, when 
he told the jury that he was 
"bound to say that I am unable to discover in the 
evidence in this case any provocation which would 
suffice, or approach to such as would suffice, to 
reduce the crime to manslaughter. It has been laid 
down that mere words or gestures will not be 
sufficient to reduce the offence, and at all events 
the law is clear that the provocation must be 
serious. I have already said that I can discover 
no proof of such provocation in the evidence. If 
you cm discover it you can give effect to it; but 
you are bound not to do so unless satisfied that it 
was serious." 
Apparently the jury could not discover it either, and Welsh was 
convicted of murder. It may be that Keating J. was reluctant 
to withdraw the issue because there was some conflict in the 
29. Supra pp.33-39. 
30. (1862) 2 F. & F. 8270 
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evidence. Welsh had started a fight in a tavern with his victim, 
who had obtained judgment in a civil action brought by Welsh. 
A more prolooble explanation is that Keating J. did not 
appreciate the logical implications of what he was saying. 
Nor did any other judge in the nineteenth century, and in 
Selten,31 Rothwel132 and Weston,33 the issue of provocation was 
left to the jury in such a way as to allow them to determine 
the sUfficiency of the provocative incident. 
A change in direction started to become discernible only 
in the early years of this century. This was a gradual trend, 
rather than a sharp swing, and frequently, a ruling that 
there was no evidence of provocation was bolstered by reference 
to the absence of a legally recognised incident, or by 
reference to the lapse of time. Thus in Birchall,34 in which 
the trial judge had withdrawn provocat ion, in additio.n to 
ruling that the mere suspicion of adultery was legally irrelevant, 
the Court of Criminal Appeal stated that 
"there was nothing to justify an ordinary man striking 
the deceased as the appellant did". 
A d 1 h h · P 1 35 1 f h 11 d ·h nat oug 1.n a mer, counse or t eappe ant argue t at 
"It was for the jury to say whether under the 
circumstances the provocation was sufficient", 
the appeal was dismissed without specific comment on this 
argument. That sufficiency was becoming to be recognised once 
-----------------------------------------------------------
31 0 ( 1871) n Cox C. C • 6740 
32. (1871) 12 Cox C.C. 145. 
33. (1879) 14 Cox C.C. 346 0 
34. (1913) 9 Cr.App.R. 91. 
35. [1913J 2 K.B. 29. 
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again as a questio.n for the judge is evident from the remarks 
of Bray J. in Greening,36 where he said that 
"there is clear authority that in a case of supposed 
provocation a judge ought to tell the jury what amount 
of provocation would entitle them to return a verdict 
of manslaughter, and if there is no such evidence, to 
tell them so". 
One of the early problems encountered arose out of the 
situation where the trial judge had withdrawn the question 
where there was a trivial yet legally recognisable provocation 
such as a minor assault. On what basis could a Court of 
Appeal say that the ruling was either correct or incorrect? 
37 Wnen confronted by this in ~§!., the Court flatly disagreed 
with the view taken by the trial judge saying 
"The reason why we have come to this conclusion is 
not from any new view of the law, but because there 
was sufficient evidence of facts and circumstances 
to justify the jury, if they took a certain view of 
them, in finding manslaughter. It is not for us to 
say whether or ,riot they wou Id have done so." 
As a corollary, if the trial judge decided that there was no 
evidence of provocation, there was no way in which the Court 
of Criminal Appeal could be persuaded that he had made an error 
of law. This point is well illustrated by Robinson,38 in 
which the trial judge had told the jury that its verdict must 
be one of murder or a complete acquittal. A verdict of murder 
was returned, but the jury added that 
"This was done without premeditation, in a fit of 
temper under provocation"., 
36. (1913) 9 Cr.App.R. 105. And see the same Judge, arguendo 
in Al~nder (1913) 9 Cr.App.R. 139. 
37. [1915J 2 K.B. 431. 
38. (1922) 16 Cr.App.R. 140. 
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It does not appear in the Report what was relied on as the 
provocative incident, and the main defence was that the death 
was equally compatible with suicide. Clearly, however, the 
jury disbelieved this, and inferred that something must have 
happened which caused the offender to kill. Thus, it seems 
that the main reason why there was no evidence of provocation 
was over the question of sufficiency. The appeal was dismissed. 
In subsequent years, the Court of Criminal Appeal frequently 
agreed or disagreed with a trial judgels ruling that there was 
no evidence of provocation, but usually without_specifying why 
it did so. Thus in Ball,39 a conviction of murder was quashed 
simply because the Court of Criminal Appeal disagreed with 
the trial judge. Similarly in Hal140 and Cobbett. 41 By 
42 
contrast in Thorpe, in which counsel did not mention the 
question of provocation at the trial, arguing that he was 
relying on the judge to exercise the duty imposed upon him by 
H 43 t d' f h' . ... . h ld h opper 0 1.rect 0 1.s own 1.n1. t1.a t1.ve, 1. t wa set at, 
had the trial judge been asked for a formal ruling, he would 
have refused to leave provocation and would have been correct 
to do so. 
It was not until the decision in Gauthier44 that the 
power of the trial judge to withdraw the issue for lack of a 
39. ( 1924) 18 Cr.App.R. 149. 
40 .. (1928 ) 21 Cr.App.R. 48. 
41. (1940) 28 Cr.App.R. 11. 
42. (1925) 18 Cr.App .. R. 189. 
43. D.915J 2 K. B. 43l. 
44. (1943) 29 Cr.App.R. 113. See esp. Cassels J. at 119. 
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sufficiently provocative act was rationalised in terms of the 
reasonable man. But the rule was stated most succinctly by 
Viscount Simon L.C. in Holmes v. D.P.p.,45 when the allocation 
of the respective functions was explained as follows; 
"The distinction, therefore, is between asking Icould 
the evidence support the view that the provocation was 
sufficient to lead a reasonable person to do what the 
accused did?' (which is for the judge to rule), and, 
assuming that the judgers ruling is in the affirmative, 
asking the jury: IDo you consider that, on the facts 
a s you find them from the evidence, the pro'Voca tion 
was in fact enough to lead a reasonable man to do what 
the accused did?' and, if so, EDid the accused act under 
the stress of such provocation?'" 
It is submitted that this represents the perfectly logical 
46 
culmination of the decision in Welsh. All that is really 
surprising is that it took the Courts so long to state 
explicitly what they had been doing in practice for the previous 
thirty years" 
Such was the state of the law when the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment was presented. Dissatisfaction 
was felt with this aspect of the law, and the recommendation 
was made that the task of determining the question of 
47 
sUfficiency should be transferred to the jury. Insofar as 
the resultant legis la tio.u, Section 3 of the Homicide Act, 
195748 continues to use the word "provocation", it was perhaps 
open to the Courts to refuse to alter previous practice, and to 
require evidence upon which a jury could conclude tha t a 
reasonable man would have behaved as the offender did. Sir 
45. [1946J A.C. 588, 597. 
46. (1869) 11 Cox. C"C. 336" 
4 7 • Cmnd. 8932 of 1953, para. 151. 
48. For the text of which see supra Chapter Ill, fn. 117. 
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John Barry seems to have anticipated this possibility, and 
recognised tendencies of this sort in Australia, when he 
wrote that 
"In thi s field, often it is the jury tha t makes the 
lww tolerable, for as they are not required to give 
reasons, in most instances they may be relied on to 
avoid an over-harsh application of the lawo Though 
this may be unsatisfactory from the standpoint of 
legal theory, it is a compromise of a kind that is 
common in human affairs. The provisions found in the 
Codes, that whether any wrongful act or insult 
constitutes provocation, and whether it had tha t 
effect are questions of fact, are a recognition of 
the desirability of leaving the matter to the jury 
as the body expressing the sense and feeling of the 
community. 
Some judges have been inclined to interpret the 
Codes restrictively, and so far as possible to 
treat their prOVisions as doing no more than express-
ing neatly the effect of the decisions with which 
they are familiar. Such an inclination is the 
product of judicial conservatism and is to be 
deplored." 49 
The inclination is nevertheless an understandable one, and 
the decision to treat the ordinary man test as one requiring 
no evidence places the test in a rather unique posi tion q This 
may explain why it has so frequently been the subject of 
50 
comment. Surprise that it should be treated in this way is 
diminished by a consideration that the question of what a 
reasonable man might or might not do is essentially one of 
opinion, about which eVidence, in the stricter sense, cannot 
b .. 51 e gLven Ln any case. 
So far, there is no evidence that the judges in England 
--------------------------------------.----- , 
49. Barry; "The Defence of Provocation ll (1949) 4 Res Judicatae 
129, 141. 
50. See e.g. the commentary oiL Simpson [195 7J Crim. L.R. 815, 
Fantle [1959J Crim.L.R. 584, Wardroll§. [1960J Crim.L.R. 770. 
And see Smith and Hogan (1969;-2nd ed. p.210. 
51. Phipson o.n Evidence 11th ed. 1970 para. 1296. 
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have succumbed to the temptat ion. I R b· 52 n 0 ~nson, in w..1.ich 
the offender killed his victim in the course of a street 
brawl, an appeal brought on the grounds that the trial judge 
should have directed the jury on provocation was unsuccessful. 
The Reporter surmises that the trial judge must have 
decided that there was no evidence that the accus ed lost his 
self-control, but the Report of the case does not actually 
say tha t this wa s the ba sis of the ruling. More signif icantly, 
53 in Finley, the Court of Criminal Appeal qua shed a conviction 
of murder (and substituted a sentence of three year1s imprison-
ment) after the trial judge had ruled that there was no evidence 
that the acaused had been provoked. In fact, the accused had 
made contradictory statements in the witness-box, saying both 
that he was "really mad", and at the same time agreeing with 
Counsel for the Crown that he had killed in cold blood, and it 
was held that this evidence was sufficient to raise a jury 
question. 
Any doubts which may have lingered as to the correct 
interpretation of Section 3 on this point have now been dis-
pelled by the decision of the Privy Council in Phillips, 54 
in which identically worded legislation from Jamaica was being 
considered. Delivering the judgment of their Lordships, Lord 
Diplock said 
"In Holmes v. Director cf Public Prosecutions [1946J. A.C. 
588, the case which finally decided that even a sudden 
confession of adultery could not amount to provocation 
at commo.n law, it was laid down that although the 
[reasonable man testJ was also one for the jury it was 
32. [1965J Crim. L.Ro 491:---
53. [1965J Crim. L.Ro 105. 
54. [1969J 2 A.C. 130, 137. 
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nevertheless the f unction of the judge to make a 
preliminary ruling as to whether or not the 
provocation was such as could provoke a reasonable 
man to react to it in the way in which the 
defendant did. It was this decision, not that in 
Mancini v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1942J 
A.C. 1 which was reversed by English legislation of 
1957 and the Jamaican legislation of 1958." 
This has been the basis of the approach of the Criminal 
Division of the Court of Appeal in two subsequent cases. In 
-55 Cascoe, the appellant had fired seven times at his attacker, 
hitting him with all seven shots. A conviction of manslaughter 
was substituted for one of murder. The Court commented that 
evidence of provocation was "extremely tenuous", but held that 
the jury might have concluded that the acts of the victim 
"so frightened and angered the appellant that he lost 
all control of himself and took up the gun, and in a 
passion fireq it at:Mr. Francis. We are far from saying 
tha t .i t is probab Ie that the jury would have taken tha t 
view, All that we conclude is that there is evidence 
on which they could have taken that view. If they 
could have taken that view, then the question whether 
the provocation was enough to make a reasonable mn 
do as the appellant did had to be left to be determined 
by the jury." 
More recently in Brown,56 Talbot J. IS concluding reIMrks were 
that the Court could not 
"see how any reasonable jury could have found in the 
present case that the provocation proved might have 
induced a reasonable man to act as the accused did". 
This appears at first sight to be a reversion to pre-Homicide 
Act days, but it is submitted that the comments should be 
construed rather as a statement that, on the facts, no injustice 
had been done. Certainly, the Court did not say that, as a 
result, there was no evidence of provocation. 
55. [1970J 2 All E.R. 833, 836 per Salmon L.J. 
56. [1972J 2 All E.R. 1328, 1333. 
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2. The New Zealand Law 
As the English law ha s been moving in one direction, the 
New Zealand law has passed it going the other way. The 
Criminal Cose Act, 1893 was drafted and enacted at a time when 
sufficiency was considered to be most properly a jury question. 
This is evident in the mction of the Criminal Code Bill Comm-
" "R d I" "h . 57 Mo· . ~ss~on eport ea ~ng w~t provocat~on. re ~nterest~ng 
is the fact that this question should be singled out for comment 
in the section of the Report dealing with codification in 
general. It is pointed out that 
"Numerous instances occur in the draft code in which 
we have thus designedly and of necessity employed 
general language... In the provision relating to 
provoca tion, we speak of an 'insult of such a nature 
as to deprive an ordinary person of the power of 
self-control'; and many other expressions of the like 
kind occur in different parts of the draft code. All 
of them leave, and are intended to leave, a consider-
able latitude to the jury in applying the provisions 
of the draft code to particular states of fact. In 
other cases a considerable amount of discretion is given 
to the Court." 
To achieve this, it was provided in Section 165(3) of the 1893 
Act (re-enacted verbatim as Section 184(3) of the Crimes Act, 
1908) that the questions 
"Whether any particular wrongful act or insult amounts 
to provocation, and whether the person provoked was 
actually deprived of the power of self-control by the 
provocation he received, are questions of fact". 
This would seem to be similar to the Homicide Act, 1957, and in 
58 Jackson, Chapman J. made a point of telling the jury that, 
whereas in England the rule was that words and gestures could 
not constitute provocation, he could not lay down a similar 
57. 1878-9 [C.2345J 
58. [1918J NoZ.L.R. 363, 364. 
rule here because 
"by the Crimes Act the Legislature has confided to 
you the whole question of the sUfficiency of the 
provocation by wrongful act or insult." 
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In 1961, the legislation was amended by the insertion in 
Section 169 of subsection (3)59 and by the interpolation in 
subsection (4) of the words, "if there is evidence of provocat-
ion". Adams suggests that subsection (3) does not alter the law, 
and that it was always for the judge to decide whether there 
·d f" f· h ·d " f h' 60 was ev~ ence 1t or t e cons~ erat~on 0 t e Jury. With 
respect, if these comments are intended to apply to the 
question of suf fic iency as we 11 as the other elements of the 
defence, this opinion is not borne out by the repo.tted cases. 
It is true that in Malcolm,61 the Court of Appeal stated that, 
where the evidence disclosed murder or nothing, the trial judge 
is entitled to tell the jury that it cannot find a verdict of 
manslaughter. That case however concerned a killing in the 
course of aggravated robbery, and there was no suggestion either 
that the offender had lost his self-control or that the victim 
had done anything which might ca use him to do so. And in 
Stuck,62 although the Court does say that there was no evidence 
of provocation, and ,no need therefore to consider the adequacy 
of the direction on the point, the gravamen of the appellant's 
compla:ir:t: was that his conduct might have been interpreted by 
the jury as negligent, a submission which the Court of Appeal 
59. For the text of which see supra p.162. 
60. Adams; 2nd ed. p.346, para. 1273. 
61. [1951J N.Z.L.R. 470. 
62. [1949J N.Z.L.R. 108. 
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accepted, and quashed a conviction of murder because there 
had been no reference to the possibility of a verdict of 
manslaughter being brought in on this basis. 
It is submitted that neither of these cases can be 
interpreted as authority for the proposition that a trial 
judge may make a preliminary ruling on the question of 
sufficiency when the possibility of a provocation verdict 
arises. And. in ~,63 in which the trial judge clearly had 
misgivings about the sufficiency of what was done or said, 
the issue was nevertheless entrusted to the jury. 
now. 
Be that as it may, he would clearly be entitled to do so 
64 In Anderson, the Court of Appeal stated that 
"Now in England, there is no doubt at all that it is 
now enough that the provocation may have been 
sufficient momentarily to deprive a reasonable man 
of self-control. It is necessary for the Judge to 
ask himself, 'could the evidence support the view 
,that the provocation was sufficient to lead a 
reasonable person to do what the accused did? '" 
In support of this proposition the Court cites extensively from 
Lee Chun Chuen65 and Holmes v. D.P.p.66 Enough has already 
been said to indicate t~, with respect, this no longer 
represents English law, and did not do so in 1965 either. 
But applying that test, the Court ruled that there was no 
evidence of provocation and the appeal was dismissed. It is 
submitted, however, that the purpose of introducing Section 
169(3) was to introduce the pre-1957 Common law, and that, 
63. [1947J NoZ.L.R. 368. 
64. [1965J N.Z.L.R. 29, 36. 
65. [1963J R.C. 220. 
66. [1946J A.C. 588. 
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whatever the process which the Court used to arrive at its 
decision, the result is above criticism. It may be noted 
however, that when in ~~67 counsel complained that the trial 
judge did not direct the jury on the question of provocation when 
he should have done so, he faced the same difficulties as were 
. d b l' R b' 68 h' ° hO h exper1.ence y counse 1.n ....2.....1:ll.§.Qf!; t ere 1.S no way 1.n w 1.C 
he can argue that the judge erred in law when he exercised the 
power conferred by Section 169(3). The best that can be hoped 
for is tha t the Court of Appeal will disagree, with the opinion 
held by the trial judge 
n) ConclusiQl! 
It is submitted that the present New ZGSland law is un-
fortunate in several respects, and that, by comparison, the 
Homicide Act, 1957 has created a tolerable and workable compro-
mise. It retains the objective test without pressing it to 
what is, admittedly, a logical conclusion. Nor is the present 
New Zealand approach calculated to achieve the degree of 
consistency which the Courts evidently desire. The cefect in 
the present law is that it fails or refuses to recognise that thE 
ordinary man test is a question of opinion. To some extent, 
it is true, the personal element is removed from the judge's 
decision by the test which he is required to apply; it is not 
his opinion as to the issue which counts, but whether in his 
view twelve reasonable men might form the opinion or have 
doubts about whether an ordinary man would have lost his self-
control. But any illusions about consistency which this may 
create must be at least shaken by the English experience at the 
b " f thO t And 1.°f th 1 f P k 69 ° eg1.nn1.ng 0 1.S cen ury. e examp e 0 ~~ 1.s 
67. (1971) unreported C.A. 96/7l. 
68. (1922) 16 Cr.App.R. 140. See supra fn. 38. " 
89. (1963) III C.L.R. 610. 
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anything by which to judge, it would seem that the judicial 
a bili ty to predict the reaction of a jury does not increa se 
with experience. Applying precisely the test just outlined 
in the High Court of Australia, Dixon C.J. and Windeyer J. 
concluded that there was evidence of provocation and Taylor, 
Menzies and Owen J.J. decided that there was not. 
In any case, it is submitted, past experience shows that 
consistency, admirable though it may be as an end in itself, 
tends to lead to rigidity. In refusing to permit words alone 
to amount to provocation the Courts were in one sense consistent. 
But as a measure of the provocative effect of conduct, such all 
or nothing rules had little to commend them. In defining 
provocation as "anything done or said", the Crimes Act, 1961 
has to an extent obviated this difficulty. But one consequence 
of this is that a trial judge now has no guides (other than his 
own opinion) upon which to decide whether there is evidence of 
provocation. Is it not arguable that, potentially, the law is 
even more capricious than it was before 1961? 
There is no evidence in the reported English cases since 
1957 of the "inconveniences of juries" .. 70 Cascoe, in which the 
Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal quashed a conviction 
of murder and refused to interfere with the sentence imposed, 
serves as a reminder of the consequences of a finding of 
manslaughter rather than murder; it simply gives a trial judge a 
discretion as to sentence. It is therefore submitted that the 
present law should be changed, and that the SUfficiency of a 
provocative incident should be treated as a matter for the 
opinion of the jury. 
70. [1970J 2 All E.R. 833. 
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